Cambodia’s Family Trees
Illegal logging and the stripping of public assets
by Cambodia’s elite

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Abbreviations

**CDC**  
Council for the Development of Cambodia

**CG**  
Consultative Group

**CPP**  
Cambodian People's Party

**DFW**  
Department of Forestry and Wildlife  
(renamed Forest Administration in 2003)

**ELC**  
economic land concession

**ESIA**  
environmental and social impact assessment

**FA**  
Forest Administration

**FAO**  
Food and Agriculture Organisation

**FLEG**  
Forest Law Enforcement and Governance process

**ha**  
hectare

**IFM**  
independent forest monitoring

**IFSR**  
Independent Forest Sector Review

**km**  
kilometre

**m³**  
cubic metre

**MAFF**  
Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries

**MRII**  
Military Region II

**MRIII**  
Military Region III

**MRIV**  
Military Region IV

**NGO**  
non-governmental organisation

**RCAF**  
Royal Cambodian Armed Forces

**RGC**  
Royal Government of Cambodia

**SEZ**  
special economic zone

**SFMP**  
sustainable forest management plan

**SGS**  
Société générale de surveillance

**UN**  
United Nations

**UNOHCHR**  
United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights

**UNTAC**  
United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia

**WGNRM**  
Working Group on Natural Resource Management
**RECOMMENDATIONS**

**CAMBODIA’S JUDICIAL AUTHORITIES SHOULD:**

1. Hold accountable those responsible for illegal logging and associated crimes
   - Investigate and prosecute all those responsible for the cases of illegal logging, corruption, smuggling, attempted murder and kidnapping detailed in this report.
   - Prioritise investigation of the following people: Minister for Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF) Chan Sarun, Director General of the Forest Administration (FA) Ty Sokhun, Hun Sen Bodyguard Unit commander Lieutenant General Hing Bun Heang, Brigade 70 Brigadier General Hak Mao, logging syndicate leaders Dy Chouch, Seng Keang, Khun Thong and Seng Kok Heang.

**THE ROYAL GOVERNMENT OF CAMBODIA SHOULD:**

1. Hold accountable those responsible for illegal logging and associated crimes
   - Support the efforts of the judicial authorities to investigate and prosecute those responsible for the illegal activities detailed in this report.
   - Dismiss any government ministers, officials and military officers responsible for these illegal activities.

2. Protect the Prey Long Forest
   - Take Prey Long, mainland Southeast Asia’s largest lowland evergreen forest, out of production. Develop an alternative management regime for Prey Long, based on consultation with local populations, which prioritises conservation and safeguards the usage rights of people living in and around the forest.

3. Reform forest management
   - Reinstate independent forest monitoring (IFM) based on a robust institutional framework and terms of reference, following a period of public consultation. Appoint a qualified organisation on the basis of an open tendering process conducted in line with international best practice.
   - Terminate all economic land concessions (ELCs) and mining concessions that are situated in forest or are otherwise contrary to existing law.
   - Develop a new forest management regime based on the recommendations of the IFSR. This should centre on expanded community forestry, partnership forestry and landscape-based conservation programmes.
   - Recognise the prior claims of indigenous minorities, as required by the Land Law, in determining the status and usage of forested areas.
   - Ensure that any future logging and tree plantation ventures meet Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) or equivalent standards and follow consultation with affected communities.
   - Complete and pass the new Protected Areas Law and all outstanding sub-decrees and prakas (ministerial declarations) required under the 2002 Forestry Law. Ensure that drafts are made publicly available prior to passage, allowing sufficient time for public comment.
   - Impose a moratorium on the construction of roads through forested areas, in line with the recommendations of the 2004 IFSR.

4. Take immediate steps to increase transparency in the management of public assets
   - Ensure full and continued disclosure of information concerning the management of public assets such as forests, land, oil and gas, mineral deposits, fisheries, heritage sites and state-owned buildings.
   - Ensure that this information includes the following: investment agreements, contractual conditions and compliance status (completion of satisfactory environmental and social impact assessments (ESIAs), payment of royalties etc); exploration, exploitation, transportation and export permits awarded; names and details of the beneficial owners of the companies concerned.

5. Strengthen the legal framework governing the management of public assets
   - Include in the draft Anti-Corruption Law the following provisions:
     - A guarantee that all Cambodian citizens have rights of access listed above.
     - Prohibition on individuals or companies that have a record of illegal activities managing public assets of any kind.

---

1 Partnership forestry is a new model proposed by the 2004 Independent Forest Sector Review. It would give a greater say in forest management decision-making to elected commune councils, with the Forest Administration playing a regulatory role.
– Requirement that all contracts between the government and companies concerning the management, exploration or exploitation of natural resources and other public assets proceed from an open tendering process conducted in line with international best practice.
– Requirement that all private sector operators holding concessions on public assets annually disclose the payments they make to the government in the form of taxes, royalties, signature bonuses etc.
– Requirement that the government annually discloses details of all taxes, royalties, signature bonuses etc. received from concessions on public assets.
– Requirement that the government maintains a regularly updated and publicly accessible register of senior officials' business interests and personal assets, as well as those of their family members.

**CAMBODIA’S INTERNATIONAL DONORS SHOULD:**

1. **Use their influence proactively to ensure that aid benefits ordinary Cambodians**
   - Donors should link disbursement of non-humanitarian aid to demonstrable progress in implementing the measures outlined above, in accordance with set time-lines.

2. **Withhold support from state institutions engaged in serious criminal activities**
   - In particular, donors should not provide funding or other forms of support to RCAF until such time as it ceases its involvement in large-scale organised crime.

3. **Support Cambodian civil society’s efforts to increase government accountability**
   - Provide more support to Cambodian organisations working to build government accountability with respect to the management of public assets. Specifically, build the capacity of local civil society to document, monitor and scrutinise the management of natural resources and other public assets and ensure transparent public sector spending.

4. **Help to protect Cambodia’s forests as part of international efforts to combat climate change**
   - Act on the conclusion of the recent UK government-commissioned Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change, that international efforts to combat climate change must prioritise the preservation of existing natural forests.12
   - With respect to Cambodia, dedicate funds and expertise to developing new incentives and institutional frameworks for preserving key areas such as Prey Long Forest.
SUMMARY

This report makes the case for greater efforts by the Cambodian government and the international community to strengthen the governance of forests and other public assets on which Cambodia’s people depend. It is based on in-depth investigations into illegal logging and associated criminality carried out by Global Witness between the end of 2004 and the beginning of 2007.

The report’s main findings are as follows:

1. A kleptocratic elite is stripping Cambodia’s forests
   • Cambodia is run by a kleptocratic elite that generates much of its wealth via the seizure of public assets, particularly natural resources. The forest sector provides a particularly vivid illustration of this asset-stripping process at work.
   • Illegal logging is causing severe damage to Cambodia’s remaining forests. The last global forest cover survey by the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) found that Cambodia had lost 29% of its primary tropical forest over a five year period.
   • Cambodia’s army, military police, police and Forest Administration (FA) are all heavily involved in illegal logging.
   • In many cases illegal logging is taking place under the guise of legally dubious plantation developments and harvesting permits. Many of these plantations and permits are being allocated to a small group of individuals who have close relations with senior politicians.
   • A particular concern is the damage illegal loggers are causing to Prey Long, which is the largest lowland evergreen forest in mainland Southeast Asia. The Cambodian government is currently developing plans to clear tens of thousands of hectares of Prey Long to make way for plantations.

2. Cambodia’s most powerful logging syndicate is led by relatives of Prime Minister Hun Sen and other senior officials
   • The most powerful logging syndicate in Cambodia is led by Dy Chouch, also known as Hun Chouch, his ex-wife Seng Keang and Khun Thong, their business partner. This group operates under the name Seng Keang Company.
   • Dy Chouch is the first cousin of Prime Minister Hun Sen.
   • Seng Keang is a friend of Bun Rany, the wife of Hun Sen.
   • Khun Thong is the brother-in-law of Minister for Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF) Chan Sarun and father-in-law of Director General of the Forest Administration Ty Sokhun.
   • Seng Keang’s brother, Seng Kok Heang, who supervises operations for Seng Keang Company, is an officer in the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces (RCAF) Brigade 70 elite military unit.

3. Activities in which members of this logging syndicate are implicated include the following:
   • The apparent abduction and detention of Lia Chun Hua, the managing director of the Kingwood Industry logging company.
   • Large-scale illegal logging in the Prey Long Forest carried out under the guise of the Tumring Rubber Plantation development.
   • Felling of thousands of resin-producing trees tapped by local people who depended on them as a source of income. Resin trees are protected under Cambodian law.
   • A reported attempt by Seng Kok Heang to kill two community forest activists in Tumring who protested against the Seng Keang Company’s felling of resin trees.
   • Use of fraudulent transportation permits describing logs as lesser-value firewood. This may have cost the Cambodian treasury over a million dollars in lost tax revenues.
   • The export to China of millions of dollars-worth of plywood on which no taxes appear to have been paid.
   • Establishment in Tumring of a factory for sawing wood and making veneer. Cambodia’s Forest Law prohibits construction of wood-processing facilities in forest areas.
   • This factory’s processing of over 100,000 cubic metres ($^3$) of logs a year into timber products worth more than US$13 million annually. Most of the logs used were cut illegally in Prey Long.
   • The above activities are covered by existing Cambodian law and are punishable by prison sentences and fines. Dy Chouch, Seng Keang, Khun Thong and Seng Kok Heang have not been prosecuted, however.

References for the points covered in this section can be found in the main body of the report.
Cambodia’s Family Trees
4. Senior officials are complicit in these activities
   • Prime Minister Hun Sen personally inaugurated the Tumring Rubber Plantation that provided the basis for massive illegal logging of Prey Long by the Seng Keang Company.
   • Establishment of this plantation followed a survey of the Tumring site by MAFF, which is run by Chan Sarun. His brother-in-law, Khun Thong, is a leading figure in the Seng Keang Company. This MAFF survey misleadingly categorised the area as land containing only small amounts of valuable forest.
   • Despite claiming a lack of valuable timber in the area, Chan Sarun awarded exclusive rights to Seng Keang Company to collect and process all wood cut in Tumring Rubber Plantation.
   • Chan Sarun subsequently gave the company the permit to establish its wood-processing factory in Tumring, despite the fact that this was illegal.
   • The FA, which is run by Khun Thong’s son-in-law Ty Sokhun, has played a key role in facilitating Seng Keang Company’s illegal logging and other criminal activities.

5. Evidence suggests that some of these senior officials are directly responsible for corruption within the institutions that they head
   • There is substantial evidence that Chan Sarun and Ty Sokhun have illegally sold 500 or more jobs in the Forest Administration.
   • Officials have calculated that selling jobs netted Chan Sarun more than US$2.5 million in bribes.
   • The desire to recoup the costs of purchasing these positions appears to account for the increasingly corrupt behaviour of many FA officials.
   • Corruption and collusion in forest crime are both covered by existing Cambodian law and punishable by prison sentences and fines. No senior official has yet been either charged or disciplined in connection with the sale of jobs or the illegal logging in Prey Long, however.

6. Hun Sen’s private army is financed through illegal logging and smuggling
   • In transporting illegally-logged timber out of Prey Long, the Seng Keang Company has worked closely with Royal Cambodian Armed Forces Brigade 70. Brigade 70 acts as a reserve force for Hun Sen’s 4,000 strong Bodyguard Unit. The two units comprise what is essentially a private army controlled by the prime minister.
   • Aside from its activities in Prey Long, Brigade 70 acts as a nationwide timber trafficking service. It transports illegally-logged timber all over Cambodia and exports significant quantities to Vietnam.
   • The officer organising these operations is Brigadier General Hak Mao. His main protectors and patrons include Hun Sen Bodyguard Unit commander Lieutenant General Hing Bun Heang and national head of the military police General Sao Sokha.
   • Brigade 70’s clients are a ‘who’s who’ of major timber barons in Cambodia, including the infamous Pheapimex company run by Hun Sen crony Yeay Phu, as well as government officials and generals.
   • In the second half of 2006, Brigade 70 was transporting an average of 1,260 m³ illegally-logged timber per week. Through these timber trafficking operations, Hak Mao makes approximately US$1.2 million per year.
   • Brigade 70 operates a parallel service transporting smuggled goods through ports on Cambodia’s south coast, notably Oknha Mong Port, which belongs to Mong Reththy, a tycoon who is also a senator for Hun Sen’s Cambodian People’s Party (CPP).
   • The Brigade 70 illegal timber and contraband trafficking operations combined are worth between US$2 million and US$2.75 million annually.
   • The profits are used to pay for the operations of Brigade 70 itself. In addition, a large cut is handed over to Hun Sen Bodyguard Unit commander Lieutenant General Hing Bun Heang.
   • These activities are covered by existing Cambodian law and are punishable by prison sentences and fines. To date none of those responsible have been prosecuted.
   • Despite the evidence of entrenched criminality within the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces international donors such as China and the USA are now providing direct military assistance to Cambodia.

7. Cambodia’s international donors are not using their influence effectively
   • International donors annually provide approximately US$600 million per year in aid to Cambodia. This is equivalent to half the national budget.
   • Donors have not used the leverage that this aid gives them effectively. Specifically, they have refused to acknowledge the fact that the government is thoroughly corrupt and does not act in the best interests of the population.
   • As a result, billions of dollars-worth of aid funded by western taxpayers have done relatively little to improve the lives of ordinary Cambodians.
   • Moreover, donor support has failed to produce reforms that would make the government more accountable to its citizens. Instead, the government is successfully exploiting international aid as a source of political legitimacy.
Table 1: Issues that Cambodia’s Judicial Authorities Must Now Investigate

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Individuals</th>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Relevant Laws &amp; Penalties for Violations</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dy Chouch Seng Keang Khun Thong</td>
<td>Apparent detention of Lia Chun Hua and forced takeover of Kingwood Industry Company</td>
<td>Law on the Aggravating Circumstances of Crimes Article 7: Detention and illegal confinement penalty: 5-10 years in prison Article 6: Robbery penalty: 5-10 years in prison</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seng Kok Heang</td>
<td>Reported attempt to kill two community forestry activists</td>
<td>Law on the Aggravating Circumstances of Crimes Article 3: Murder penalty: 15-20 years in prison</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dy Chouch Seng Keang Khun Thong Seng Kok Heang</td>
<td>Industrial-scale logging outside the boundaries of the Tumring Rubber Plantation and cutting of thousands of resin trees belonging to local people</td>
<td>Forest Law Article 98: Misuse of a permit to harvest forest products; harvesting forest products without a permit; felling rare tree species and trees that local people tap for resin penalty: 1-5 years in prison and fines of 10-100 million riel (US$2,500-US$25,000) Land Law Article 259: Infringement against public property penalty: 1-5 years in prison and/or a fine of 5-50 million riel (US$1,250-US$12,500) Law on the Aggravating Circumstances of Crimes Article 6: Robbery penalty: 5-10 years in prison UNTAC Penal Code Article 52: Wrongful damage to property penalty: 1-3 years in prison</td>
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<td>Transporting millions of dollars-worth of logs cut during these operations</td>
<td>Forest Law Article 96: Transporting forest products obtained via illegal harvesting penalty: Fine 2-3 times the value of the forest products</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>Use of ‘firewood’ collection permits to facilitate log transportation</td>
<td>Land Law Article 127 &amp; Article 135: Tax evasion penalty: 1-5 years in prison and/or a fine of 10-20 million riel (US$2,500-US$5,000) Forest Law Article 96: Transporting forest products contrary to those described in a transport permit penalty: Fine 2-3 times the value of the forest products</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>Processing these logs</td>
<td>Forest Law Article 96: Processing forest products obtained via illegal harvesting penalty: Fine 2-3 times the value of the forest products</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Transporting the finished products</td>
<td>Forest Law Article 96: Transporting forest products obtained via illegal harvesting penalty: Fine 2-3 times the value of the forest products</td>
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<td>Selling these items</td>
<td>Forest Law Article 96: Trading forest products obtained via illegal harvesting penalty: Fine 2-3 times the value of the forest products</td>
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<td>Payments to officials to protect or turn a blind eye to the above activities</td>
<td>UNTAC Penal Code Article 54: Intentional corruption penalty: 1-3 years in prison</td>
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<td>Establishing an informal association dedicated to undertaking the above activities</td>
<td>UNTAC Penal Code Article 36: Organised crime penalty: 3-15 years in prison</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chan Sarun</td>
<td>Issuing a permit that provided a cover for industrial-scale logging outside the boundaries of the Tumring Rubber Plantation and cutting of villagers’ resin trees</td>
<td>Forest Law Article 100: Officials directly or indirectly allowing activities contrary to the Forest Law penalty: 1-5 years in prison and fines of 10-100 million riel (US$2,500-US$25,000) UNTAC Penal Code Article 69: Complicity penalty: the same punishment applicable to the principal offender</td>
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<td>Authorising construction of a veneer factory and sawmill by Seng Keang Company within Prey Long forest</td>
<td>Forest Law Article 30: Prohibition on constructing sawmills within 5 kilometres of the Permanent Forest Reserve Article 100: Officials directly or indirectly allowing activities contrary to the Forest Law penalty: 1-5 years in prison and fines of 10-100 million riel (US$2,500-US$25,000)</td>
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<td>Chan Sarun Ty Sokhun</td>
<td>Selling hundreds of jobs in the Forest Administration</td>
<td>UNTAC Penal Code Article 38: Extortion penalty: 3-7 years in prison and a fine of double the sum of money extorted; prohibition on standing for election or holding public office for 2 years after sentence served</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hing Bun Heang Dy Phen</td>
<td>Demanding and receiving payments from subordinates</td>
<td>UNTAC Penal Code Article 38: Extortion penalty: 3-7 years in prison and a fine of double the sum of money extorted; prohibition on standing for election or holding public office for 2 years after sentence served</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hak Mao</td>
<td>Transporting millions of dollars-worth of logs and timber products sourced from areas where there are no legal harvesting operations</td>
<td>Forest Law Article 96: Transporting forest products obtained via illegal harvesting penalty: Fine 2-3 times the value of the forest products</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Managing and protecting the transportation of goods on which the requisite import duties have not been paid</td>
<td>Land Law Article 127 &amp; Article 135: Tax evasion penalty: 1-5 years in prison and/or a fine of 10-20 million riel (US$2,500-US$5,000) Article 128 &amp; 136: Obstruction of implementation of tax penalty: 1 month to 1 year in prison and/or a fine of 5-10 million riel (US$1,250-US$2,500)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Collecting, storing and delivering these items</td>
<td>UNTAC Penal Code Article 51: Receiving and concealing stolen goods penalty: 1-5 years in prison</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

References for the points covered in this table can be found in the main body of the report.
CHAPTER I: FORESTS AND CAMBODIA’S SHADOW STATE

“One does not need expertise in human rights to recognise that many policies of the government have subverted the essential principles of democracy and due process, deprived people of their economic resources and means of livelihood, and denied them their dignity. I have come to believe that these policies are integral to the political and economic systems through which the government rules, which has manipulated democratic processes, undermined legitimate political opposition, and used the state for the accumulation of private wealth. In short I believe that the deliberate rejection of the concept of a state governed by the rule of law has been central to the ruling party’s hold on power.”

Yash Ghai, Special Representative of the United Nations (UN) Secretary General on Human Rights in Cambodia, statement to the UN Human Rights Council, 26 September 2006

In 1991 the international community undertook to bring democracy and development to post-conflict Cambodia. More than fifteen years later, what a UN Special Representative has described as Cambodia’s “shaky façade of democracy” overlays a shadow state built on patronage, corruption and coercion. Cambodian’s shadow state misappropriates public assets, extorts from businesses and manages an extensive illicit economy. It is administered by senior ministers who are fluent in the jargon of good governance and sustainable development.

Prime Minister Hun Sen and his inner circle have successfully pursued this two-faced approach to government since the late 1980s. After maintaining a veneer of socialism to placate Vietnamese mentors, they now project a semblance of liberal democracy tailored to western donors. Along the way they have progressively tightened their grip on power by both political and economic means.

1. Asset-stripping Cambodia

Cambodia’s shadow state generates much of its illicit wealth via the expropriation of public assets, particularly natural resources, as well as through institutionalised corruption. With particular reference to the forest sector, this report looks at three of the main ways in which this works:

The allocation of public assets to cronies and relatives of the Cambodian leadership

This involves the allocation of concessions on forests, land, mineral deposits, fisheries and heritage sites, together with ‘land swap’ deals on state-owned buildings. Many of these transactions are unlawful. The beneficiaries are a relatively small group of tycoons with political, business or familial ties to senior officials. The effect is to place valuable public assets under the private control of individuals who are themselves part of the shadow state structure.

In an illustration of this overlap between politics and business, six of the most prominent tycoons have recently been appointed senators for Hun Sen’s political party, the CPP. The six are Kok An, Kong Triv, Ly Yong Phat, Lao Meng Khin (who along with his wife Yeay Phu runs the Pheapimex company), Men Sarun and Mong Reththy. Figure 1 summarises their main interests.

Information about deals involving public assets is not made available to the Cambodian people to whom they collectively belong. For ordinary citizens whose livelihoods depend on the resources being signed away, the first they hear of new concessions is often the sound of chainsaws cutting down their forests or bulldozers flattening their crops.

The immediate human impact of this asset-stripping is to deny Cambodians access to natural resources and in some cases to evict them from their homes. More broadly, it deprives the entire population of the revenue that could be derived from sustainable management of these public goods. The corruption that facilitates asset-stripping concessions undermines the rule of law, while elite families’ accumulation of wealth gives them increased power and impunity. The end result is that already poor Cambodians get poorer and find it more difficult to hold the country’s rulers to account.

Lao Meng Khin and Choeung Sophap (also known as Yeay Phu) together run Pheapimex, arguably Cambodia’s most powerful company. Through its logging and economic land concessions, Pheapimex controls 7.4% of Cambodia’s total land area.

‘Shadow State’ is a term coined by academic William Reno to describe the style of government adopted by certain African heads of state. Characteristics features of these ‘shadow states’ include the use of informal networks to accumulate personal wealth and exercise power, deliberate undermining of formal institutions of government and a highly personalised style of rule that makes no reference to the law. (William Reno, ‘Clandestine Economies, Violence and States in Africa’, Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 53, 2000.)
Figure 1: Cambodia’s Tycoon-Senators

References for the data displayed in this figure are set out in Appendix 1.
Corruption within government institutions that enriches senior officials
Corruption in Cambodia is sometimes portrayed solely as a survival mechanism by badly-paid civil servants. In those institutions with the greatest scope for rent-seeking, however, staff generally pay for their jobs, make regular payments to keep them and expect to recoup these expenses through corruption. Money generated through corrupt practices flows upwards through a pyramidal structure, with the largest share accumulating in the pockets of those at the top of the hierarchy. The burden of everyday corruption in Cambodia falls proportionately most heavily on those without the power and connections to resist.

Military management of the illicit economy
The Royal Cambodian Armed Forces (RCAF) have little strategic purpose and questionable operational capacity. They are heavily involved in high-level deals involving public assets, notably via an undisclosed portfolio of ‘military development zones’ covering 700,000 hectares (ha) or almost four percent of Cambodia’s land area. RCAF’s senior officers are major players in illegal business activities such as logging and trafficking drugs. They also generate large sums of money through extortion.

2. Cambodia’s Forest Sector
Cambodia’s forest sector provides a particularly vivid illustration of how the country’s elite has looted a public asset.

In the last years of Cambodia’s civil war, which ended in 1998, both the Khmer Rouge and the Phnom Penh government used logging to fund military campaigns and then used military campaigns as a pretext for more logging. Cambodia’s leaders have since found it hard to kick the habit of treating the country’s forests as a slush fund for political campaigns, personal enrichment and rewarding key clients.

In the mid-1990s, senior government ministers secretly awarded between 30 and 40 logging concessions to Cambodian and foreign-owned companies. The contracts signed away over seven million hectares of forest, i.e. 39% of Cambodia’s land area, on terms that greatly favoured the interests of the concessionaires over those of Cambodia. All the concessionaires proceeded to break the law or the terms of their contracts or both. By the end of the decade, they were responsible for most of the illegal logging in Cambodia.

Reform
Global Witness first began exposing illegal logging in Cambodia and its links with conflict, corruption and human rights abuses in 1995. International pressure on the government to curb forest destruction mounted and at the end of 1998 Hun Sen declared that he would tackle forest crime and institute reforms. The prime minister’s apparent epiphany coincided with a decline in the capacity of his rivals to compete for logging revenues. This related to the CPP’s coup against its FUNCINPEC coalition partners in July 1997, its victory in national elections the following year and the final disintegration of the Khmer Rouge.

The government duly suppressed the activities of less well-connected illegal loggers, passed new laws and in 1999 agreed to appoint Global Witness as independent monitor of its efforts to combat forest
crime. In September 2001 Cambodia signed up to the East Asia Forest Law Enforcement and Governance (FLEG) initiative under which the government committed to “take immediate action to intensify national efforts, and to strengthen bilateral, regional and multilateral collaboration to address violations of forest law and forest crime, in particular illegal logging, associated illegal trade and corruption; and their negative effects on the rule of law”.  

For their part, the logging concessionaires failed to abide by the terms of a restructuring process that required them to produce sustainable forest management plans (SFMPs) and environmental and social impact assessments (ESIAs). Some carried on logging illegally. Under pressure to act, the government finally suspended the concessionaires’ operations from January 2002. 

In 2003 international donors and the Cambodian government commissioned a team of international consultants to carry out an Independent Forest Sector Review (IFSR) and draw up a ‘road map’ for forest sector reform. In 2004 these consultants recommended that the government terminate the logging concession system and devolve forest management responsibilities to elected commune councils, with the Forest Administration (FA) playing a regulatory role. The rationale for this ‘partnership forestry’ model was the empowerment of populations living in and around the forest and greater institutional checks and balances aimed at reducing corruption. However, the government has demonstrated limited enthusiasm for the Independent Forest Sector Review’s proposals and the international donor community has not backed them strongly enough.

The shadow state strikes back

However, even as senior ministers publicly committed to reform processes, Cambodia’s shadow state continued to generate money from the timber sector. The same officials charged with implementing reforms actively subverted them, with the result that illegal logging has continued in a variety of forms:

Permits

In the aftermath of the crackdowns and the suspension of logging concession operations, the issuing of permits and licences which were themselves illegal, or designed to provide a cover for illegal activities, increased and diversified. These included permits to collect ‘old logs’ – a practice banned by Hun Sen in 1999 because of its widespread use as a cover for illegal logging operations. Innovative variations on the ‘old log’ collection theme also emerged, notably licences to collect tree stumps, branches and poles, authorisations to cut timber for racing boats and permits to build wooden towers for the parachute regiment to jump off.
Plantations
The opportunistic issuing of permits has accompanied more ambitious schemes to facilitate logging. The most lucrative of these is cutting in the name of plantation development, courtesy of government-led development projects or economic land concessions (ELCs). Through these schemes, officials have allocated to pro-CPP tycoons land which contains valuable forest. The forest is then cut down, nominally to make way for plantations, and the timber is extracted and sold. Allocating ELCs on land that is forested contravenes Cambodia’s 2001 Land Law, which classifies forests as state public property and only allows ELCs on state private property. Many ELCs exceed the law’s 10,000 ha limit for this type of concession. Most, if not all, the ELC holders have failed to meet legal requirements to conduct environmental impact assessments.

The clear-cutting operations that characterise ‘plantation development’ result in the complete eradication of the forest. The damage is terminal. Chapter II describes a case of plantation development being used as a pretext for renewed industrial-scale logging in Prey Long, the largest lowland evergreen forest in mainland Southeast Asia.

Military logging
While permits and plantation developments provide logging with a bureaucratic gloss, the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces have kept up an assault on the country’s forests that does not even pretend to be legitimate. Many RCAF units are stationed in or around forests and carry out illegal logging operations geared towards enriching their commanders.

In November 2004, in the midst of a ‘War on Corruption’ announced by Hun Sen, Global Witness published Taking a Cut, an in-depth exposé of military logging and extortion in Mount Aural Wildlife Sanctuary that named some of the senior RCAF officers profiting. A government spokesman criticised Global Witness for making the information public without giving it to the government first, but did not rebut the specific allegations made. The authorities took no serious action to halt forest crime in Aural and, as Chapter IV shows, the military remains heavily involved in illegal logging of protected areas and production forest across the country.

Annual bidding coupes
Since the suspension of logging concessions, the Forest Administration has been developing so-called annual bidding coupes as an alternative. The concession system gives companies control over large forests but typically subdivides these into 25 units, of which the concessionaire may harvest one per year. By contrast, annual bidding coupes are smaller parcels of forest that companies log for just 12 months. In theory the FA could now split a concession-sized forest into 25 annual bidding coupes and allocate them all for logging simultaneously, thus greatly increasing the rate of destruction.

There is little transparency in FA decision-making and the fact that annual bidding coupe boundaries will be redrawn each year could make an already bad situation much worse. Members of the public will find it harder to track which companies have harvesting permits at any one time and therefore harder to hold them to account. Standards of management planning, environmental and social impact assessments, public consultation and law enforcement, already abysmal under the concession regime, are likely to deteriorate.

The new system will also involve the construction of road networks through forested areas in order for logging companies to access their annual bidding coupes. Road building in Cambodia, as elsewhere in Southeast Asia, has provided a cover for uncontrolled cutting and has opened up previously inaccessible forests to poaching, land encroachment and secondary illegal logging operations. In recognition of these threats, the 2004 Independent Forest Sector Review recommended a moratorium on the construction of roads in forest areas.

As Box 1 shows, the first annual bidding coupe permit to be given out since the suspension of the logging concessions has provided the basis for an illegal logging operation.
The first annual bidding coupe to have become operational in Cambodia is officially described as a “special coupe to supply timber to the new National Assembly Construction Committee”. The chairman of this committee, CPP parliamentarian Cheam Yeap, wrote to the Minister for Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, Chan Sarun, in May 2004 to inform him that the new National Assembly building would require luxury timber for furniture and grade I and II wood for other unspecified purposes. Luxury grade timber comes from rare tree species that are protected by law. In March 2005 Chan Sarun directed the Forest Administration to establish a coupe on the cancelled Hero Taiwan logging concession in Ratanakiri Province. This decision contravenes the Sub-decree on Forest Concession Management, which states that forest in cancelled logging concessions cannot be reallocated to another company.

Chan Sarun’s instructions to the FA called for the harvesting of 10,577 m³ of logs in order to generate 6,509 m³ of sawn wood. The inventory that the FA subsequently drew up went much further, however, and proposed felling 16,747 m³ of logs. These plans suggested that Cambodia’s new National Assembly building might be among the most comprehensively furnished in the world. Global Witness does not have the specifications for the proposed items of furniture. However, it is worth considering that processing 16,747 m³ of logs into rather thick 25 mm wood panel at the conversion rate specified by Chan Sarun would generate 41 ha of panelling or enough to cover 1,580 tennis courts.

In 2005 the government awarded a permit to cut timber in the coupe to a company named Heng Brothers. To the best of Global Witness’ knowledge, this permit allocation did not follow any kind of open bidding process. Heng Brothers was previously involved in illegally logging Botum Sakor National Park in Koh Kong Province in 2004, in cahoots with an offshoot of controversial Indonesian firm Asia Pulp and Paper. For the special coupe Heng Brothers teamed up with Ly Chhuong Construction Company which is building the new National Assembly and is reportedly owned by the son-in-law of Cheam Yeap.

Heng Brothers commenced operations in April 2005 and was still logging the coupe midway through the following year. In September 2006 Global Witness received reports from a source close to the company that timber cut in the special coupe was not going to the National Assembly as required but was instead being transported across the border for sale in Vietnam. This account is corroborated by separate investigations in Ratanakiri by NGO workers.

In August 2006 Cheam Yeap announced that the coupe had so far yielded only 257 m³ timber for the National Assembly construction. Global Witness wrote to him in February 2007 to ask for an update on this figure, but has not yet received a reply.
Suppression of critical voices

Since the formation of a new CPP-led government in June 2004 there have been a number of violent attacks on villagers, junior officials and NGO workers involved in combating forest crime. These include at least three murders and two attempted murders.

At the same time, the authorities have also tried to suppress reports of illegal logging and associated corruption. A development strategy prepared by officials for the donor-government Consultative Group (CG) meeting of December 2004 declared that “The Royal Government welcomes the work in Cambodia of Global Witness, other NGOs and civil society organisations concerned with forest law enforcement”.42 In February 2005, however, customs officials confiscated 2,000 copies of Global Witness’ Taking a Cut report at Phnom Penh International Airport and the following month the Council of Ministers announced it was investigating Global Witness’ activities in Cambodia. In July, soldiers and police delivered threats to several of the organisation’s Cambodian staff and the government banned five international employees from entering the country. These developments coincided with Global Witness investigating illegal logging by relatives of Hun Sen and the elite Brigade 70 military unit.

In view of the deteriorating security situation, Global Witness closed its Phnom Penh office in September 2005. That same month, Hun Sen declared that the organisation was “finished”.43 In 2006 Global Witness’ London-based staff completed the investigations begun by the Phnom Penh office the previous year. The findings form the basis of this report.
Box 2: Measuring Forest Cover and Deforestation in Cambodia

Estimating Cambodia’s forest cover and deforestation is a contentious issue. Successive surveys of Cambodia’s forest cover have rarely, if ever, used the same methodology twice, thereby restricting the scope for cross-comparison and accurate measurement of forest loss. Moreover, recent forest cover surveys have relied on satellite image interpretation, with little or no ground-level verification. These recent surveys offer only limited insights into forest quality, in terms of either biodiversity or standing timber volume.44

Cambodia’s last national forest cover survey was conducted in 2003 by the Forest Administration and funded by a loan from the World Bank. The survey’s main finding – that forest cover had increased – ran counter to evidence gathered by NGOs and others over several years that illegal logging was causing a decline in forest cover and forest quality in Cambodia. Global Witness interviewed a consultant who worked on the 2003 study and asked him to explain how the survey came to mark as fully forested areas that the previous (1997) survey had marked as forest-free. In response, the consultant said that this reflected the inability of the 2003 forest cover survey to distinguish adequately between forest and bamboo.45

Despite widespread doubts about the reliability of the 2003 forest cover survey, officials seized on its findings as evidence of their wise stewardship of the forest estate. Speaking on the eve of a national election, Prime Minister Hun Sen said that:

“It is a significant achievement that Cambodia’s forest cover has increased from 58.6% (10,638,209 hectares) in 1997 to 61.14% (11,104,285 hectares) in 2002. This is an important achievement of the second term of the Royal Government.”46

The most recent Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) assessment of global forest cover paints a different picture, however. Its findings indicate that Cambodia lost 29% of its primary tropical forest between 2000 and 2005.47 While this figure may possibly be too high, there can be little doubt that forest destruction in Cambodia is continuing at an alarming rate.

Tumring Rubber Plantation. Forest was cleared in Kompong Thom Province to make way for this rubber plantation.
3. Cambodia’s International Donors – Aiding Cambodians or Abetting the Government?

“There is a frenzy now across the country by the rich and powerful in Cambodia to acquire land. I think the donor communities and the UN agencies need to be much more outspoken. What I find missing here is a sense of outrage that should be there.” UN Special Rapporteur on Housing Rights Milan Kothari, 2005

For over a decade, international donors have consistently provided Cambodia with aid equivalent to half its national budget. Total international aid to Cambodia currently stands at around US$600 million per year. Despite the leverage that this gives them, the donors’ track record in ensuring that their aid produces results for Cambodia’s citizens has been unimpressive.

In the late 1990s donors did, to their credit, place illegal logging and reform of forest management at the top of the agenda in their dialogue with the Cambodian government. In 1996 the IMF froze funding to Cambodia because of massive irregularities in the government’s management of logging revenues. This catalysed concerted donor action which saw the World Bank make disbursement of its US$15 million Structural Adjustment Credit contingent upon the implementation of forest management reforms.

The momentum generated by this donor pressure and initial government crackdowns against politically dispensable loggers gradually dissipated, however. With its refusal in January 2003 to allow Global Witness to continue working as independent monitor and threats to prosecute its in-country representative, the government signalled that it had moved as far as it intended to go. Many donors retreated from a sector increasingly perceived as being too difficult.

Donors’ shortcomings are not confined to the forest sector however, and the donor track record with regards to rural poverty, infant mortality and literacy is equivocal at best. In terms of establishing a genuine democracy, rule of law, respect for human rights and good governance it is even less convincing. In private, ministers describe the donors as ‘dunces’ who will continue to bankroll the government no matter how much of their taxpayers’ money is misappropriated.49 In public they present the aid the government receives as a sign of the international community’s approval of their actions.50

Donors frequently justify their failure to work harder for the interests of ordinary Cambodians by arguing that a more robust stance will push Hun Sen further into the arms, or rather pockets, of China. China’s growing influence in Cambodia is undeniable. However this argument overlooks the fact that China, despite its generosity, cannot offer the Cambodian government the international respectability it seeks. The government’s continued pursuit of international recognition can be seen in its efforts to secure a seat on the UN Security Council, gain entry to the WTO, contribute to UN peacekeeping forces and join the US-led ‘War on Terror’. It is similarly eager to sign up to all manner of international conventions which it generally then fails to implement. The 2001 East Asia Forest Law Enforcement and Governance Ministerial Declaration is just one example.

A more banal but more plausible explanation for donors’ supine behaviour is simple indifference. As an international event Cambodia has lost its novelty value and policymakers’ priorities have long since moved on. Donor representatives and diplomats on the ground know they will not be rewarded by their head offices for rocking the boat and putting Cambodia back on a crowded foreign policy agenda. It is easier to keep heads down and the money flowing.

It is not just NGOs that are disturbed by the donors’ reluctance to exert themselves. In 2006, UN Secretary General’s Special Representative on Human Rights in Cambodia Yash Ghai noted that:

“If it is indeed true that donor agencies are not mindful of human rights or democracy, but just wish to build a cosy relationship with the government, then it seems to me that they are not only failing the people of Cambodia, but also their own domestic taxpayers as well, who approve these grants in the expectation that these countries will be the beneficiaries.”

Hun Sen meeting a Chinese delegation. Many donors cite China’s increasing influence as justification for turning a blind eye to kleptocratic behaviour by Cambodia’s government.
CHAPTER II: KEEPING IT IN THE FAMILY

1. Introducing Cambodia’s Premier Logging Syndicate

This chapter examines the careers of a group of timber barons who together constitute Cambodia’s most powerful logging syndicate. Boasting familial links to Prime Minister Hun Sen, the Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, Chan Sarun and Forest Administration Director General Ty Sokhun, their careers illustrate how the country’s political elite has successfully subverted forest management reforms and continued looting a valuable public asset. There is substantial evidence that this group’s activities extend beyond illegal logging to encompass kidnapping and attempted murder. Moreover, there are strong indications that corruption and nepotism at the highest levels explain the impunity with which its members have operated for almost a decade.

While this syndicate has operated under various labels, most recently ‘Seng Keang Import Export Company Ltd’, its public profile is relatively low considering the immensely damaging impact it has had on the country’s forests.

1.1 Dy Chouch, also known as Hun Chouch

Dy Chouch, better known as Hun Chouch, is a first cousin of Prime Minister Hun Sen. In the mid 1990s Dy Chouch operated a range of businesses with Hun To,52 a nephew of the prime minister whom well-placed sources name as a major drugs trafficker.53 Another of Dy Chouch’s early business associates was renegade RCAF commander Sat Soeun.54 Over the past decade, Sat Soeun has faced charges relating to three different murders, two attempted murders and one physical assault.55 According to residents of Kompong Cham, Dy Chouch, Hun To and Sat Soeun’s early ventures centred on smuggling fish and rubber tree wood across the border to Vietnam.56

Dy Chouch and his ex-wife Seng Keang have gone on to manage logging operations for several of the forest concessionaires, including Kingwood Industry, (whose activities are described in detail later in this chapter), Cambodia Cherndar Plywood and Mieng Ly Heng. Global Witness has documented illegal acts by all three of these concessionaires over a number of years.57 Cherndar Plywood, despite its nominal Taiwanese ownership, is referred to within the timber business as “Hun Chouch’s company” or “Seng Keang’s company”.58 The exact nature of the couple’s links with Cherndar Plywood has proved difficult to establish, however.

Dy Chouch and Seng Keang’s relationship with Mieng Ly Heng is equally murky and Dy Chouch has appeared reluctant to advertise his association with the firm.59 During a visit to the Mieng Ly Heng logging camp at Baksna in Kompong Thom in 2001, Global Witness staff met with a man who introduced himself as ‘Li Seng’, the head of company security. When asked how, as a security supervisor, he was able to afford the solid gold, diamond-studded Rolex Oyster Perpetual watch he was wearing, ‘Li Seng’ explained that it had been given to him by his boss in recognition of his services to the firm. Global Witness photographed ‘Li Seng’, who was subsequently identified as Dy Chouch by two people that know him.60

In social circles, however, Dy Chouch is less reticent and introduces himself as an oknha. Oknha, which has a meaning similar to ‘Sir’, is an honorific title conferred on businessmen and women who have made donations of at least US$100,000 to the state.61 Dy Chouch has been known to threaten with a gun those who have declined to address him by this title.62

Logging syndicate member Dy Chouch at Mieng Ly Heng’s Baksna logging camp, 2001

Hummer belonging to Dy Chouch associate Hun To

Dy Chouch associate Sat Soeun
1.2 Seng Keang

While ‘Hun Chouch’ commands greater name recognition, Seng Keang’s influence within the timber industry appears to equal or exceed that of her ex-husband. Like Dy Chouch, Seng Keang has worked as a subcontractor supplying logs to Cherndar Plywood, Mieng Ly Heng and Kingwood Industry. She has also played a similar role for the Chinese state-owned Everbright CIG Wood logging concessionaire. Forest Administration officials have named Seng Keang, moreover, as the principal shareholder in Mieng Ly Heng.

Seng Keang has a number of friends in high places. She is friends with Hun Sen’s wife Bun Rany and periodically appears with her at public events broadcast on national television. She is also close to Leang Vouch Chheng, the wife of the prime minister’s brother and Kompong Cham Provincial Governor Hun Neng. Global Witness has received reports from a well-placed source that Seng Keang and Leang Vouch Chheng run lucrative racketeering ventures in Kompong Cham in partnership with the wives of two other provincial officials. These activities are said to include levying protection money from taxi operators in Kompong Cham town.

Dy Chouch and Seng Keang divorced in 2005. According to timber industry insiders, they continue to do business together, however.
1.3 Khun Thong
Khun Thong has the dual distinction of being the brother-in-law of Minister for Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries Chan Sarun and the father-in-law of Director General of the Forest Administration Ty Sokhun. Phnom Penh telephone directories previously listed one of Khun Thong’s sawmills as Ty Sokhun’s residential address.

Like Seng Keang and Dy Chouch, Khun Thong is a logging subcontractor and has worked with Kingwood Industry and Everbright CIG Wood. In 2001, in its capacity as official independent forest monitor, Global Witness exposed a large-scale illegal logging operation by Everbright outside its concession. Members of the government team that subsequently investigated the case blamed Khun Thong’s relationship with Ty Sokhun for their inability to mount a successful prosecution against the company.

In addition to his work with Kingwood and Everbright, Khun Thong is known to have generated additional income by extorting money and timber from rival wood traders along the Mekong River. According to those he targeted, Khun Thong would accompany his demands with threats to invoke ‘crackdowns’ by forestry officials answerable to his son-in-law, Ty Sokhun.

A low-profile figure, Khun Thong has nonetheless been described by Dy Chouch as the “backbone” to his timber business and his name appears on a range of documents relating to the group’s activities.
2. Kingwood – Rise and Demise of a Logging Concessionaire

The Cambodian government’s allocation of between 30 and 40 logging concessions in the mid 1990s set the stage for what an Asian Development Bank review described as “total system failure”. Specifically, it placed arguably the country’s most important natural resource in the hands of the most unsuitable commercial operators, many of whom operated under the patronage of the country’s ruling families. Typifying these new custodians of Cambodia’s forests was Kingwood Industry, a company incorporated in Cambodia by Taiwanese, Singaporean and Indonesian businessmen, which obtained a 301,200 ha concession in 1995 covering parts of Kratie, Stung Treng and Mondulkiri provinces. In common with all but two of the concessionaires, Kingwood had no experience of managing a forest. Like many others, it rapidly demonstrated a willingness to break the law in pursuit of a quick profit.

Another exemplary aspect of the Kingwood operation was its associations with a politically influential family. Prior to obtaining its concession, Kingwood had already formed an alliance with Khun Thong’s sister Sok Keo. Sok Keo is the wife of Chan Sarun, then Director General of the Department of Forestry and Wildlife (DFW) and currently the Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF). In September 1994, she helped Kingwood acquire a 25 ha plot on the Mekong River in Kandal Province’s Muk Kampoul District, 21 km from Phnom Penh. Within four days of acquiring title deeds for the land in her name, Sok Keo signed an agreement with Kingwood’s Taiwanese managing director Lia Chun Hua to pass control of the site to the company. The document states that she is leasing the land to Kingwood on a rent-free basis for 70 years; while Kingwood is providing her with an interest-free loan of US$430,984. The only condition attached to the lending is that Kingwood be allowed to build a factory on the site:

“In case of the Cambodian Government not allowing (Kingwood) to build a wood-processing factory on the said land, (Sok Keo) has to sell, transfer or dispose of the said land within one year. The mortgage loan of US$430,984 shall be refunded to (Kingwood) without condition.”

The contract does not say whether Sok Keo intended to take an active role in ensuring that Kingwood received authorisation to construct a factory; however it gave her a very strong incentive for doing so. The agreement thereby set up a potential conflict between Chan Sarun’s responsibilities as an impartial regulator of the forest sector and his wife’s business interests. In February 2007 Global Witness wrote to Chan Sarun to ask him whether he was aware of his wife’s dealings with Kingwood and whether he helped the company obtain its factory construction permit. As this report went to print, Chan Sarun had not replied to this letter.

After receiving permission to build on the land leased from Sok Keo, Kingwood’s directors took out initial loans of at least US$9.4 million to finance the construction of a plywood factory. A 2001 loan agreement between the company and the Cambodian Public Bank describes Sok Keo as the owner of both the factory premises and the machinery within it. In February 2007 Global Witness wrote to Sok Keo to ask her to explain her association with Kingwood. Sok Keo has yet to reply.

2.1 Illegal Logging

According to industry analysts, the factory Kingwood built was capable of producing 96,000 m³ of finished product per year, with practical capacity of 84,000 m³ per year. To operate at full practical capacity, and therefore full efficiency, thus required an annual supply of around 164,000 m³ of round logs – almost five times the 35,000 m³ per year Kingwood could provide.
was legally permitted to cut in its large but sparsely forested concession. Processing over-capacity has been a feature of Cambodia's concession system as a whole. For the concessionaires, it created a strong incentive either to log illegally or try to source timber from other concessions. Kingwood opted to do both.

In 1997, the company cut trees illegally in the Macro-Panin concession adjacent to its own, using the excuse that it was collecting 50,000 m³ of 'old logs'. Over the same period the firm employed a military commander to cut logs in a 100 km² area outside its concession and haul them back within Kingwood boundaries to be passed off as a product of the company's own harvesting operations. In addition, the 2000 Asian Development Bank review of logging concessionaires' performance revealed that the company failed to honour its contractual commitments to invest US$76.5 million in Cambodia and pay the government US$300,000 royalties and deposits.

In its efforts to supply its factory, Kingwood contracted Sok Keo's brother Khun Thong, together with Seng Keang, to supply logs. The advantages to Kingwood included Seng Keang and Khun Thong's ability to source wood from other concessions in which they operated as subcontractors; notably that of Cherndar Plywood.

2.2 Bad Debts
Despite its factory's intensive production activity, Kingwood's operations were underwritten by an expanding array of loans. A source close to the company claimed that it needed to borrow because its directors were laundering sales revenue through affiliated companies in Indonesia, Singapore and Taiwan. Global Witness wrote to the Kingwood directors in February 2007 to ask them to comment on this claim but has not yet received a reply. Whether or not the allegation is true, there is no doubt that the company's financial situation became increasingly precarious.

During its start-up phase in the mid 1990s, Kingwood obtained three loans totalling around US$9.4 million from Maybank of Malaysia. These loans took the form of a debenture because Kingwood claimed that it did not own any land that it could mortgage as collateral. The stringent terms of the debenture agreement prohibited Kingwood from transferring control to or borrowing from any other party. Despite this, the company went on to borrow from three other banks in Cambodia. In June 2001 for example, Chan Sarun's wife Sok Keo took out a loan from the Cambodian Public Bank on behalf of Kingwood, mortgaging the factory site and machinery. The mortgage agreement was signed not only by Sok Keo and a representative of Cambodian Public Bank but also by Cambodian Bar Association President Ky Tech. A source close to Kingwood claims that Cambodian Public Bank lent the company a total of around US$3 million.
concessions with effect from January 2002. The moratorium followed the concessionaires’ failure to meet the deadline for submission of sustainable forest management plans (SFMPs) and Environmental and Social Impact Assessments (ESIAs) set for the end of November 2001.

The moratorium on cutting was followed by a moratorium on the transportation of logs, which came into full effect in May 2002. Some concessionaires, notably GAT International and Pheapimex, initially continued logging and transporting wood in violation of the moratoria. Following Global Witness’ exposure of GAT’s activities, however, Hun Sen cancelled the firm’s two concessions in June 2002.93 Hereafter the logging concession system entered a state of near-total inactivity.

2.3 A Very Hostile Takeover

For Dy Chouch, Seng Keang and Khun Thong, concession companies such as Kingwood had provided a useful façade behind which they could exercise control over a large slice of the logging industry in Cambodia. The 2002 moratoria on harvesting and log transportation changed this completely, however.
A source close to the Kingwood operation informed Global Witness that, in August 2002, Kingwood’s Managing Director Lia Chun Hua attempted to cut his mounting losses and leave Cambodia for good. According to this source, he was prevented from doing so by Seng Keang, whose entourage abducted Lia, confiscated his passport and held him hostage in the factory compound. Global Witness has investigated these claims and gathered information from a range of sources which points to the need for a credible judicial investigation into the fate of Lia and the current ownership of Kingwood. This information is summarised below:

i) Documents concerning Lia Chun Hua’s surrender of control of Kingwood
Lia Chun Hua relinquished control over Kingwood in a series of written agreements signed with Seng Keang and Khun Thong during the second half of August 2002. On 12 August, he signed an agreement on behalf of the company acknowledging debts of US$1,871,871.56 to Seng Keang and US$1,605,000 to Khun Thong. This document effectively superseded the agreement on log purchases of October 2001. It reiterated that Seng Keang, and now Khun Thong also, would hold the same 94 items of factory machinery as collateral until Lia cleared his debts. Lia also agreed to pay interest of 1.8% per month. The document is countersigned by the deputy district governor and the commune chief.94

One week later, on 19 August, Lia signed a second agreement in which he effectively surrendered all control over Kingwood. This second contract states that Lia has ceded the entire Kingwood operation and assets to Seng Keang and Khun Thong until the debts and interest are paid. It adds that once the last repayments are made, Seng Keang and Khun Thong will retain a 30% share in the company. The document also commits Lia to assist in the running of the factory. Once again it is witnessed by the deputy district governor and the commune chief.95

The next day, Seng Keang, Khun Thong and Lia signed a memorandum listing the same 94 items of machinery referenced in previous agreements. This handwritten document carries the signatures of 13 different people, including local officials and police officers. It is accompanied by a fourth contract, also signed on 20 August, which certifies that control of all the Kingwood factory machinery has passed to Seng Keang, Khun Thong and an individual named Yiem Seng.96 The signatories to this last agreement are Lia and Malaysian businessman and Kingwood shareholder Lim Yok Fong.97
The outcome was the de facto transfer of ownership of Kingwood’s assets and operations to Seng Keang and Khun Thong. While the terms of the various contracts indicate that Lia Chun Hua could regain partial, if not complete, control of the company in the future, the level of debt he is committed to repay, not to mention the interest payments, are extremely high.

Cambodia’s investment law requires that the government Council for the Development of Cambodia (CDC) gives its consent to any transfer of company ownership a full 30 days before the transaction takes place. To the best of Global Witness’ knowledge, neither Kingwood’s board, nor Seng Keang nor Khun Thong approached the CDC for its authorisation, however. CDC officials did subsequently learn of the takeover and contacted Seng Keang. She informed them that she took control of Kingwood the way she did to avoid assuming responsibility for the company’s existing debts.

The transfer of control leaves many questions unanswered. The document that Lia Chun Hua signed on 12 August gave Seng Keang and Khun Thong possession of items of factory machinery until he cleared his debts. This does at least maintain a degree of internal consistency with the agreement on debt repayment and log supply of October 2001. Why then, only one week later, did Lia Chun Hua agree to hand over complete control of Kingwood’s operations? Nothing in the document accounts for the rapid change in circumstances. What, moreover, accounts for the drafting of four overlapping and in some cases crudely written documents? While the paper trail is not in itself evidence of coercion, it gives the appearance of a hurried and unorthodox transfer of control.

ii) Accounts from individuals employed by or associated with the logging syndicate

In 2004 Global Witness interviewed a close associate of Seng Keang who confirmed that the logging syndicate was holding Lia prisoner within the factory. This person added that, although the timber barons were confident that Lia could not escape, they were concerned that he might attempt suicide. The interviewee also reported the presence at the factory of ten other Taiwanese nationals whom Dy Chouch and Khun Thong were employing as technicians. These technicians were said to be prohibited from leaving the factory for fear that they might divulge information about the syndicate’s activities.

The same year Global Witness interviewed a second individual closely associated with the Kingwood operation who also maintained regular access to the factory. This person had not met Lia Chun Hua since his abduction but claimed to have heard from workers that he was being kept in harsh conditions that were adversely affecting his health, that his phone was no longer connected and that he had no further contact with the outside world. The interviewee reported that guards accompanied Lia Chun Hua at all times within the factory compound.

In a separate interview in 2004, a business associate of Seng Keang informed Global Witness that Lia Chun Hua was living inside the Kingwood compound. This individual did not talk in terms of abduction or...
imprisonment and claimed that Lia was being "well looked after". They did not offer any explanation, however, for why Lia would have left his home to live inside an industrial processing facility or why he needed to be looked after.102

In 2005 an employee of the logging syndicate informed Global Witness that Lia Chun Hua continued to live inside the factory compound and was being guarded by military police employed by Dy Chouch.101

iii) Account from an official who has investigated the case
A prominent government official who has conducted his own investigations of Kingwood told Global Witness in 2004 that Seng Keang and Khun Thong were keeping Lia Chun Hua and other foreign workers hostage inside the factory compound and had confiscated their passports. The official added that the authorities had been unable to free the men because the logging syndicate represents the business interests of Bun Rany, Prime Minister Hun Sen’s wife.102

iv) Evidence of the logging syndicate imposing strict security measures at the Kingwood factory
According to a security guard at the Kingwood factory, the person responsible for security since 2002 is a military police officer named Keo Sarim.103 In the first half of 2005, Keo Sarim’s group consisted of three military police officers each armed with an AK-47 and a pistol, together with six additional guards each equipped with an AK-47 only.104 All were being paid by Dy Chouch. Two of these guards were detailed to accompany Lia Chun Hua at all times within the factory compound. The guards’ other duties included screening and searching factory staff as they arrived for work each day and excluding unwanted visitors.105 The latter include members of the local authorities, who have been prevented from conducting mandated checks on the factory’s operations and the visa compliance of its foreign staff.106

v) Sightings of a man resembling Lia Chun Hua
During a visit to the Kingwood factory in December 2002, Global Witness investigators observed a middle-aged ethnic Chinese man, together with four ethnic Chinese women, being escorted to a waiting vehicle by two men wearing uniform and carrying guns. While not possible to confirm the man’s identity, his physical appearance and his armed escort match descriptions of Lia Chun Hua and the conditions of his alleged detention.106

In April 2005 Global Witness staff observed four guards with AK-47s escorting a man into the Kingwood compound. An employee of the logging syndicate accompanying Global Witness identified the man as Lia Chun Hua. This employee added that Lia was not allowed to leave Cambodia and had to be escorted at all times by armed guards.107

vi) Reports that Lia Chun Hua has failed to respond to summons from the courts in Phnom Penh
Since the time of the Kingwood takeover, Maybank of Malaysia has pursued a legal action to reclaim unpaid debts from the company. Lia Chun Hua has failed to answer summons to appear before the court in Phnom Penh on at least three occasions. His place has been taken by lawyers hired by Seng Keang who have failed to explain his repeated non-appearance.86 Court documents record Lia Chun Hua as having a permanent residence in Phnom Penh but “presently living in Kingwood sawmill, Prek Anghchanh Commune, Muk Kompoul District, Kandal Province”.108

In October 2006 a public official informed Global Witness that they had received letters recently signed by Lia Chun Hua on Kingwood’s behalf.109 While this information gives little insight into Lia’s current circumstances, it does suggest that he is still in Cambodia and remains associated with the company’s operations.

In February 2007 Global Witness wrote letters to Lia Chun Hua as well as Seng Keang, Dy Chouch and Khun Thong and other Kingwood shareholders to ask about Lia’s current whereabouts. At the time...
of publishing, Global Witness had not received any responses to these letters.

In summary, there are grounds for believing that the reports of Lia Chun Hua’s abduction are correct and that his personal safety may be seriously at risk. It is evident that the authorities are aware of the situation but are either unwilling or unable to act. Given the close connections between the logging syndicate and senior officials, this situation seems unlikely to change in the absence of outside pressure on the Cambodian government.

2.4 Competing Claims

After taking over the Kingwood factory, Dy Chouch, Seng Keang and Khun Thong serviced selected debts owed to other Kingwood creditors. They may also have borrowed money themselves: a source close to Hun Sen’s family told Global Witness that Bun Rany had been making loans to Seng Keang for the Kingwood operation.110 Global Witness wrote to Bun Rany in February 2007 to ask for her comment on this claim. As this report went to print she had not replied.

One Kingwood creditor that the timber barons refused to pay, however, was Maybank, which received little or no repayment on the approximately US$9.4 million it lent Kingwood in the mid 1990s.88 The magnitude of this potential loss spurred the bank to embark on legal proceedings in 2003.

Maybank targeted its legal action at Kingwood directors Lia Chun Hua and Lee Kwan Siang.111 This posed a serious challenge to the position of the logging syndicate. In the first instance it threatened their hold over Lia, who faced summons to appear before court, not to mention the possibility of a prison sentence if found guilty. A win for Maybank, moreover, would pave the way for the bank to enforce its claim on the same Kingwood assets that Seng Keang and Khun Thong seized in August 2002.

The timber barons vigorously contested the case, with Seng Keang appointing her lawyer, Chet Boravuth112 to ‘represent’ Lia Chun Hua. In pre-trial hearings Chet Boravuth argued that Maybank’s action was invalid because Kingwood now belonged to Seng Keang. He was unable to supply any documentary proof to substantiate this claim however, and the trial went ahead.86

Sources within Cambodia’s judiciary informed Global Witness that Seng Keang’s representatives subsequently tried to bribe the judge and, when this failed, to intimidate him. These sources claim these threats were delivered separately by Chet Boravuth and Ky Tech, the lawyer who helped Sok Keo and Kingwood secure a loan from Cambodian Public Bank in 2001. Both sources allege that Chet Boravuth and Ky Tech told the judge that Hun Sen’s wife Bun Rany would have him sacked if he found in favour of Maybank.89 Global Witness wrote to Chet Boravuth and to Ky Tech in February 2007 to ask them to comment on this allegation. As this report went to print, neither had replied to these letters.

In April 2004, the court found in favour of Maybank, convicting Lia Chun Hua and Kingwood Chairman Lee Kwan Siang for breach of trust. Lia Chun Hua and Lee Kwan Siang received sentences in absentia of six months imprisonment, suspended pending their repayment of the loan, plus interest and a US$250,000 fine. Following an unsuccessful appeal by Seng Keang’s lawyers, the courts confirmed the conviction and sentences in August 2005.106 This paved the way for Maybank to seize control of the factory to reclaim Kingwood’s debts. To date, however, the authorities have taken no action to enforce the court’s verdict.

**Box 4: Kingwood’s Assets – Property of the Cambodian People?**

In August 2003, the Council of Ministers issued a prakas (ministerial declaration) terminating Kingwood’s investment agreement, along with that of Mieng Ly Heng.113 These cancellations related to the poor quality of the concessionaires’ sustainable forest management plans and environmental and social impact assessments rather than the illegal takeover of Kingwood, however.

For Dy Chouch, Seng Keang and Khun Thong, termination of Kingwood’s investment agreement had little consequence in terms of timber supply, as the forest in the Kingwood concession was largely exhausted. The legal implications were potentially far-reaching, however.

The Asian Development Bank-funded concession review published in 2000 concluded that termination of companies’ investment agreements implied a simultaneous cancellation of their Forest Timber (harvesting) Licence.114 Under the terms of Kingwood’s original Forest Timber Licence agreement with MAFF, the company agreed to forfeit all buildings and plant that it did not remove upon the licence expiring. This indicates that the Cambodian government is now empowered to seize the Kingwood factory and other remaining assets as state property.115 Given that MAFF Minister Chan Sarun’s wife Sok Keo owns the Kingwood site and her brother Khun Thong now controls the factory, it is perhaps unsurprising that no such seizure has taken place.
3. Tumring Rubber Plantation – the New Face of Industrial-Scale Logging in Cambodia

“If the logging companies still don’t listen, take away their licences. This morning I read the Cambodia Daily. It said that many companies won’t obey the order of the Ministry of Agriculture. Just you try, if you aren’t going to obey, just you try. If I don’t take away your concessions and close down your factory I will cut my throat!” Prime Minister Hun Sen, December 2001

Following the imposition of the cutting and log transportation moratoria, forest concessions no longer provided a vehicle for elite logging interests. However, with the connivance of those senior officials responsible for enforcing the timber industry’s suspension, the more powerful timber traders continued their activities under a range of new guises. The most lucrative and destructive of these has been the use of plantation developments – whether government-mandated development projects or so-called economic land concessions (ELCs) – as a pretext for clear-cutting forest.

Few timber barons are as well placed to take advantage of such schemes as Dy Chouch, Seng Keang and Khun Thong. By the time the government suspended forest concession operations, the group was already positioning itself for the next logging bonanza, courtesy of Tumring Rubber Plantation. Tumring is a flagship development initiative of the Cambodian government. It is also a classic example of how corrupt misallocation of public assets benefits the country’s political elite at the expense of the rural poor.

3.1 A Family-Scale Enterprise
In August 2000, Prime Minister Hun Sen issued a communiqué calling for the establishment of “family-scale rubber plantations”, as a component of the government’s rural development policy. The following year officials announced the creation of a new rubber plantation. The designated site comprised 6,200 ha excised from three logging concessions – Colexim Enterprise (3,577 ha), GAT International (2,181 ha) and Mieng Ly Heng (442 ha) – at their point of convergence in Tumring Commune in Sandan District, Kompong Thom Province. The area is in the heart of Prey Long – mainland Southeast Asia’s largest lowland evergreen forest and an important part of Cambodia’s natural heritage.

This process was expedited via a survey by the Kompong Thom Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries in November 2000. This survey team classified the Tumring site as land containing only small amounts of valuable timber, when in reality much of the 6,200 ha was forested.

The government established the plantation not as an economic land concession allocated to a private company, but as a state-led development project mandated by a sub-decree. A sub-decree is a binding legal instrument signed by the prime minister but not subject to the approval of Cambodia’s National Assembly. Sub-decrees on the usage of particular areas of state land are unusual although not unprecedented. Issuing one specifically devoted to Tumring reflected the importance the prime minister and other senior officials attached to the project.

Dy Chouch (left) and his ex-wife Seng Keang (centre left) posing with Hun Sen’s daughter Hun Mana and her husband Moeung Kompeat, who is the son of Royal Cambodian Armed Forces General Moeung Samphan.
Having signed the sub-decree establishing Tumring Rubber Plantation in August 2001, Hun Sen personally inaugurated the project the same month.118 Addressing local residents, he expounded his vision of a new Tumring:

“If you tap resin, the logging concessions aren’t happy. And you don’t know when they’ll cut down your trees ... The first recommendation is that we need to change people here, from slash and burn farmers and resin tappers ... Make this a place ... Change from collecting resin, tapping resin ... from tapping resin to tapping rubber.”

Hun Sen concluded with a personal assurance:

“If Hun Sen says something, he will do it. I have not come to cheat you, I have not come to cheat you. And I don’t know how to cheat people. I don’t know how to cheat people, Hun Sen doesn’t know how to cheat people. Hun Sen means honest. That’s it.”137

The government turned over control of the 6,200 ha site to Chup Rubber Company,138 a parastatal firm which runs large rubber plantations in Tboung Khmum District, Kompong Cham Province. According to the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, “Chup Rubber Plantation has a poor record in human rights and labour rights compliance”.139 In Tumring, the company received a mandate to implement industrial-scale rubber production on 4,359 ha, with 1,841 ha available for local families in three hectare parcels. Officials encouraged families to cultivate rubber, and the sub-decree signed by Hun Sen stated that Chup would provide them with technical assistance over the six to ten years that the trees would take to mature.118

Hun Sen makes a point
Box 5: Resin Tapping

Liquid resin, tapped from chhoeuteal and other species of Dipterocarp tree is the most widely harvested and traded non-timber forest product in Cambodia and a source of income for roughly 100,000 people living in or around forested areas. It is used for lighting, water-proofing boats and for making paints and varnishes.

Resin tapping involves cutting a hole in the trunk of a mature tree and thereafter burning a handful of grass or twigs in this cavity every few days to stimulate a flow of resin. Over the course of a year, tappers collect around 20,000 tonnes of resin in this way across Cambodia. Available evidence suggests that tapping does not harm the trees, which can continue to yield resin for several decades.

While agriculture is the dominant form of economic activity for most rural Cambodians, for many resin tapping is a vital secondary source of income with which to buy rice in times of shortage. Research undertaken in 2004 in Preah Vihear and Kompong Thom provinces found that households derived almost one-third of their income from resin tapping.

The activities of logging companies pose a direct threat to resin tappers’ livelihoods. The trees that rural Cambodians tap for resin are those same commercial grade species that the timber companies target for use in production of plywood and veneer. Records of logging concessionaires’ harvests during the last cutting season (2000-2001) before the government suspended their operations clearly illustrate this. The harvesting records of one concessionaire state that 89% of the trees it cut comprised the principal resin-producing tree species. Another concession company informed Global Witness that resin trees accounted for 80% of its harvest.

Article 17 (g) of the 1988 Decree-Law on Forest Practice Rules made it illegal to cut trees that people were tapping for resin. This law has been superseded by the 2002 Forest Law, Article 29 of which extends this protection to “trees of species that people tap for resin”. The logging companies have consistently violated these laws, however. Resin tappers living in and around logging concessions in one province have reported losing as many as 20-30% of their trees to company harvesting operations. The impact of the Tumring Rubber Plantation project on households in the centre of Prey Long forest has been even more severe.
Box 6: Prey Long Forest at the Crossroads

Industrial-scale logging in tropical regions typically targets lowland rainforests over upland areas because they are easier to access and yield higher volumes of timber. The consequence in Southeast Asia has been the disappearance or severe degradation of most rainforests of this type.119

The Prey Long forest landscape in northern Cambodia is the largest contiguous area of lowland dry evergreen and semi-evergreen forest left standing in mainland Southeast Asia. Situated to the west of the Mekong River, it covers an area of approximately 5,250 km².120

Surveys carried out in the Prey Long region reveal a diverse and unique natural heritage at risk and in need of preservation. A 2004 study found seven distinct types of forest, including the rare first-growth evergreen forests and evergreen marsh forests.121 Prey Long is also home to rare wildlife species such as elephant, gaur, banteng, tiger and Asiatic black bear.122

Prey Long is critically important to the lives of some 256,000 people living in 340 villages in and around the forest. For these communities, the forest provides a livelihood not only through resin tapping (described in Box 6), but also via its provision of building materials, medicine and food.120 It also plays an important role in cultural terms, as it contains large numbers of burial groves and spirit trees that have particular significance for indigenous minority groups such as the Kuy.123 In addition, forests such as Prey Long provide important watershed management services to Cambodia’s rural population as a whole through their regulation of water flows to agricultural areas.124

Prey Long’s importance is highlighted in a number of studies of forest management in Cambodia, not least the 2006 World Bank Inspection Panel report and the 2004 Independent Forest Sector Review. It has been included in a tentative list of sites proposed for UNESCO World Heritage status.125 However, Prey Long is not currently under any kind of protective management regime and it has been at the epicentre of logging concession activity over the past decade.120 Despite the failure of all Cambodia’s concessionaires to meet requirements to produce adequate sustainable forest management plans and environmental and social impact assessments, four logging concessions covering much of Prey Long remain in place.123

Although these concessions have been largely inactive since the 2002 moratoria on their operations, industrial-scale logging in Prey Long has continued via the Tumring Rubber Plantation profiled in this chapter. In 2006 the government granted at least one new ELC in Prey Long and officials are currently drawing up plans to convert tens of thousands of hectares to more rubber plantations.126

Looking east across Prey Long Forest towards the Mekong River
While the short-term economic gains of more logging in Prey Long are doubtless tempting for Cambodian officials, the costs in terms of biodiversity, livelihoods and watershed management would be severe. Furthermore, the conclusion of the recent Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change – that any serious attempt to address climate change must include preventing destruction of existing natural forests – underscores an already compelling case for concerted international action to preserve Prey Long and Cambodia’s other remaining forest landscapes.
3.2 The “Benefit of Conversion”

“If this area [Tumring], can contribute to the national economy, and the forest is going to be lost anyway, why should we keep it? We should immediately convert it to this use [rubber] that has high economic effectiveness. This is the benefit of conversion.” Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries Chan Sarun addressing the National Assembly, 2002

To date Tumring has not yet produced any rubber; however it has yielded a huge timber haul through the clear-cutting of thousands of hectares of forest. The initial wave of logging in the months following the plantation’s inauguration was carried out by the GAT, Colexim and Mieng Ly Heng concessionaires. As already noted, Seng Keang and Dy Chouch have close links with Mieng Ly Heng which may extend to actual ownership. Operating in a regulatory vacuum, the three companies illegally felled thousands of resin trees belonging to local families.140

In May 2002 the government re-instated a log transportation moratorium. The following month it cancelled the two timber concessions held by GAT International. From this point Dy Chouch, Seng Keang and Khun Thong took sole charge of the logging in Tumring. At around the same time they began working under the name Seng Keang Import Export Company.141

In October 2002 Chan Sarun’s Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries issued a letter conferring “permission, in principle, to collect wood of all classes within the rubber plantation at Tumring, Kompong Thom Province” to Seng Keang Import Export Co. Ltd.142 To the best of Global Witness’ knowledge, the Ministry’s decision did not follow an open tendering process and was never publicly announced. This lack of transparency offers little reassurance to a Cambodian public that already perceives MAFF as being very corrupt.143 In a letter to Deputy Prime Minister Sok An in March 2006, Chan Sarun explained his decision in the following terms: “Cambodia’s tropical forest always contains different types of trees: luxury trees, first-grade trees, second grade trees, third grade trees, and other kinds of tree. Whenever there is clearing of the forest, it is vital to collect these trees for measurement, taxation and use of the timber resources other than burning, which causes a loss to the national budget and affects the natural environment.”

Chan Sarun’s concern to avoid wasting Tumring’s timber is commendable but appears at odds with the argument he makes elsewhere in the same letter that “before issuing the sub-decree to create Tumring Rubber Plantation, we had already set up a committee to conduct prior research, the results of which showed only small amounts of valuable timber in this area.”144

The Minister’s statements on Tumring are at best contradictory and at worst deliberately misleading. By October 2002, Dy Chouch, Seng Keang and Khun Thong had a track record of violations going back several years. Chan Sarun’s decision to give the trio a permit offering a cover for continuing their illegal logging appears to place him in breach of Article 100 of Cambodia’s Forest Law, which states that “Any activities carried out by local authority officials, the police officers, Royal Armed Forces or other authorities that directly or indirectly allow forest exploitation or other activities contrary to the provisions of this law ... shall be subject to one to five years in prison and fines of ten million to one hundred million riel [US$2,500 to US$25,000].” The Minister’s actions also amount to complicity, as defined by the UNTAC (United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia) Penal Code. To date, Cambodia’s judicial authorities have not investigated the minister’s actions with respect to Tumring; however Global Witness believes there are compelling grounds for doing so.

In summary, as Cambodia’s logging concessionaires faced up to a period of enforced hibernation that has now lasted more than five years, Dy Chouch, Seng Keang and Khun Thong secured, in rapid succession, one of the country’s largest timber processing facilities and a new resource with which to supply it.
3.3 Log Laundering

Seng Keang, Dy Chouch and Khun Thong appointed as their representative in Tumring Seng Keang’s brother Seng Kok Heang, an officer in the elite Royal Cambodian Armed Forces Brigade. Seng Kok Heang is known as ‘Ta Kao Pram’ or Mr. 95 – 95 being his number in the numerical sequence of radio call signs used by his entourage. Seng Kok Heang had previously worked for Mieng Ly Heng and made a seamless transition from logging as forest concession management to logging as plantation development.

Tasked with supplying the Kingwood factory, Seng Kok Heang quickly showed himself uninhibited by the perimeters of the poorly demarcated Tumring site. During field investigations in September and October 2003, Global Witness found his loggers cutting over half a kilometre outside the plantation boundaries. Commenting on this illegal expansion of the plantation operation, Chup Rubber Company’s on-site representative stated “I don’t know ... On the other hand I’m not supposed to know too many things.”

Seng Kok Heang’s cutting within the plantation boundaries involved the removal of all tree cover. Logging beyond the perimeter however, focused on the most suitable throughputs for the Kingwood plywood mill: chhoeuteal (resin tree), phdiek and other commercial grade species. Having felled the trees, Seng Kok Heang’s crews then moved the logs inside the plantation boundaries where they could be presented as a by-product of the authorised land conversion process. The Tumring formula – officially-sanctioned clear-felling within a valuable forest – provides almost unlimited scope for laundering illegally-logged timber.
3.4 Firewood Collection

With the rubber plantation project enjoying political support from the highest level, the logging syndicate was able to poach villagers’ resin trees and log outside the plantation boundaries with impunity. In the context of a national log transportation moratorium, however, the group adopted a more circumspect approach to moving the timber to the Kingwood factory. Surveillance by Global Witness staff in January 2003 revealed that the factory’s logs supplies arrived from Tumring only after dark, at an average of 6-7 trucks per night. Thanks to fraudulent permits supplied by the Forest Administration meanwhile, the trucks’ 60 m³ loads of two metre log sections assumed the guise of ‘firewood’. In the words of the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights:

“The Special Representative [UN Secretary General’s Special Representative on Human Rights in Cambodia Peter Leuprecht] visited Tumring Commune in July 2003 ... When meeting with local forestry officials, he personally witnessed the transport of five truckloads of large tree trunks, including those of resin trees. When he queried this, he was shown permits for firewood.”

The firewood permits offered not only a documentary pretext for the log transports, but also scope for tax evasion. While the royalty rate for the grade II chhoeuteal and phdiek logs transported from Tumring is US$54 per cubic metre, the corresponding rate for firewood is only US$1. Based on accounts from FA staff in Kompong Thom and Global Witness surveillance of trucks arriving at the Kingwood factory in 2003, it appears that Seng Keang Company transported a minimum of 20,000 m³ grade II wood out of Tumring in that year alone. This suggests that in 2003 the company should have returned at least US$1,000,000 in royalties to the Cambodian treasury. In 2006, however, Chan Sarun stated that in over three years Seng Keang Company had paid the government total timber royalties of less than US$600,000. The question of how much tax the logging syndicate should have paid is examined in more detail in section 4.6.

Commenting on the logging around Tumring in September 2003, an official in the Kompong Thom provincial forestry department stated that “The Ministry of Agriculture has licensed Mrs Seng Keang to collect cut trees for firewood since late 2002”. Meanwhile, Khun Thong’s son-in-law, FA Director General Ty Sokhun declared that “There is no log transportation. Some people use wood as firewood. If there are trees cut outside the plantation, we will crack down on it. There is no log exploitation business. There could be some clearing for farms.” He denied ever having heard of Seng Keang or Dy Chouch.

Writing in a letter to the international donor Working Group on Natural Resource Management in the same month, Khun Thong’s brother-in-law Chan Sarun asserted that “Up to date, as per the timber transport, MAFF continues implementing moratorium of the exploitation ban and effective logs transport.” Seng Keang’s staff informed associates in 2004 that the group was continuing to receive firewood permits from the Forest Administration.
3.5 Further Benefits
In September 2004, a few weeks after the formation of a new CPP-led government and his reappointment as Minister of MAFF, Chan Sarun issued a *prakas* authorising Seng Keang Company to establish a factory in Khaos village in Tumring for milling wood and processing veneer. This *prakas* contravenes the 1999 Sub-decree on Measures Restricting Certain Investment Sectors, which prohibits further investment in the processing of round logs. It also violates the 2002 Forest Law, Article 30 of which states that no processing facility may be established within five kilometres of the permanent forest reserve. The Forest Law adds that “The Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries may grant an exemption to (these) prohibitions if a study by the Forest Administration can demonstrate that the benefit of such an exception would not cause harm or have only minor social and environmental impacts”. Chan Sarun’s *prakas* makes no reference to any such study and FA officials based in Tumring informed Global Witness in 2005 that none had been conducted.

A credible Environmental and Social Impact Assessment would certainly have highlighted destructive and illegal logging by the Seng Keang Company. In any case, by mid 2004 Tumring had already attracted considerable attention for the environmental damage, loss of household income, destruction of spirit forests and intimidation being visited upon its population. Global Witness, other NGOs and journalists, not to mention local inhabitants themselves, had presented the authorities with ample evidence of what was occurring. Assuming that Chan Sarun was exercising his ministerial duties competently, he would have been fully aware of this information. In all likelihood, he simply chose to ignore it.

In 2006, the Minister defended his decision to issue the *prakas* in the following terms: “Our authorisation of the Seng Keang Company to create a sawmill in Tumring is in accordance with the Forest Law as it [the sawmill] is not within the forest boundaries but in the middle of the development zone of Tumring Rubber Plantation.”

This argument is unconvincing, as the plantation site is bounded on all sides by Prey Long and the Seng Keang Company sawmill site is less than a kilometre from the forest that forms the plantation’s eastern perimeter.

Chan Sarun’s authorisation raises further questions as to how he reconciles his conflicting arguments on Tumring and who is receiving the “benefit of conversion”. The Minister has claimed that there was little valuable timber in Tumring, yet he chose to authorise construction of a sawn wood and veneer factory operating no less than four production lines. Where did he expect that the Seng Keang Company would source its timber from?

Chan Sarun again appears to have breached Article 100 of the Forest Law. Yet, while almost certainly illegal, the Minister’s actions are entirely in keeping with a political culture in which public office is perceived as a licence to circumvent the law rather than a responsibility to enforce it.

In the final quarter of 2004, Seng Keang Company proceeded with the construction of a milling and veneer manufacturing plant equipped with new machinery imported from China. Its opening ceremony was graced by high-ranking officials from Phnom Penh. Seng Kok Heang took charge of managing the factory and by the end of 2004 it was processing large numbers of villagers’ resin trees cut outside the plantation boundaries.
3.6 Old logs and Donor Amnesia

In late 2004 Dy Chouch, Seng Keang and Khun Thong’s operations received an additional boost when the temporary lifting of the log transportation moratorium allowed them to use logs left in Tumring Rubber Plantation by the logging concessionaire Colexim Enterprise. Colexim Enterprise had taken a leading role in the early months of the clearing operation in Tumring and, according to its own records, “collected” 3,355 logs.\(^{159}\) Following the introduction of the moratorium, 2,812 of these logs remained stranded beside the road running through the plantation. Global Witness inspections of these logs revealed that at least 50% had resin-tapping holes, suggesting that the company had cut them illegally.\(^{160}\)

Collection of old logs is well-established as a cover for illegal logging operations in Cambodia and Hun Sen banned the practice in 1999. Unperturbed, Colexim lobbied persistently for permission to transport the logs from Tumring to its factory on National Route 5.\(^{161}\) In 2003 the company submitted a formal proposal to the government with the tacit encouragement of the World Bank.\(^{162}\) Meanwhile, Chan Sarun solicited support from the international donor Working Group on Natural Resource Management (WGNRM) for lifting the log transportation moratorium. The WGNRM responded with two letters to the minister which noted that:

“The proposed log transport cannot be separated from the origin of the logs. Our understanding of the development of the Tumring Rubber Plantation is very troubling ... communities have been displaced and lost their established livelihoods ... Our critical concern is that any authorised log movement should not create an opportunity for transport of new illegal logging [sic] or transport of illegally felled timber. It was for this reason that the Working Group urged in 2002 ... the present suspension of log transport.”\(^{163}\)

“We also see the environmental aspects (erosion) as well as the social issues of the Tumring project as closely linked with the wisdom of advancing on the controlled transport and sale of logs from the project site. Even with the clarifications you provide, we still can not endorse the movement of these logs.”\(^{164}\)

However, when Chan Sarun pushed for a resumption of log transportation at the December 2004 Consultative Group meeting, the donors decided to give the proposal their support. In the interim nothing had changed, beyond a deterioration of the situation in Tumring as Seng Keang Company’s operations expanded and more resin-tappers lost their trees. In January 2005 concessionaires began moving stockpiles of logs; many of them illegally-felled resin trees. Donor endorsement became Chan Sarun’s main justification for ending the log transportation moratorium.\(^{165}\)

Along with Colexim, one of the main beneficiaries was Seng Keang Company which, by the time timber transports resumed in January 2005, had bought more than a thousand of the logs in Tumring for US$216,397.\(^{166}\) The syndicate proceeded to take these logs to the Kingwood factory by truck before re-loading them onto barges and selling them to sawmills further down the Mekong River.\(^{166}\)

Donor representatives who had previously expressed concern about the proposed log transportation from Tumring raised no further questions about the origin of the logs or the wisdom of allowing dubious companies to profit from illegal activities. Neither did Swiss firm SGS, which had taken over as the official monitor of government efforts to tackle forest crime following the removal of Global Witness. SGS informed Global Witness in February 2007 that it “was not asked to investigate or provide any opinion regarding the origin of these logs which were harvested well before the start of the SGS contract. SGS was advised by the donor group that they had approved the transportation exercise on condition that it was supervised to try and ensure that no fresh or additional logs could enter the supply chain.”\(^{167}\)
4. Anatomy of an Illegal Logging Operation

Thanks to the rubber plantation project and the permits that Chan Sarun provided, Dy Chouch, Seng Keang and Khun Thong managed to establish themselves in the heart of Prey Long, Cambodia’s most valuable forest resource. It is unlikely that they could have selected a more suitable location for their activities and Tumring duly became the centre of the largest illegal logging operation in Cambodia. This section summarises the findings of Global Witness investigations into this operation’s main components.

4.1 Processing Capacity

From the time of the new factory’s establishment in Khaos village in Tumring in late 2004, the logging syndicate reduced its transportation of logs to the Kingwood factory in Kandal Province. Instead, it began processing logs into veneer sheets at a range of sites, before transporting them to the factory for assembly into plywood. This may have reflected a preference for a less conspicuous alternative to the illegal log transports repeatedly exposed by Global Witness, the UN and others. At the same time the syndicate began placing a greater emphasis on processing and trading sawn timber.

While the new factory in Khaos became the centre for these processing activities, the syndicate also made use of additional sites in Kompong Thom and Kompong Cham provinces. In Kompong Thom these included a sawmill near Kompong Thmor which local inhabitants claim Dy Chouch bought for around US$10,000 in early 2005.

The logging syndicate may also have acquired ownership of the El Dara factory nearby. People interviewed at the El Dara site in May 2005 stated that Dy Chouch had taken it over in March that year. El Dara workers informed Global Witness that they were producing veneer for use at the Kingwood plant. Aerial surveys of the site in November 2005 and September 2006 revealed that the factory was continuing to process logs into veneer sheet.
In Kompong Cham, the syndicate commissioned the processing of logs into veneer at a mill in Chamkar Andoung District known as Factory Number II. Workers at Factory Number II informed Global Witness in May 2004 that they were processing timber from natural forests into veneer sheet for plywood manufacture at Kingwood.\(^{49}\)

Close to the Kingwood factory itself, Global Witness found the group using an additional two sites for aspects of the plywood production process.\(^{170}\)

Khn Thong’s own sawmill on Route 2, meanwhile, remained fully active. Investigators visiting the site in April 2005 found it processing approximately 100 m³ of **beng** (luxury grade, protected species), **chhoeuteal** (resin tree wood) and **phdiek**. All this timber had been transferred from the Kingwood factory via the Mekong and Bassac rivers. The following month investigators observed a Forest Administration official arriving at the sawmill with a large military style truck loaded with luxury and grade I timber. The wood had been illegally logged in Pursat Province.\(^{471}\)

4.2 Feeding the Factories

Satellite imagery shows that by January 2005 the forest resource within Tumring Rubber Plantation was all but exhausted. Interviews with loggers, officials and local inhabitants, together with surveillance of cutting sites and truck movements, indicate that from late 2004, if not before, logging by the Seng Keang Company focused primarily on forests outside the plantation boundaries.\(^{172}\) Throughout 2005, Global Witness investigators found evidence of Seng Kok Heang’s loggers operating across Sandan and Santuk districts; in other words areas of Prey Long falling within the Colexim, GAT, Mieng Ly Heng and Pheapimex-Fuchan concessions. (Colexim, its track record and its links with the Seng Keang Company are profiled in Box 7.)

As with the Kingwood plant, the Seng Keang Company factory in Khaos processed primarily **chhoeuteal** (resin trees), **phdiek** and other commercial grade species suitable for veneer and construction timber.\(^{173}\) It also functioned as a depot for timber that loggers had already cut into planks or **may tap** (square logs) in the forest using chainsaws. This sawn wood included not only commercial grade timber, but also luxury species such as **beng**, **neang nuon** and **thnong**. In early 2005 much of this luxury wood was coming from the forest around Phnom Chi in the Pheapimex-Fuchan concession east of Tumring.\(^{168}\)

Global Witness also uncovered evidence of the logging syndicate casting its net beyond Kompong Thom Province in its efforts to maintain supply to its processing facilities. In May 2004 investigators discovered a large-scale logging operation inside the Timas Resources forest concession at the southern edge of Prey Long in Kompong Cham Province. The loggers said that they were working for Military Region II officers Sath Chantha\(^{188}\) and Uy Kear\(^{189}\) and that they were cutting to order for the Kingwood factory.\(^{190}\) More than two years into a moratorium on cutting in logging concessions, these activities were clearly illegal.
Box 7: Colexim – Cambodia’s Model Concession Company

“The most valuable point is we will be able to be the Model Company ... Colexim can be a best sample company for all concession companies in Cambodia, and then we hope they will try their best to follow Colexim.”

Extract from a petition sent by Colexim to the Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, Chan Sarun in December, 2003

Colexim controls a 147,187 ha logging concession covering western areas of Prey Long. The company’s owners are a Japanese firm called Okada, a Cambodian tycoon named Oknha So Sovann and the Cambodian government. Colexim has a well-documented record of illegal logging and violence against local residents. In 1997 one of its security guards murdered a resin tapper who tried to stop Colexim cutting down villagers’ resin trees.

Global Witness investigations during 2003 and 2004 found that illegal felling and fires had destroyed at least 1,000 ha of forest around Colexim’s Camp 99 logging base in Meanrith Commune. Agricultural businesses were buying the land and planting it with soybean and other crops. Local inhabitants accused Colexim subcontractors Cheng Savath and Svay Savath of orchestrating the logging and land sales with the collusion of FA and commune officials.

In June 2005, consultants hired by the World Bank to conduct a review of concessionaires’ sustainable forest management plans and environmental and social impact assessments conducted an aerial survey of the same area and made the following observation:

“Land grabbing, forest conversion: virtually all forests, which have been harvested by (Colexim) from 1996 to 2000 (some 18,800 ha) are now either irreversibly disturbed, encroached, largely converted already or about to be cleared.”

It is inconceivable that Colexim is not aware of this destruction. If the company is not directly responsible, its negligence alone would be sufficient grounds for cancelling its concession contract.

During 2005 and 2006, Global Witness conducted renewed investigations into illegal logging in the Colexim concession. Local people provided detailed accounts of illegal cutting of resin trees, which they claimed was orchestrated by Colexim subcontractors Svay Savath, Neak Sok Nai and Ngin Vanthai, together with Seng Kok Heang. They claimed that, once cut, the logs were being transported from the concession to the Seng Keang Company factory in Tumring. Staff at the El Dara plywood mill near Kompong Thom informed Global Witness in September 2005 that they had also been sourcing logs from Colexim’s Camp 99.

Global Witness conducted an aerial survey of the Camp 99 area in September 2006, and found that what had once been a small clearing in the forest had sprawled to denuded plain of around 5,000-6,000 ha.

In December 2006 Global Witness obtained an internal MAFF memo written for Chan Sarun that concerns debts owed by Colexim to a Cambodian bank and other creditors. This memo refers to a plan by CPP senator and tycoon Ly Yong Phat to buy some of Colexim’s land. In February 2007 Global Witness wrote to Ly Yong Phat to ask him if the land concerned was part of Colexim’s logging concession in Prey Long. At the time of this report’s publication, Ly Yong Phat had not replied.
4.3 The Suppliers

“In response to the claim of large-scale illegal logging 5-10 kilometres outside the rubber plantation area: in this case, according to the local Forest Administration, which fights forest crime, small-scale violations (secret cutting, wood-sawing and transportation by ox cart or horse cart) may sometimes arise in the forest area. These violations are carried out by the people living in and adjacent to the forest to support their livelihoods, especially during drought and in order to use timber products for necessary local public construction. Meanwhile, competent officials from the local Forest Administration have strengthened law enforcement to prevent and continuously combat forest crimes.”

MAFF Minister Chan Sarun, 2006

The suppliers of timber to the Seng Keang Company operation in Tumring comprised three main groups:

1. A small group of salaried employees working for Seng Kok Heang who supervised logging operations. Each of these staff received basic pay of up to US$220 per month.191
2. Full-time logging crews paid US$15-US$25 for each cubic metre cut. Seng Kok Heang provided these workers with equipment and protection and sent his own vehicles to collect the logs from the cutting sites. In 2005 he was using around five bush trucks for this purpose.191
3. Timber traders supplying the factory on a freelance basis. These traders took responsibility for finding their own equipment and paying off corrupt officials. They could not necessarily count on Seng Kok Heang’s support if they encountered difficulties. On the other hand, Seng Keang Company paid them more per cubic metre of processed timber delivered to the factory. In 2005 Seng Kok Heang paid such suppliers around US$150 per cubic metre of grade I timber and US$75-US$100 for grade II. These timber traders typically used either small Korean trucks or hired ox carts (each able to carry 1-1.25 m³) to transport wood to the factory.191

Labourers working for the timber traders sat at the bottom of this pecking order. Most came as migrant workers from other areas, sometimes living in the forest for weeks at a time during logging operations. Loggers interviewed by Global Witness in November 2005 stated that their employer, a military policeman supplying Seng Kok Heang, paid them US$30-US$50 each per month depending on the volume of wood they had cut and processed.192

The exact number of people and machines involved is hard to estimate; however in mid 2005 a resident of Tumring with close connections to the Seng Keang Company informed Global Witness that there were 52 chainsaws in Tumring Commune alone.193 In the same year community forestry activists recorded 131 chainsaws and 12 mobile sawmills across all communes of Sandan District.194

Cutting a resin tree into planks several kilometres south of the Tumring Rubber Plantation boundaries, October 2003. (Inset) Logger’s order book at cutting site outside the plantation boundaries, November 2005
4.4 Transportation
A Seng Keang Company employee describing himself as the firm’s transportation manager informed Global Witness in November 2005 that the company was using a fleet of five trucks and transporting 3-4 truckloads of timber out of Tumring each day.195 This statement tallies with Global Witness’ own observations of activity around the Seng Keang sawmill in Tumring.

Many of the trucks used by Seng Keang Company belonged to Brigade 70, the elite military unit in which Seng Kok Heang is an officer.196 Brigade 70’s timber transportation service is a nationwide operation which is described in detail in Chapter IV. Its 10-wheeled military green trucks typically bear Royal Cambodian Armed Forces licence plates and some display a ‘70’ plaque against the windscreen. Global Witness investigators have tracked these trucks from Prey Long to the Kingwood factory and have gathered accounts of the unit’s collaboration with Seng Keang Company from Brigade 70 soldiers, timber traders and local people.197

4.5 The Markets
Seng Keang Company supplies some of the commercial and luxury grade wood that it illegally logs in Prey Long to Cambodia’s domestic market. Global Witness has gathered information from various sources suggesting that a significant proportion may be consumed outside the country however:

- Supplies of logs from Prey Long have enabled continued industrial-scale production of plywood at the Kingwood factory. As outlined in Box 8, there are strong indications that much of this product is being exported to China.
- As detailed in Chapter IV, Brigade 70 is heavily implicated in the trafficking of timber to Vietnam.198 The unit may well have been transporting wood logged by Seng Keang Company in Prey Long across Cambodia’s eastern border.
- Well-placed sources have informed Global Witness that Dy Chouch is involved in the illegal export of luxury grade timber in shipping containers via ports on Cambodia’s south coast.199 Global Witness wrote to Dy Chouch in February 2007 to ask for his comment on this allegation but has not received a reply.
Box 8: Cambodia’s Invisible Timber Exports

After the 2002 moratoria on logging in concessions and transporting logs, the Kingwood factory was the only one that continued to operate. From 2001 Kingwood’s factory started making a new type of plywood using a mix of timber from natural forest and wood from old rubber trees grown in plantations. This production line continued following the company’s takeover in August 2002 by Dy Chouch, Seng Keang and Khun Thong. From 2004 the Seng Keang Company also began manufacturing veneer sheets at various sites around Prey Long and transporting them to the Kingwood factory for assembly into finished plywood.

Investigations by Global Witness between 2002 and 2006 found that the Seng Keang Company was the only firm in Cambodia manufacturing plywood or veneer on an industrial scale. The company also became a leading producer of sawn timber over the same period.

The government promoted exports of Kingwood-manufactured plywood ...

In April 2004, the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries staged a trade exhibition to promote the export of Cambodian products. The exhibits included samples of three different types of plywood, all of which carried the label “made from rubber wood”. In separate interviews, two MAFF officials informed Global Witness that this plywood came from “Hun Chouch’s factory in Muk Kampoul District on Route 6”, i.e. the Kingwood plant. One of the MAFF officials stated that plywood was made from 100% rubber wood, while the other described it as a rubber wood-timber mix. Certainly, the grain and texture of the veneer used in the plywood samples resembled that of commercial grade timber rather than rubber tree wood.

... but no exports of plywood and sawn wood were recorded in official government statistics.

Following the moratorium on logging in concessions from 2002, official Cambodian government figures suggest that timber exports nose-dived. Statistics published by the Forest Administration show no plywood exports in the years 2003 and 2004. The trade in sawn wood appears to have stopped earlier, with no exports recorded between 2000 and 2004. The Cambodian government has not published any timber export statistics for the years 2005 and 2006. Global Witness has written to the Forest Administration to request these sets of figures but has not received a reply.

However imports of Cambodian timber products continued to be registered by other countries ...

International trade figures paint a rather different picture of Cambodian timber exports. These figures show that, between 2003 and the end of 2006, China imported from Cambodia a total of approximately 28,000 m3 of plywood worth US$16 million. They also show that, from 2003 to 2005, Cambodia exported plywood in much smaller quantities to Australia, Singapore, Taiwan and elsewhere.

Figures for sawn wood are much higher – 150,000 m3 exported from Cambodia to China between 2003 and 2007 at an approximate import value of US$34 million.

... with worrying implications for the Cambodian treasury.

Both plywood and sawn timber exports from Cambodia are taxed at 10% of their value and the total loss to the Cambodian government on untaxed plywood shipments to China between 2003 and 2006 may have amounted to US$1.5 million. Losses on unregistered sawn timber appear to be double that figure.

Global Witness is unable to say with certainty what percentage of these exports involved the Seng Keang Company. However, as the only known industrial-scale producer of plywood and veneer active in Cambodia at the time, it is highly likely that the firm played a significant role in the multi-million dollar trade in plywood. As perhaps the largest sawmill operator in the country, there is a strong possibility that it accounted for a sizeable share of the sawn wood trade as well.
a) Sawn wood

Cambodian sawn timber exports according to Cambodia
- 2003: US$0, 0 m³
- 2004: US$4.8m, 24,100 m³
- 2005: US$7m, 37,200 m³
- 2006: US$11.7m, 48,900 m³

Cambodian sawn timber imports into China according to China
- 2003: US$0, 0 m³
- 2004: US$9.5m, 43,800 m³
- 2005: US$11.7m, 43,800 m³
- 2006: US$0m, 0 m³

b) Plywood

Cambodian plywood exports according to Cambodia
- 2003: US$0, 0 m³
- 2004: US$8.6m, 16,100 m³
- 2005: US$2.7m, 4,600 m³
- 2006: US$0m, 0 m³

Cambodian plywood imports into China according to China
- 2003: US$0, 0 m³
- 2004: US$4.9m, 7,400 m³
- 2005: US$0m, 0 m³
- 2006: US$0m, 0 m³

c) Estimated lost tax revenue for the Cambodian government: 2003 - 2006

Estimated tax revenue due to the Cambodian government for sawnwood and plywood exports to China, 2003-2006
- US$4.5m

Confirmed tax revenue collected by the Cambodian government for sawnwood and plywood exports to China, 2003-2006
- US$0

Note 1: the products shown in this figure account for the overwhelming majority of China’s declared timber imports from Cambodia.
Note 2: 2006 data are estimated here by multiplying the sum for the first eleven months of 2006 by 12/11.
Note 3: Sawn wood commodity was calculated using HS Codes for sawn wood and for sawn wood n.e.s. (not elsewhere specified). Sawn wood n.e.s describes non-coniferous wood and could include tropical sawn wood.
Note 4: Based on other bilateral trade flows, it is reasonable to assume that the unit value of timber in Cambodia would be approximately 10% less than the value of the same timber in China. The tax revenue due to the Cambodian government has been estimated using the conservative figure of 90% of the import values declared in China.
4.6 Outputs and Financial Returns

Because of the illegal nature of Seng Keang Company’s activities, there are no credible official statistics on the amount of timber the firm has cut in Prey Long. Global Witness has, however, compiled data on the group’s operation that permit estimates of output covering the period since it established its factory in Khaos village at the end of 2004.

What volumes of timber have the Seng Keang Company processed at its factory in Tumring?

People living beside the road leading out of Tumring whom Global Witness interviewed in 2005 and 2006, stated that over a 24 hour period they usually saw or heard two to three loaded trucks leaving the plantation. Seng Keang Company’s transportation manager informed Global Witness in November 2005 that it was transporting on average three to four truckloads of sawn timber each day. Each of the Seng Keang Company vehicles carried at least 60 m³ of processed wood.

These estimates of between two and four truckloads of timber per day correspond with Global Witness’ observations of truck movements over the same period. Assuming that the company was using an average of three trucks per day, this would suggest output of 180 m³ of sawn timber per day, 4,680 m³ per month and over 56,000 m³ per year.

What does this equate to in terms of volumes of logs consumed?

A standard international conversion rate for round wood (logs) processed into sawn timber is 1.8; in other words it takes 1.8 m³ of logs to produce one cubic metre of sawn timber. In reality, significant amounts of the Seng Keang Company’s timber were processed in the forest using chainsaws and therefore converted much less efficiently. Using the 1.8 conversion rate, however, one can conservatively estimate the syndicate’s consumption of logs as approximately 324 m³ of round wood per day; 8,424 m³ per month and over 100,000 m³ per year.

It is worth noting that such volumes are far in excess of what logging concessionaires were permitted to cut. Dy Chouch, Seng Keang and Khun Thong’s erstwhile employers Kingwood, for example, were entitled to harvest a maximum of 35,000 m³ per year.

In March 2006 Chan Sarun offered MAFF’s assessment of Seng Keang Company’s logging activities in the area:

“Up to late 2005, Seng Keang Company collected forest and by-products from the cleared Tumring Rubber Plantation to a total amount of 12,204.696 m³ of round and mixed types of logs and 2,023 stere of saplings and firewood.”

While admirably precise, these figures are extremely low, bearing in mind that Seng Keang Company officially commenced operations in Tumring in October 2002. Chan Sarun’s calculation of the total log volume the company extracted in over three years is equivalent to the amount of logs that its factory in Tumring was processing every 38 working days.

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Workers loading timber inside the Seng Keang Company factory, September 2005

\* Based on 52 six day working weeks in a year.

\*\* A stere is a unit used to measure volumes of stacked timber and equates to one cubic metre.
What were the financial returns to Seng Keang Company and the state?

Global Witness has gathered a range of data about the costs to the Seng Keang Company of logging, transporting timber, paying workers and bribing officials, but has no figure for the syndicate’s overall outgoings and profit margin. Nonetheless it is clear that the returns on its logging and timber processing operation have been considerable. Calculated at the 2006 Phnom Penh price for sawn grade II wood of US$235 per cubic metre, Seng Keang Company’s yearly output of processed timber from Tumring would be worth over US$13 million.  

This figure does not account for the substantial quantities of logs the Seng Keang Company was converting into veneer and plywood, which is worth more than sawn wood. It also ignores the more valuable grade I and luxury woods the syndicate cut and sold, as well as the higher returns it would have received on any timber products it exported.

According to Chan Sarun, between the point at which it officially commenced operations in Tumring and the end of 2005, “the [Seng Keang] Company also paid US$594,987.92 and 8,496,600 riel in taxes to the state”; in other words just short of US$600,000. In a sense questions regarding the amount Seng Keang Company paid in taxes are academic, given that the vast numbers of trees it cut illegally should not have been felled in the first place. Nevertheless, it is indicative of the overall loss to Cambodia, if only in financial terms, when one considers that taxing the syndicate’s 100,000 m³ annual round log consumption at the royalty levels applied to grade II wood – US$54 per cubic metre – would have netted the treasury US$5.4 million per year.
Forest Destruction and Institutional Corruption in Cambodia
5. A Rural Gangland

The Seng Keang Company’s representative in Tumring, Seng Kok Heang, used a combination of familial connections, bribery, threats and acts of violence to establish a personal fiefdom in the area. Local people interviewed by Global Witness invariably knew him as “Hun Sen’s relative” and saw this connection with the prime minister as a source of great power.\(^{14}\) Police and military police provided accounts of him buying influence through monthly payments to officials.\(^{20}\) In addition, Seng Kok Heang employed a group of twenty to thirty armed men, several of them drawn from the ranks of the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces.\(^{29}\) This private militia helped him to keep tabs on local opponents and outsiders visiting Tumring.\(^{21}\)

5.1 Resin Tree Theft

Interviews with loggers and visits to cutting sites in Prey Long suggest that resin-producing *ebhoentel* trees accounted for at least 50% of the wood processed in the Seng Keang Company factory in Khaos village.\(^{21}\)

Having exhausted the supply of resin trees and other timber within the plantation, Seng Kok Heang focused on the surrounding forests. At the end of 2005, Global Witness found teams of his loggers cutting up to eight kilometres from the plantation perimeter. As a result, resin tappers continued to lose their trees and the income these provided.\(^{21}\) Resin tappers in Tum Ar village on the edge of the plantation, told Global Witness in 2006 that in the past all of the 100 families living there had owned 200-300 resin trees each. Now only 5-6 families had any trees left at all.\(^{21}\) In Rumchek village in Sokchet Commune villagers reported losing 800 resin trees to Seng Kok Heang’s loggers in mid 2005 alone.\(^{16}\)

According to resin tappers, Seng Keang Company would sometimes pay them compensation for cutting their trees. The sums involved were derisory however, – US$1.25-US$12.5 for a tree whose timber might sell for as much as US$1,000 in Phnom Penh.\(^{21}\) Seng Kok Heang and those working for him offered these payments on a ‘take it or leave it’ basis. As one villager put it: “Mr. 95 [Seng Kok Heang] is the most powerful because he threatens the resin tappers, saying to them ‘I will cut your trees, whether you sell them to me or not’ ... only Mr. 95 would dare to say this.”\(^{21}\)
5.2 Dealing with Dissent

From the early stages of the Tumring plantation project, local people trying to protect the forest met with threats from the loggers. A report on plantations published in November 2004 by the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights made a clear link between this intimidation and the presence in Tumring of Seng Kok Heang, alias Mr. 95.

“A man who goes by the name of ‘Ta Kao Pram’ [meaning 95 in Khmer; his radio call sign is 95] heads the security guards of Mieng Ly Heng Company, and has a particularly brutal reputation. He is the brother of Seng Keang, the director of Seng Keang Company, the main subcontractor of Mieng Ly Heng. In Roniem village, people reported that they have been frequently threatened with death for their attempts to block illegal logging and illegal transport.”

Persistent intimidation of this sort gave way to outright violence on 10 July 2005, when Seng Kok Heang is reported to have tried to kill two local men who had played a leading role in protecting villagers’ resin trees.

Global Witness interviewed eyewitnesses to the attacks on the two men the day after they occurred and conducted follow-up investigations in Tumring in September and November 2005. The UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights investigated the case from July to October 2005. Two other NGOs also went to Tumring to gather information about what happened. The description of events in Box 9 is based on the findings of the investigations by Global Witness, the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNOHCHR) and the two NGOs.
Box 9: Account of the Shootings of 10 July 2005

On 9 July 2005, the community forestry group based in Tum Ar village in Tumring organised a meeting to hear the complaints of families whose resin trees had recently been cut. In all, 19 families complained of losing trees since the beginning of May. One villager said that they had lost 38 trees since the beginning of June. Another had lost 96 over the same period. All had been felled outside the rubber plantation boundary and taken to the Seng Keang Company factory.216

On the morning of 10 July the community forest group sent a team of eight people to four locations in the forest near Tum Ar to check for illegal logging. At one site near Trapeang Boeung, they discovered a group of six loggers cutting up a resin tree. The loggers refused to surrender their chainsaws for confiscation so the community forest team proceeded to the sangkat (Triage) Forest Administration office in Khaos village to report the incident. Leaving one of their members at the FA office, the community forest team, along with two FA staff and three soldiers, then returned to the forest to apprehend the loggers. As the group approached the logging site, gunmen within the forest fired shots in their direction and then fled the scene leaving behind one chainsaw.216

While they were in the forest, Seng Kok Heang came to the FA office in Khaos village. Finding a community forester there, Seng Kok Heang threatened the man, telling him that he wished to kill him.217 Seng Kok Heang left shortly afterwards, but returned at around 3pm accompanied by five armed men wearing military uniform and bearing assault rifles. Seng Kok Heang himself carried a pistol. Others in the FA office at this point included three FA officials, a representative of official independent forest monitor SGS and seven or eight individuals associated with the timber business.218

According to eyewitnesses, Seng Kok Heang again stated his intention to kill the community forester and tore up the reports that the community forest group had written about their attempt to intercept loggers earlier in the day.219 He also threatened the FA staff, saying that if any of them helped the community intercept his loggers again, he would kill them.217 At around 7pm Seng Kok Heang and his companions left the FA office saying they were going to Tum Ar village. Before departing, Seng Kok Heang told the community forester that he should not try to leave the FA office as he had already blocked all the roads out of the area.217

First shooting

At around 7pm a group of six men arrived on motorbikes at the house of another member of the Tum Ar community forest group. According to eyewitnesses, five of the men were dressed in military fatigues, while the sixth wore camouflage trousers and a white t-shirt – the same combination that Seng Kok Heang had been wearing in the FA office shortly beforehand.218 One of the men called to the community forester to come out of his house. When he did not reply, the man wearing the white t-shirt fired seven shots from a pistol.218 Some of the bullets passed through the wall and narrowly missed the villager and his family who were sheltering inside.220

Approximately five minutes after the shooting a military police officer named Chea Kapoul221 came and recovered six of the seven cartridge cases left on the ground outside the house.218 Chea Kapoul is known to work closely with Seng Kok Heang in the coordination of timber transportation out of Tumring.222

Second shooting

At around 7:30pm, Seng Kok Heang and two bodyguards returned to the FA office in Khaos village.223 By this stage those present consisted of the community forest activist, two FA officers, the three soldiers who had gone to the forest with the community forest team that morning and the representative of SGS.217 According to eyewitnesses, Seng Kok Heang took out a pistol and rammed it into the chest of the community forester, pulling the trigger as he did so.224 The impact of the gun muzzle caused the man to stumble and the bullet grazed the side of his body rather than hitting him directly.224 One of the bodyguards then knocked the gun from the hand of Seng Kok Heang, who proceeded to leap on the victim, bite him and pull his hair before being restrained by his companions.225 Seng Kok Heang then left the FA office.218
Following the attacks it took the two victims more than 24 hours to escape from Tumring. Taxi drivers refused to take them for fear of an ambush by Seng Kok Heang’s paramilitaries on the road through the forest.\textsuperscript{168}

In the aftermath, some officials privately expressed a desire to take action against Seng Kok Heang and his entourage but said they were unable to do so because of his high-level connections.\textsuperscript{226} Meanwhile the Forest Administration, in whose office one of the attacks occurred, proved reluctant to provide information on what had happened and the two FA staff present on 10 July signed statements saying they had not seen the shooting.

SGS, whose representative was in the FA office in Khaos on the afternoon and evening of 10 July, made no comment on the incident in any of their reports. This omission contrasts with SGS’ coverage of an incident in Preah Vihear Province the previous year in which a gunman fired shots at an FA office.\textsuperscript{227}

In February 2007 Global Witness wrote to SGS to ask why it did not report the shooting. SGS responded that “to the best of our knowledge SGS had a staff member staying in the Khaos village at that time who verbally reported on his return to base, that a drunken policeman or soldier apparently fired his gun. We understand that he did not actually witness the event and deemed it prudent to keep out of the way. This incident was not seen to be an issue of forest crime but probably one of drunken violence which in our experience was not uncommon in Cambodia. Hence there was no official SGS report on this incident.”\textsuperscript{167}

The Special Representative of the Secretary General on Human Rights in Cambodia, Yash Ghai highlighted the attacks in a published report however, noting that:

“The strongest and most infamous security guard group [in Tumring] is commanded by Kok Heang, brother of the director of the Seng Keang Company. His group is reliably reported to have been involved in bribery, coercion, harassment, threats and actual shooting incidents, including of two forestry community activists in July 2005. The provincial authorities say they are concerned, but need help from the national authorities to disarm and investigate Kok Heang and his group, and to improve the security situation in Tumring. The problem has been brought to the attention of the Ministry of the Interior and the Special Representative hopes that its intervention will be effective. As previously recommended, criminal offences committed by company security guards and militia on concessions and rubber plantations must be investigated and prosecuted; and they should be disarmed, in compliance with existing law”\textsuperscript{228}

As this report went to press, the authorities had taken no action to apprehend Seng Kok Heng or to prosecute him. The victims, together with their families, remain in hiding.

From the perspective of the logging syndicate, the shootings seemed to have had the desired effect. Global Witness and other NGOs visiting Tumring in the months following the attacks found local inhabitants more afraid of Seng Kok Heang than ever. The community forest group that previously advocated for local people’s rights appeared moribund. As one villager put it “We don’t dare go to the forest alone so much as before. If we do go alone, we go with fear”.\textsuperscript{229} Another family told Global Witness that because of the threat posed by the loggers, they actually had to spend more time away from home living in the forest, because it was the only way they could hope to protect their resin trees.
Box 10: In Search of Mr. 95

On field visits to Tumring in September and November 2005 Global Witness sought a meeting with Seng Kok Heang to get his comment on the allegations made against him.

In September, Global Witness staff visited the Seng Keang Company factory and were informed by workers that Seng Kok Heang was at his house on the other side of the road. A group of guards playing table tennis in the yard outside the house told Global Witness that they did not know where Seng Kok Heang was, did not have his phone number and could not suggest any means of contacting him.

During a follow-up visit in November, Global Witness staff accompanied by a newspaper reporter asked Forest Administration staff in Khaos village where Seng Kok Heang could be found and what he looked like. Following the directions given by the FA officers, Global Witness and the journalist went to a restaurant in Khaos and came across the same table-tennis playing guards encountered at Seng Kok Heang’s house a few weeks before. One member of this group closely matched the FA staff’s description of Seng Kok Heang and the newspaper reporter approached the man to ask if he could interview him. Their brief conversation ran as follows:

Journalist: “We’ve been told you’re Mr. 95”
Man (agitated): “I’m not 95, you can ask anyone ... (to companion) ... They think I’m 95!”
Companion: “Yes, but you are 96”

The man then left the restaurant in a hurry and went into Seng Kok Heang’s house on the other side of the road.

Global Witness filmed the interview and later played back the footage to the FA staff, asking if they could help identify Mr Kimchheng/Mr 96. The foresters explained that the man’s full name was Huor Kimchheng, and that he was the deputy chief of their office. They did not say, however, why Huor Kimchheng seemed to be so friendly with Seng Kok Heang’s entourage or why he might have a radio call sign ‘96’ in the same numerical sequence as other members of the group.

While the apparently cosy relations between Huor Kimchheng and Seng Kok Heang’s group are not proof of wrong-doing, they do fit with a wider pattern of FA complicity in the Seng Keang Company’s illegal logging activities. The extent of this complicity is examined in more detail in Chapter III.

In addition to the efforts to meet Seng Kok Heang in person, Global Witness has also written him a letter to ask him for his comment on the shootings of 10 July 2005. At the time this report was published Seng Kok Heang had not replied to this letter, however.
6. Crackdown or Pause?

In March 2006 MAFF Minister Chan Sarun issued a prakas revoking his earlier authorisations for Seng Keang Company operations. The prakas stated that the company could no longer collect timber in Tumring and called for the removal of the factory in Khaos village with immediate effect.

While the factory did not close immediately, by September 2006 practically all traces of the Seng Keang Company operation were gone. Local inhabitants informed Global Witness that the syndicate had stopped cutting and transporting timber from the area earlier that same month. Resin tappers reported that illegal logging in the area had ceased almost completely.

Chan Sarun has not commented publicly on his signing of the prakas; however one Forest Administration official told Global Witness in September 2006 that Seng Keang Company simply left the area at the point that it finished cutting the trees within the plantation perimeter. Given that the syndicate’s logging had largely focused on forest outside the plantation boundaries since the end of 2004 if not earlier, this explanation can be discounted; indeed Seng Keang Company had every reason to maintain its presence in Prey Long. It appears more likely that the shootings by Seng Kok Heang and the subsequent investigations by the UNOHCHR and NGOs played a decisive role in persuading the government to act. In the absence of an official explanation, however, the precise rationale remains unclear.

Unfortunately, the removal of the Seng Keang Company factory from Tumring has not yet been matched by moves to hold members of the logging syndicate accountable before the law. In the absence of credible legal action against the group, there are worrying signs that it may simply re-establish itself in another area. Box 11 summarises the group’s efforts to acquire new economic land concessions within or close to valuable forests.

In addition, information received by Global Witness in March 2007 indicates that the syndicate has resumed its illegal logging operations in Prey Long. According to a well-placed source working in Kompong Thom, Seng Kok Heang is using a fleet of Seng Keang Company trucks to transport illegally-felled wood from the Tumring area on a daily basis. This source informed Global Witness that Seng Kok Heang was processing the timber in a factory 5 km from the Kingwood plant in Kandal Province.
Box 11: The Logging Syndicate’s Next Big Score

Breakthroughs such as the 2002 moratoria on cutting in logging concessions and transporting logs show that outside pressure can be effective in persuading the Cambodian government to act against illegal logging, even when the interests of politically influential groups are at stake. Unless the pressure is maintained, however, friends and relatives of the prime minister’s family are rarely kept waiting long for the next lucrative deal. Seng Keang Company’s rapid evolution from logging concession subcontractors to plantation developers following the moratoria is a case in point. Pheapimex’s shift in focus from logging concessions to economic land concessions (ELCs) is another. (Pheapimex is profiled in Chapter IV.)

A little over a month after the shootings in Tumring, the Seng Keang Company began efforts to acquire an ELC inside the Prey Long forest. Seng Keang wrote a letter to the governor of Kompong Thom Province requesting the assistance of “officials of concerned agencies to conduct a survey on 9,800 ha of degraded forest in Kleng, Koul and Tumring communes, Sandan District, Kompong Thom Province for investment and planting of fast-growing trees over a 70-year period in order to produce raw materials”. The letter goes on to describe the investment as “aimed at contributing to the restoration of the forests and development in Cambodia, and poverty reduction and the creation of employment for communities and people living in the area.” Within a week of receiving her proposal, the Kompong Thom authorities had formed a commission of Forest Administration staff and other officials to survey the 9,800 ha of land. In September 2005 the commission went with Seng Kok Heang to inspect the site and found that it contained both commercially valuable evergreen forest and areas claimed by local residents as community forests.

In September 2006 Global Witness learned from two well-placed sources that the Forest Administration had received proposals from Dy Chouch and Seng Keang to clear up to 10,000 ha of land in Preah Vihear Province for a new rubber plantation. The land under consideration is reportedly not densely forested. However, it is said to be close to the boundaries of the Kulen Prom Tep Wildlife Sanctuary and the Cherndar Plywood forest concession. If these reports are correct, the ELC’s proposed location would create opportunities for illegal logging in nearby valuable forests and then laundering of the timber as a by-product of the plantation development, just as Seng Keang Company has done in Tumring.

In March 2007 an official informed Global Witness that Dy Chouch and his cousin Hun To had requested two 2,000 ha sites as economic land concessions (ELCs) in Preah Vihear. These proposed ELCs were described as being north of the road between the villages of Sra Em and Choam Khsan in Choam Khsan District, close to a Royal Cambodian Armed Forces base. Another well-placed source confirmed that Hun To had submitted proposals for two new ELCs but said that they each covered 1,000 ha rather than 2,000 ha. This second source provided Global Witness with documents showing that the proposed ELCs are inside the Preah Vihear Protected Forest, in the An Ses area close to the border with Thailand.

At the time this report was published it was not clear how many of these proposals for new ELCs had received official approval.
At the same time, there are indications that the government continues to view Prey Long as a timber quarry. According to NGO workers, from 10 to 13 January 2007, local officials and representatives of the Vietnam Rubber Plantation Company, some of them dressed in Vietnamese military uniform, carried out a survey in three communes – Sandan, Dong Kambet and Mean Rith – all of which are heavily forested. They did not carry out any consultations with local people; however a witness to their discussions reported that the firm was studying an area of 40,800 ha.236 A Vietnamese general accompanying the party informed villagers that the company’s proposed plantation concession covered 200,000 ha.236

The same sources report that the Vietnamese company returned to Prey Long on 21 February.236 The firm is said to have requested that officials help it overcome local opposition to its proposed activities.236 District and commune officials then convened a public meeting about the plantations on 23 February and brought with them a contingent of military police and soldiers. At this meeting the officials told villagers that the forest belonged to the government, that the government could do what it wanted with the forest and that local people should not cause any trouble.236 One community leader is reported to have been threatened with arrest for encouraging people to oppose the Vietnamese company’s plans for the area.236

Global Witness has written to Chan Sarun to ask him about the plans for a new rubber plantation in Prey Long but has not yet received a reply. The limited information available thus far does not point to a direct connection between the Vietnam Rubber Plantation Company and Seng Keang Company. However, past experience suggests that a deal to clear-cut tens of thousands of hectares of Cambodia’s most valuable forest would almost certainly involve timber barons with close ties to senior officials in Phnom Penh.

The report thus far has focused primarily on illegal logging by members of elite families, with particular reference to Prey Long. The next chapter looks more closely at the role played by those state institutions responsible for stopping them.
Chapter II: Keeping it in the Family

A Short History of Forest Management in Cambodia

1. The Logging Concession System

If I cannot stop the logging concession companies, I will cut my throat!

2. The Prime-Ministerial Crackdown
On behalf of the government, I am delighted to receive Mighty Termite Company’s proposal to make a plantation.
Chapter III: Institutionalised Corruption in Prey Long

Dy Chouch, Seng Keang and Khun Thong have been able to log Prey Long with impunity because of the high levels of corruption within those state agencies responsible for combating forest crime. As set out in Article 78 of the Forest Law, these institutions include the Forest Administration (FA), police, Royal Cambodian Armed Forces and local government.

In forest crime hotspots like Prey Long, impunity for illegal loggers and corruption in the state apparatus feed off each other in a vicious circle. Logging by a group of ‘untouchables’, such as Dy Chouch, Seng Keang and Khun Thong, creates opportunities for state agencies to make money by ‘protecting’ their operations. These opportunities attract more officials to the area, many of whom pay their superiors in order to make the transfer. As well as accepting handouts from the principal timber barons, these corrupt officials have an incentive to tolerate other illegal logging ventures by less powerful groups, because this enables them to extort extra money. The corruption and the illegal logging both escalate and the assault on the forest intensifies. According to one military officer, Kompong Thom Province is seen as a choice posting for civil servants and members of the security forces because of the scope for making money from the illegal timber and bush meat trades.

The consequence in Prey Long has been a concentration of officials who have a remit to tackle forest crime. This is particularly pronounced in the case of the Forest Administration and the military police.

After the inauguration of the rubber plantation kicked off a frenzy of illegal logging, the FA maintained not one, but two offices (division and triage) in Tumring. At the same time, the military police established a string of new checkpoints around the plantation and along roads running out of the area. Both institutions quickly proved adept at uncovering cases of forest crime in the locality and identifying those responsible. However, through an inverted system of governance they used this capacity as basis for extortion rather than law enforcement.

This corrupted system is not run by rogue elements, however. Members of the FA and the military police in Kompong Thom describe paying a high proportion of their illegal earnings to their superiors at either national or provincial level. The fact that a generous cut of the profits flows up the chain of command, rather than remaining in the pockets of the officials on the ground, suggests that both institutions exercise considerable control over their staff and the acts of extortion that they commit.

The losers in all this are those whose livelihoods depend on the diminishing forest reserves and those least able to afford payments to corrupt officials, who extort not only from illegal loggers, but also those exercising their legal rights as forest users. In areas like Prey Long, the vast majority of the local population falls into both categories.

1. Forest Administration
As the institution directly responsible for managing the exploitation and policing of one of Cambodia’s most valuable natural resources, the FA offers significant opportunities for corruption.

As with other government agencies responsible for enforcing the law or collecting fines or taxes, notably the police, customs, and the Ministry of Economy and Finance Department of Taxation, the FA tends to attract applicants intent on enriching themselves through abuse of public office. Entry into and promotion within the FA is dictated largely by payment rather than competence. This ‘market’ system of job-buying has the effect of sidelining those staff with greater professional integrity and rewarding those most adept at generating money.

The pricing of jobs within the FA is determined not only by rank, but also by geographical location. Outside of its Phnom Penh headquarters, the more expensive positions are those in areas where there is a rich and accessible forest resource or along key transport arteries for the timber trade, such as major roads and rivers. According to one insider, positions in Kompong Thom command the highest price of any province, followed by those in Siem Reap, Kandal and Koh Kong provinces. Box 12 describes the FA job auction organised by the Minister for Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries Chan Sarun and FA Director General Ty Sokhun in 2003.
Box 12: Chan Sarun and Ty Sokhun’s Forest Administration Job Auction

Up until 2003 the institution responsible for exploiting and regulating Cambodia’s production forests was MAFF’s Department of Forestry and Wildlife (DFW). The 2002 Forest Law called for DFW’s reconstitution as a more autonomous body however, and in August 2003 MAFF Minister Chan Sarun issued a prakas converting DFW into the FA. The new FA featured a hierarchical structure incompatible with that of other state institutions, blurring the lines of accountability between FA staff and other government officials. The World Bank observed that:

“By having frequently deviated from forest boundaries in favour of administrative boundaries, the new FA structure has created a worst of both worlds situation where local FA staff are internally accountable to national supervision in respect of areas otherwise locally administered. Moreover, the FA structure has been devised in isolation from serious examination of budgetary realities and other constraints. This will leave operational units of FA chronically short of resources with inadequate oversight, support and a lack of accountability.”

While the restructuring of DFW may have had its limitations as an exercise in administrative reform, it appears to have made a lot of money for both Chan Sarun and Ty Sokhun. Global Witness has interviewed four individuals with close links to the FA who have provided credible accounts of the manner in which the two men took the opportunity to auction off most, if not all the jobs in the FA. Based on the information provided by these sources, it appears that the main elements of this process were as follows:

• Any DFW staff member wanting to become the head or deputy head of an FA office at any of the four new hierarchical levels – inspectorate, cantonment, division or triage – had to pay a bribe. This applied even to officials seeking a position equivalent to the one they already held under the DFW structure.

• The bribes for the positions at the upper three levels of inspectorate (4 offices), cantonment (15 offices) and division (55 offices) were paid to Chan Sarun. Bribes for positions at Triage level (170 offices) were paid to Ty Sokhun.

• Each FA office chief has at least one deputy (in practice there are sometimes several). These deputy chief positions were also put up for sale. This means that there may have been upwards of 500 FA jobs for sale at the time of the restructuring.

• The prices of the jobs varied according not only to rank, but also location. Jobs affording the greatest opportunities for extortion cost more than equivalent posts elsewhere.

• Thus while one insider has put the standard cost of a head of cantonment post at less than US$10,000, Global Witness has received reports of cantonment chiefs paying far more than this for the same rank.

• In the words of another source “The people interested in the positions spend around US$5,000 to US$15,000 for the highest rank; for other positions they need to spend around US$5,000 to US$8,000. To get these positions they approach different people, first in their department and after that they go to chiefs at the ministry level.”

• The lowest estimate Global Witness has received for any position is US$2,000 and the highest US$30,000. Global Witness does not have any figures for the price of jobs in the thirteen departments at headquarters level, however.

Given the variations in the pricing it is hard to know precisely how much Chan Sarun and Ty Sokhun made from these transactions. Based on the available data it seems likely that each received a total running into the hundreds of thousands of dollars or even more. MAFF officials estimated Chan Sarun’s share at around US$2.5 million.

The cost of their new positions has left many FA staff heavily in debt, creating an even greater incentive for them to use their positions to extort money. Indeed the job auction may be the single biggest factor driving the corruption prevalent in FA operations across the country.
The FA has expanded its on-the-ground presence across Cambodia since its restructuring in 2003. This has increased its efficiency in detecting illegal activity. It has not brought about a reduction in forest crime however, as apprehension of perpetrators is generally followed by demands for payment rather than referral to the courts.247

After purchasing positions, FA officers must still make regular payments to their superiors in a 'pyramidal' system whereby revenues generated at the lowest echelons are fed upwards and accumulate at the top of the institution’s hierarchy. Inside sources estimate that FA field offices typically pay around 50% of their illicit income to their patrons and superiors within the FA. This may take the form of regular monthly payments or periodic ‘gifts’. The remaining 50% is distributed internally, sometimes according to what some FA officers term the 3-2-1 system. This involves dividing the money into six parts, with the station chief retaining 3/6, the deputy keeping 2/6 and junior officers receiving the remaining 1/6.248

Relations with the logging syndicate

The fact that Dy Chouch, Seng Keang and Khun Thong were able to undertake the largest illegal logging operation in Cambodia under the noses of the branch of government most responsible for preventing forest crime speaks for itself. Rather than enforcing the law, the Forest Administration instead protected the Seng Keang Company operation by projecting a false impression of the situation in Prey Long – one in which there was no illegal logging bar low-level infractions by unruly peasants.249 Global Witness investigations in the area, including several interviews with FA officials, revealed that the logging syndicate engineered this outcome through a winning combination of coercion and bribery.

After a group of FA staff and military police confiscated a truck carrying luxury timber for Seng Kok Heang in late 2004, some of them were dismissed or transferred out of the area. Early in 2005, Seng Keang and her entourage visited the FA office in Kompong Thom, which is on the main route for timber traffic going south from Tumring.250 Having thanked the FA staff for looking after her business, she informed them that both her logging operations and the Chup Rubber Plantation Company belonged to the family of Prime Minister Hun Sen. According to Seng Keang this meant that her activities were legal and that any FA officers interested in keeping their jobs should not interfere.250

The message appears to have sunk in. In separate interviews with Global Witness in 2005, two Forest Administration staff in Kompong Thom Province stated that the FA was fully aware of Seng Kok Heang’s illegal logging in Prey Long. According to these officials, they could not stop him because he represented Seng Keang, who had the support of Hun Sen and other high-ranking people. This made the FA officers afraid and so they turned a blind eye to his activities.251

FA complicity in the logging syndicate’s activities may not be solely driven by fear, however. Officials in Tumring claim that in 2005 the FA office sangkat (triage) office in Khaos village was receiving a monthly allowance from Seng Keang of several hundred dollars, for “food, accommodation and fuel costs”.252 Local officials also claimed that Seng Kok Heang was paying the FA staff additional sums according to the amount of wood that the Seng Keang Company factory was processing each month.253 They told Global Witness that, through these payments and additional money levied from other illegal loggers, the FA office enjoyed a monthly income of several thousand dollars.253

Other sources of income

Global Witness gained a further insight into the FA’s revenue generation through interviews with logging crews in Prey Long in November 2005. One of these groups described how their boss paid US$100 per month per chainsaw to the Forest Administration phnai (division) office in Tumring and additional bribes to the FA depending on the volume of timber that they cut. The loggers added that FA staff periodically came to the forest to warn them if people from Phnom Penh were coming to visit the area.254

Global Witness has found additional evidence of FA officials taking a direct role in illegal logging in Prey Long and extorting money not just from timber traders, but also from local people engaged in legitimate activities.255 As described in Box 13, the FA is regarded as the most predatory of several institutions practicing this kind of extortion.

Illegal logging operation outside the Tumring plantation boundaries, November 2005. The loggers told Global Witness that they paid the Forest Administration office in Khaos village US$100 per chainsaw per month and additional fees for transporting timber
2. Military Police

Cambodia’s military police are also known as the gendarmerie. They comprise a paramilitary force of nearly 8,000.264 National Military Police Director General Sao Sokha is former bodyguard of Hun Sen who trained in Vietnam during the 1980s.265 He reports on a day to day basis to the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces command and the Ministry of Defence. On politically sensitive issues he takes his orders from Hun Sen directly, however.266

Sao Sokha is something of a high-flier. In December 2006 he was appointed head of the Cambodian Football Federation and in January 2007 he became a four star general. Previous Global Witness investigations have revealed that Sao Sokha is directly involved in the illicit timber trade and that forces under his command are active in illegal cutting, transportation, protection and extortion.267

The head of the military police in Kompong Thom Province is Dy Phen, who is the brother of Dy Chouch.268 Officers under Dy Phen’s command are heavily implicated in the activities of Seng Keang Company, which has been known to pay some military police as much as US$500 per month for their services.269 Many military police are also active as illegal loggers in their own right. In Prey Long, Global Witness has found Dy Phen’s subordinates cutting trees and selling them to the Seng Keang Company sawmill and other timber traders, providing protection services to timber convoys, extorting money, trading wildlife and selling off pieces of forested land.270

Like the Forest Administration, the military police rapidly expanded its presence in Prey Long following the establishment of Tumring Rubber Plantation. Sources in the military police claim that Dy Phen purposely created five new posts around Tumring and on roads leading out of the forest in order to make money from illegal timber transports. He placed control of these checkpoints (numbered 601, 603, 102, 104 and B6) in the hands of relatives or close allies, some of whom paid him several thousand dollars for their positions.263 Local officials told Global Witness that through these new posts and activities such as illegal logging, transporting of timber and smuggling of other goods, Dy Phen was able to earn between US$10,000 and US$30,000 per month.263 Dy Phen is sensitive to scrutiny of these activities. In June 2005 he informed his associates that an unnamed group was spying on his business and offered US$20,000 to anyone who could get rid of the problem for him.264

The table below provides a breakdown of the payments received by just one of Dy Phen’s new checkpoints. Checkpoint 102 is located near the base of the ‘Hun Sen Trail’, which runs from Baksna logging camp south of Tumring to the junction with main roads to Phnom Penh and Kompong Cham. Most of the timber cut in and around Tumring passes along this route. The information comes from interviews with military police officers manning the post. These military police stated that the monthly takings for the post’s ‘black box’ varied from US$5,500 to US$10,000. The checkpoint chief, Seong Kim Ran,265 would then pay his brother-in-law Dy Phen a share of between US$5,000 and US$6,000.264

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<tr>
<th>Bribes paid by</th>
<th>By month</th>
<th>By day</th>
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<tr>
<td>Seng Keang</td>
<td>US$500-US$750</td>
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<tr>
<td>Seng Kok Heang</td>
<td>US$500-US$750</td>
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<tr>
<td>El Dara plywood factory management</td>
<td>US$350-US$500</td>
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<tr>
<td>Management of Kompong Thmor sawmill</td>
<td>US$100-US$200</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other timber traders</td>
<td>US$150-US$500</td>
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Sao Sokha receiving the Moha Sereiwath medal from Hun Sen, January 2007
3. Royal Cambodian Armed Forces Kompong Thom Provincial Military Sub-Operation

Kompong Thom’s Provincial Military Sub-Operation has had a close association with illegal logging over several years. Many of those soldiers Global Witness found working with the Seng Keang syndicate or running their own logging operations in Prey Long previously worked as guards or subcontractors for the companies holding concessions in the province: Colexim Enterprise, GAT International, Mieng Ly Heng and Pheapimex-Fuchan.266

One example is the activities of a 17-strong unit commanded by a lieutenant colonel and deputy commander of the military sub-operation headquarters named Seng Meas.267 Seng Meas’ role in providing security for Mieng Ly Heng and other concessionaires from the late 1990s enabled him to build a close relationship with Dy Chouch and Seng Keang. After the suspension of the logging concessions and the creation of Tumring Rubber Plantation, Seng Meas and his unit switched to working for the syndicate as suppliers of timber. Their logging operations have centred on the former GAT concession south of Tumring, as well as parts of the Colexim concession to the north and east of the plantation.268

Local officials and residents in Tumring interviewed by Global Witness accused the provincial sub-operation soldiers based around the plantation of colluding with the foresters in the extortion of money from small-scale loggers operating in the area. According to these sources, soldiers would seize chainsaws and take them to the FA offices in Khaos where the machines would be impounded until the owner paid a US$100 bribe.264

4. Royal Cambodian Armed Forces Military Region II

Military Region II covers four provinces in eastern and north eastern Cambodia and abuts Kompong Thom Province, which falls within Military Region IV. A group of Military Region II troops led by Sath Chantha and Uy Kear has been involved in illegal logging in Prey Long over several years.263 In 2004 and 2005, Global Witness found evidence of Sath Chantha’s involvement in illegal logging in areas west and south of Tumring.270 Sath Chantha and Uy Kear have previously supplied Dy Chouch, Seng Keang and Khun Thong with logs illegally cut in the Timas Resources concession.269

5. Military Intelligence

Another branch of the security forces involved in illegal logging in Prey Long is the RCAF military intelligence department, also know as Bureau No. 2. Military Intelligence head Major General Mol Roeup271 is a close ally of Hun Sen whom one political analyst describes as the architect of ‘dirty tricks’ campaigns against the prime minister’s political opponents.272

While Military Intelligence plays an important, albeit shadowy role in Cambodian political life, its officers are also involved in various types of organised crime, including illegal logging. Global Witness investigations in Aural Wildlife Sanctuary in 2004 revealed how Military Intelligence operatives ran their own timber trading and extortion rackets. In Prey Long Global Witness found evidence of Military Intelligence illegally logging and selling timber to Seng Keang Company, as well as extorting money from other loggers.209
Box 13: Bearing the Burden of Corruption

“Law enforcement doesn’t discriminate between the company and the villagers. They all have equal rights before the law. We implement the law equally, and there are few checkpoints along the roads in this area.” MAFF Minister Chan Sarun on law enforcement in Prey Long, 2006.

In 2005 and 2006 Global Witness interviewed a number of people in and around Tumring about their interactions with those branches of state responsible for combating forest crime. There was a consensus among the interviewees both that corruption was a serious problem and that extortion weighed most heavily on those without the power and connections to resist. Many singled out the Forest Administration as being particularly predatory.273

Global Witness interviewed several groups transporting various types of forest products along one of the two logging roads running south from Tumring to Kompong Thmor town. These interviewees reported encountering between 11 and 20 checkpoints run by FA staff, Royal Cambodian Armed Forces, military police, police and environment officers in the course of a single journey.273

Timber traders transporting illegally-logged wood were not the only ones being forced to hand over money. People exercising their legal rights as forest users also reported frequent demands for payment from officials. Carpenters gathering wood waste left behind by illegal logging operations, for example, reported that FA staff “depending on their mood” demanded bribes worth half the value of the wood waste, or alternatively confiscated the material and sold it.168

Global Witness visited O’Kampub Ambel, a combined FA and RCAF station identified by the wood waste collectors as one of those they had to pay off. Asked to describe his work, one of the RCAF officers stated that his team never intercepted the trucks carrying wood from the Seng Keang Company factory and only ever stopped pracheachon (the people). Asked why, he said that he did not know; he was only following instructions from the FA staff who were not interested in looking at the logging syndicate’s trucks.

The soldier was keen to show off the impressive haul of timber that his team had confiscated and stacked within their compound. However, when Global Witness asked permission to photograph a vehicle loaded with luxury grade square logs, the soldier refused, explaining that this wood belonged to him. In separate interviews other soldiers and FA officers working at the O’Kampub Ambel post informed Global Witness that the major timber traders made monthly payments directly to senior FA officials in Phnom Penh and did not need to stop and pay each time they used the road. These interviewees said that their checkpoint still made US$2,000–US$4,000 per month through bribes extracted from less well-connected loggers and timber traders.274

Further down the same road, Global Witness investigators observed security personnel at a checkpoint near Baksna pull over a line of ox carts carrying dead branches for firewood. Firewood collection is an entirely legitimate activity. As officials questioned the firewood collectors, a convoy of small covered trucks escorted by a pickup and two armed soldiers passed the checkpoint unimpeded. Global Witness staff were later able to inspect a second convoy of these covered trucks as they stopped near Kompong Thmor. Each vehicle was loaded with two metre sections of commercial grade timber, which the convoy supervisor attempted to pass off as "mango tree wood". Soldiers escorting the trucks attempted to photograph members of the Global Witness team who carried out the inspection.
6. Police

A Center for Social Development survey of public attitudes towards corruption found that Cambodians rank the police as the third most corrupt institution in the country after the judiciary and customs and taxation authorities. The police are frequently implicated in forest crime and border police units played a lead role in the massive illegal logging of the Virachey National Park in Ratanakiri in 2003-2004.

The National Director General of the police is Hok Lundy, a close ally of Hun Sen.

Global Witness investigations in Prey Long have uncovered substantial evidence of police collusion in illegal logging, but also occasional, albeit unsuccessful, attempts to combat forest crime.

In February 2005, Kompong Thom National Assembly member Nguon Nhel designated a special police operation involving 100-200 men under the command of Om Pyly, the deputy provincial police commissioner. This team was tasked with rooting out lawlessness – particularly kidnapping, banditry and illegal logging – across three communes (Baksna, Balaing and Krava) in Baray District, Kompong Thom Province.

Shortly after commencing its operation, Om Pyly’s team intercepted a convoy of large green military trucks full of timber at Baksna. A policeman involved in the operation later told other officials and local residents how, within hours of impounding the vehicles, Om Pyly was recalled by his headquarters in Kompong Thom to take a phone call. On returning to Baksna later the same day, Om Pyly explained to his subordinates that the caller was Seng Keang, who had phoned from Singapore to tell him that she was married to the prime minister’s cousin, that all her activities were legal and that Om Pyly should therefore release the trucks. Seng Keang added that she could provide his team a monthly allowance of US$375-US$500 to cover their food costs; an offer which Om Pyly accepted. Seng Keang’s trucks were allowed to continue their journey.

Local officials and villagers claim that, for the remainder of their four month operation, Om Pyly’s group colluded openly with Seng Keang Company and the provincial military sub-operation, troops and military police transporting timber out of Prey Long. Some people accused the police of carrying out logging operations themselves and extorting payments from timber traders.
7. Local Government

The local authorities in Kompong Thom are heavily complicit in the illegal logging in Prey Long. A close association between local government and logging goes back to the 1980s when some provincial departments owned and operated their own sawmills. In the early 1990s these assets were sold off to well-connected individuals. It remains the case that some senior provincial officials expect to benefit from logging in the province, whether or not the activity is legal.

Kompong Thom National Assembly member Nguon Nhel was the driving force behind the laudable but unsuccessful police operation against illegal logging in the first half of 2005. The parliamentarian’s credentials as a defender of the forests are somewhat tarnished however, by his family’s involvement in illegal logging and receipt of corrupt payments. One well-placed local official informed Global Witness that Nguon Nhel’s wife, Nhem Sophanny, was receiving monthly payments from military police and Forest Administration checkpoints extorting money from timber traffic. According to residents of Sokchet Commune meanwhile, Nhem Sophanny’s brother Nhem Buntha is a timber trader responsible for illegal logging of luxury timber in their area.

Nguon Nhel is not the only Kompong Thom National Assembly member whose family are involved in illegal logging, however. Fellow parliamentarian Un Noeung is widely perceived to be the main protector of the Ta Aok sawmill, which is located in Prasat Sambour District between the Mieng Ly Heng concession and Boeung Per Wildlife Sanctuary. This sawmill is run by Men Pha and Chet Ra who are described by industry sources as nephews of Un Noeung. Global Witness has found the Ta Aok sawmill processing illegally-logged wood on several occasions over the past five years.

In conclusion to this section, those arms of the Cambodian state responsible for combating forest crime are well represented in Tumring and the wider Prey Long area. They have been ineffective, however, in thwarting forest crimes by Seng Keang Company and other illegal loggers because so many officials and military officers have a stake in these activities. The following section examines in more detail the operations of one particular Royal Cambodian Armed Forces unit – Brigade 70 – which has been involved in illegal logging not only in Prey Long but across the country as a whole.
CHAPTER IV: THE BRIGADE 70 CONNECTION

“On behalf of the Royal Government of Cambodia and myself, may I extend my deep gratitude and appreciation to you all, the officers and soldiers of the Brigade 70 as well as those of the RCAF, for your sacrifices and efforts to overcome all the challenges and difficulties for the cause of national reconciliation and peace for our motherland of Cambodia.” Prime Minister Hun Sen, 2004

“Most commanders in Brigade 70 have very good connections with top government officials, [elite] families and police groups. They also have strong connections with all provincial governors, because Brigade 70 provides them with bodyguards and convoy escorts. Brigade 70 has also been involved in protecting illegal activities and has committed serious crimes such as killing, smuggling, illegally arresting people and violating people’s personal property.” Former Brigade 70 officer

In the past few years, Hun Sen has expressed strong support for the US-led international ‘War on Terror’. This has helped to improve his government’s relations with officials in Washington and the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces (RCAF) are now poised to receive renewed training and equipment supplies from the USA. Cambodia’s military already benefits from various forms of military assistance from Australia, China, Vietnam and other countries. This foreign assistance risks providing legitimacy to a military apparatus which, as this chapter shows, is heavily involved in the theft of public assets.

Article 78 of the 2002 Forest Law calls on the security forces to combat forest crime and Hun Sen has praised the army for its presumed role in stopping ‘anarchic’ logging. At the same time, revenues from the illegal timber trade sustain the military component of Cambodia’s shadow state. This is amply demonstrated by the activities of the elite RCAF Brigade 70, which runs an illegal timber and contraband trafficking operation worth between US$2 million and US$2.75 million per year. The Brigade 70 case highlights the direct linkage between Hun Sen’s build-up of loyalist military units and large-scale organised crime.

1. Brigade 70 and the Bodyguard Unit – a Private Army for the Prime Minister

Brigade 70 is a special unit of 2,000 soldiers headquartered in Cham Chao on the outskirts of Phnom Penh. Its commander is Major General Mao Sophan. It acts as a reserve force for Hun Sen’s 4,000 strong Bodyguard Unit and Mao Sophan takes his orders from Bodyguard Unit chief Lieutenant General Hing Bun Heang. Hing Bun Heang’s commanding officer is General Kun Kim, one of four deputy commanders-in-chief of the RCAF and Hun Sen’s chief of cabinet. In January 2007 Hun Sen promoted Kun Kim to four star General, the most senior rank in the Cambodian armed forces.
In the words of a former member of United Nations Office of the High Commission for Human Rights (UNOHCHR) staff, “The term bodyguard is a misnomer ... the Prime Minister’s bodyguard unit is a substantial military elite unit equipped with modern weaponry and many of its members have received special training abroad.” The Bodyguard Unit and Brigade 70 are central to Hun Sen’s strategy of cultivating special units to protect his interests from potential challengers inside and outside the CPP. The latent threat of violence is integral to the prime minister’s hold over the population as a whole, moreover. Hun Sen responds even to muted criticism by declaring that attempts to remove him will cause the country to fall back into conflict and instability. Cambodians take these threats extremely seriously. The fact that the prime minister has developed what is essentially a private army is surely one of the reasons why.

Hun Sen’s military capability is rarely commented on by the international community, despite the evident danger that it poses to democracy in Cambodia. It perpetuates a situation in which military units are controlled by individual politicians rather than the state; the same conditions that enabled Hun Sen to unseat his co-prime minister Norodom Ranariddh in a violent coup d’état in July 1997. Human rights organisations accuse Hun Sen’s Bodyguard Unit of playing a leading role in mounting this coup.

Box 14: General Kun Kim and Lieutenant General Hing Bun Heang

As key lieutenants to Prime Minister Hun Sen, Kun Kim and Hing Bun Heang’s responsibilities extend beyond security issues. Kun Kim previously took a close interest in the operations of the Malaysian GAT International logging company, visiting its plywood factory near Sihanoukville and its Baksna logging camp in Kompong Thom on a number of occasions in 2001. Hun Sen cancelled GAT’s two concessions in 2002 after Global Witness exposed persistent illegal logging by the company and Kun Kim is now head of a committee to stop illegal clearance of forests.

Hing Bun Heang, meanwhile, was appointed in September 2006 to the position of Supreme Consultant to Cambodia’s Senior Monk Assembly, a body established as a ‘supreme court’ to adjudicate in disputes involving Buddhist monks. The lieutenant general informed journalists that he would be advising the Supreme Monk Assembly on matters relating to conflict resolution.

Kun Kim receiving a fourth general’s star from Hun Sen, January 2007

Lieutenant-General Hing Bun Heang

Brigade 70 headquarters in Cham Chao, on the outskirts of Phnom Penh
**Box 15: Illegal Logging and Royal Cambodian Armed Forces Forces Loyal to Hun Sen**

Hun Sen’s efforts to build up loyalist military units date back to 1994 when disaffected elements within his political party attempted a coup against him. At this point he relocated to the heavily defended ‘Tiger’s Lair’ compound in Takhmau south of Phnom Penh and established the Bodyguard Unit.258

According to an analyst of Cambodia’s military, the core forces loyal to Hun Sen include not only the bodyguards and Brigade 70 but also the military police, Military Region II and Military Region III. This analyst describes these units as “a force of last resort” should Hun Sen come under threat.258 All of Cambodia’s five military regions and many of the RCAF’s special units are involved in illegal logging to a greater or lesser extent. Those most closely identified with Hun Sen are no exception:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Commanding Officer</th>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Illegal logging</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>General Kun Kim</td>
<td>Bodyguard Unit</td>
<td>• Members of the Bodyguard Unit have worked as subcontractors to forest concessionaires responsible for massive illegal logging, notably Pheapimex-Fuchan and Hero Taiwan.258</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lieutenant General Hing Bun Heang</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Major General Mao Sophan</td>
<td>Brigade 70</td>
<td>• Brigade 70 operates an illicit timber trafficking service that spans Cambodia and encompasses exports to Vietnam.301</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Sao Sokha</td>
<td>Military Police</td>
<td>• The military police are heavily involved in forest crime, notably in illegal logging hotspots such as the Cardamom Mountains and Prey Long.302</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• As well as running their own logging operations, they provide protection and transportation services to major timber traders and extort money from less well-connected operators.302</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major General Choeun Sovantha</td>
<td>Military Region II</td>
<td>• Senior Military Region II officers are involved in illegal logging not only within MRII but also in MRIV.106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major General Keo Samuon</td>
<td>Military Region III</td>
<td>• MRIII is the driving force behind the illegal timber trade in the Cardamom Mountains, notably Aural Wildlife Sanctuary.306</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Much of the money generated through the illegal logging, protection and extortion activities undertaken by MRIII soldiers ends up in the pockets of senior commanders.307</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Senior generals at military parade, January 2007. The Royal Cambodian Armed Forces has no less than 613 generals, equivalent to one for every 179 soldiers.
2. Hak Mao

According to a number of Brigade 70 soldiers and other well-placed sources within Royal Cambodian Armed Forces, the driving force behind the brigade’s dubious business ventures is an officer named Hak Mao. According to one close associate, he has direct lines of communication with senior officers close to Hun Sen, notably Hing Bun Heang and Sao Sokha, the director general of the military police.

Hak Mao’s colleagues claim he began his career running retail outlets in Phnom Penh’s Olympic market. In the mid-1990s he purchased the rank of major in Brigade 70 for US$5,000 and began managing the unit’s illicit transportation services. In March 2005 he was promoted to the rank of (one star) Brigadier General.

The businesses Hak Mao runs for Brigade 70 are transportation services that use large military green trucks and Brigade 70 soldiers as drivers and guards. Hak Mao personally owns 16 trucks, each capable of carrying 60 m³ or more. In the second half of 2006, twelve out of his fleet of 16 were in active use. Hak Mao’s vehicles sometimes, but not always, display a plaque with the number ‘70’ against their windscreens. Two other groups that use similar vehicles are ‘Long Meng’, which labels its trucks ‘LM’ and whose activities are detailed in Box 20, and Mong Reththy Group, whose trucks are tagged with an ‘MRT’ logo. Mong Reththy is profiled in Box 18.

Although Hak Mao is not the overall commander of Brigade 70, his pivotal role in raising funds gives him a stature that transcends his rank.

Global Witness first became aware of Hak Mao in 2004, when investigators discovered that soldiers under his command were transporting illegally-logged timber from Aural Wildlife Sanctuary and other parts of the Cardamom Mountains.

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This source informed Global Witness that Hak Mao and Hing Bun Heang liaise with Sao Sokha ahead of any major transportation operations so that the military police can ensure that the road is open to the Brigade 70 convoys.

Hak Mao also has close connections with the wife of General Meas Sophea, the commander of the RCAF infantry forces. Mrs Meas Sophea runs her own transportation enterprise and sometimes calls upon Hak Mao’s staff to repair her vehicles. She is also a key player in RCAF patronage politics, holding a fearsome reputation among her husband’s subordinates on account of her frequent demands for money. RCAF sources have told Global Witness that military officers sometimes bribe Mrs Meas Sophea in order to increase the chances of her husband giving them a promotion.
3. Timber Trafficking

Under Hak Mao’s direction, Brigade 70 acts as a specialist provider of transport and protection services to the most powerful of Cambodia’s timber barons. The legacy of Hun Sen’s crackdowns on ‘anarchic’ logging is a streamlined illegal timber sector monopolised by entrepreneurs and kleptocratic networks loyal to him. These different groupings often work closely together; Brigade 70’s collaboration with the Seng Keang Company in the illegal logging of Prey Long is just one example.

In the past three years Global Witness has uncovered evidence of Brigade 70 transporting illegally-logged wood from Koh Kong, Kompong Speu, Kompong Thom, Kratie, Mondulkiri, Oddar Meanchey, Preah Vihear and Siem Reap – provinces that span the main forested regions of the country. These timber trafficking activities continue all the year round, through both wet and dry seasons. According to one timber dealer in Phnom Penh, Hak Mao is able to deliver logs of all types according to order. Although some of his commissions involve moving timber directly from the forest to the client, in many cases the Brigade 70 teams first bring the wood to Phnom Penh where they store it temporarily in depots that Hak Mao owns or rents.

Global Witness has identified two of Hak Mao’s depots on Street 2002, a small road running off Royal Cambodian Armed Forces Boulevard. Hak Mao employs approximately 60 Brigade 70 soldiers as drivers, guards, mechanics and administrators at these sites and pays their wages out of his own pocket. He delegates aspects of day-to-day management to a colonel named Kong Horm. Hak Mao is also said to own two additional properties close to the Olympic Market; however Global Witness has not been able to confirm this.

The depots on Street 2002 are Brigade 70’s main timber storage facilities. Hak Mao owns the compound on the north side of the road and rents another on the south side. The road has a public right of way; however Hak Mao has set up a checkpoint manned by Brigade 70 troops and installed a metal barrier to control vehicle access. The depot on the south side of the road is used primarily for larger volumes of commercial grade wood, with the compound on the north side generally holding stocks of luxury grade timber of 100 m³ or less.
In the second half of 2006, Hak Mao was using seven out of his 12 active vehicles for transporting timber. Based on surveillance, interviews with Brigade 70 officers and accounts from people living around Hak Mao’s compounds, Global Witness estimates that these seven trucks were all making an average of three round trips each week. Each vehicle’s capacity is around 60 m³, indicating that the fleet was collectively transporting an average of approximately 1,260 m³ per week. If legally harvested and taxed at the US$54 per cubic metre rate applied to grade II wood, this volume of timber would net the Cambodian treasury around US$3.5 million per year. As it is, the profits are split between timber traders and Hak Mao.

The rates Hak Mao charges his clients for transporting timber vary according to the length of the journey. A source in Brigade 70 reports that for collection of timber in more remote provinces, such as Koh Kong, Pailin, Preah Vihear and Ratanakiri, the standard rate is US$1,500 per truck per journey.

### Box 16: The Royal Cambodian Armed Forces Get a Helping Hand from the US Government

The US government suspended military assistance to Cambodia in the wake of the July 1997 coup. Since then, RCAF has continued to operate more as an extended organised crime syndicate than as a defence force. However, a spokesman for the US Embassy in Phnom Penh informed Global Witness in March 2007 that the Cambodian military was now eligible for direct US funding, because Cambodia had signed an Article 98 agreement with the US – in other words a commitment not to send US nationals to the International Criminal Court – and because it had improved its performance in tackling human trafficking.

Other factors that may have influenced the change in policy include Hun Sen’s cooperation in the ‘War on Terror’, US competition with China for influence in mainland Southeast Asia, and US firm Chevron’s imminent exploitation of a large share of Cambodia’s offshore oil deposits.

So far, the US government has committed around US$1 million in assistance to the Cambodian military in fiscal year 2006 and projects a further half million dollars for 2007. While these sums may not be especially large by international standards, they are highly significant in political terms; conferring legitimacy on an institution which is integral to Hun Sen’s hold on power.

According to the US Embassy, just under a third of the funds committed in fiscal year 2006 will be used for trucks, spare parts and training. Whether Brigade 70, which makes particularly heavy use of trucks in its trafficking operations, will be receiving some of the new American vehicles is not clear. The embassy says that it has not yet decided which military units will be benefiting. It insists, however, that the US government will not be supporting units or individuals that have committed gross human rights violations.
Transportation from Kompong Thom, by contrast, may cost only US$700. These fees do not include the costs of fuel or food for the one driver and two guards assigned to each truck, for which the client has to pay additional charges. Assuming an average return of US$1,100 per truck per journey and seven trucks in operation, timber-related activities could be netting Hak Mao approximately US$23,100 per week or around US$1.2 million annually.

An integral part of the service that Hak Mao provides is preventing timber confiscation by law enforcement agencies. Brigade 70 trucks bringing timber from Kompong Thom typically have an escort of soldiers in one or two pickups. Within Phnom Penh, meanwhile, Global Witness investigators have observed Brigade 70 trucks moving timber between locations at night accompanied by armed motorcycle outriders. The escort teams act as a deterrent and, when required, negotiate payments to checkpoints along the road, in order to ensure that the trucks do not have to stop. They budget for these payments at US$10-20 per checkpoint.

Hak Mao often smoothes the path of his timber convoys through the use of illegal permits signed by senior military officers. Permits of this type are one of the main tools of the trade for Cambodia’s major timber dealers. They generally take the form of a document that authorises illegal logging activities and bears the signature of politicians or generals who have no jurisdiction over the forest sector. Their purpose is to invoke not a law but the name of somebody powerful. One such case involving Hak Mao and Commander-in-Chief of the Army General Pol Saroeun is outlined below. Police interviewed by Global Witness reported that on occasions that they had intercepted Brigade 70 trucks transporting timber, the drivers claimed they were following mission orders from General Sao Sokha of the military police, Lieutenant General Hing Bun Heang of the Bodyguard Unit, RCAF head of procurement General Moeung Samphan, or Major General Mao Sophan of Brigade 70.

Hak Mao’s staff claim that they transport timber throughout Cambodia with impunity except for parts of the Cardamom Mountains where international NGOs support law enforcement teams of Ministry of Environment rangers, Forest Administration officials and military police. These teams have previously impounded Brigade 70 trucks carrying illegally-logged wood and Hak Mao has experienced difficulties securing their release.

Overall, such cases are the exception rather than the rule, however, and Brigade 70 trades on a reputation for speediness and efficiency. Hak Mao’s drivers have orders to turn off their phones before starting each journey in order to avoid distraction, and instructions not to stop under any circumstances, even if they hit another vehicle or people along the road. According to police interviewed by Global Witness in two districts on the outskirts of Phnom Penh through which Brigade 70 convoys regularly pass, Hak Mao’s trucks have hit motorists or pedestrians on several occasions. The policemen claim that Brigade 70 compensates injured victims with payments of US$50-US$150 and pays the families of those that die between US$100 and US$300. Sometimes they just give the police US$100 and tell them to settle the matter on the unit’s behalf.

A source close to the Brigade 70 reported that in October 2006 one of the convoys became involved in a shooting incident in Koh Kong Province. Unhappy at the attention this drew to the brigade’s activities, Bodyguard Unit commander Hing Bun Heang ordered Hak Mao’s teams to cease carrying weapons during their transportation operations. Global Witness wrote to Hing Bun Heang in March to ask him to comment on this report. As this publication went to print, Hing Bun Heang had not responded.
3.1 Exports
Global Witness investigations have found that Brigade 70 is involved not only in the distribution of illegally-logged wood within Cambodia but also in the export of significant volumes to Vietnam. According to officials in Kandal and Prey Veng provinces, timber transported by Hak Mao often passes through Neak Loeung, a port on the Mekong River. Here the wood is stored temporarily in warehouses before being loaded into large boats that carry it across the border at the Ka’am Samnor checkpoint. These boats make their journeys to Vietnam in groups of between two and four every week to ten days, with each vessel carrying at least 400 m³ of timber. Alternatively, Hak Mao’s trucks proceed directly through Neak Loeung along Route 1 to the border crossing at Bavet. Taking the timber over the border by road usually involves using a permit signed by a high-ranking official.

One Brigade 70 officer interviewed by Global Witness stated that the unit was not only transporting timber to Vietnam, but also exporting containers packed with wood through sea ports on Cambodia’s south coast. Two businessmen who provide services to Hak Mao’s group have also told Global Witness about this activity. These different reports corroborate claims made by officials working at Oknha Mong Port in Koh Kong Province. These port officials told Global Witness that they were prevented from inspecting certain sealed containers delivered by Brigade 70, but were told by the drivers that some contained plywood, luxury wood furniture and pieces of grade I timber. Global Witness investigators have observed trucks carrying sealed shipping containers leaving the two Brigade 70 depots on Street 2002 but have not been able to verify their contents.

3.2 The Clients
Brigade 70’s timber transport service caters primarily to major timber barons who have close links to elite families. Some of the unit’s more prominent clients include the following:

Dy Chouch, Seng Keang, Khun Thong and Seng Kok Heang
As described in Chapter II, Brigade 70’s transportation services have been a major component of this syndicate’s illegal logging activities in Prey Long forest. Seng Kok Heang, the group’s operations manager, is himself a Brigade 70 officer. His sister, Seng Keang, collaborates with the unit not only in timber ventures, but also other aspects of her business. According to local inhabitants, in 2006 Seng Keang enlisted Brigade 70 officers to help her intimidate rival claimants to land she is attempting to acquire in Trapeang Sray on the outskirts of Phnom Penh.

Khai Narin
Khai Narin owns a sawmill on Route 5 in the outskirts of Phnom Penh and is described by timber industry insiders as a close associate of Dy Chouch. Her company is listed, along with Seng Keang Company, as the owner of timber stockpiles in Tumring in a 2003 log transportation plan prepared by Colexim Enterprise.

In December 2003, Global Witness discovered Khai Narin’s sawmill processing illegally-sourced timber and reported the case to SGS, the new independent monitor of forest law enforcement. SGS subsequently attempted an inspection of the site, only to be, in the words of its project manager, “chased away by a man with a big stick.” Global Witness
wrote to SGS in February 2007 to ask the company to comment on this episode. SGS replied as follows:

“At this time the project had only been in operation for 11 days and was still in the inception phase awaiting the formal mandate from the RGC [Royal Government of Cambodia] to enter all relevant forest and processing areas. Thus it was not possible at the time to insist on access to the mill which was denied by the security guard. Even so, the SGS team spoke with local villagers and was able to establish that some illegal logging had occurred in the area. This was reported to the Forest Administration and it is understood that they closed this operation down. Subsequent inspections of the mill from the river in January and February 2004 revealed no evidence of any further logs being delivered or milling activities taking place. This incident was reported in full on pages 13 to 14 of the first SGS Quarterly Report which was made publicly available.”

In April 2005 Global Witness investigators visited the sawmill again and found it to be well stocked with 100 m³ of protected luxury grade wood (*beng* and *neang nuon*) as well as grade I and grade II species. Two Brigade 70 trucks were observed unloading additional timber supplies. A few weeks later, Global Witness saw one of the same trucks (number plate *Khor Mor* 0.5314) in Kompong Thom Province, travelling along the ‘Hun Sen Trail’ – the road which carries timber illegally cut in Prey Long. People living close to Khai Narin’s compound informed Global Witness that Brigade 70 trucks were coming to deposit logs at the sawmill on average three times a week. During an aerial survey in September 2006, Global Witness observed stocks of logs in the Khai Narin sawmill compound. Over four years into a cutting and log transport ban it is highly unlikely that this wood was sourced legally.

**Choeung Sopheap, also known as Yeay Phu**

Yeay Phu and her husband, CPP senator Lao Meng Khin, own Pheapimex, arguably Cambodia’s most powerful company. Yeay Phu is a close friend of Hun Sen’s wife Bun Rany and regularly travels abroad with the prime minister’s entourage. Lao Meng Khin has been a CPP senator since 2006. Pheapimex is one of a small number of firms with ties to Hun Sen that act as joint venture partners to powerful Chinese firms moving into Cambodia. The company appears rarely to commit significant capital to these partnerships itself.

Within Cambodia, the name Pheapimex is synonymous with illegal logging and over the past decade Global Witness has repeatedly uncovered evidence of the company cutting illegally both inside and outside its three logging concessions. Since the suspension of logging concession operations in 2002, Pheapimex’s Kompong Thom concession has become a centre for illicit sawmill operations run by military units and one of the company’s subcontractors. Global Witness published details of these activities in
June 2004. While Pheapimex made no comment, Prime Minister Hun Sen publicly attacked the report, telling journalists that “Global Witness has lied before and today they are lying again.”

Pheapimex has a wide range of other interests beyond forests. These include salt iodisation, over which the government granted it a monopoly, iron ore extraction, bamboo cultivation, pharmaceutical imports and hotel construction. In recent years, the company has increasingly focused on economic land concessions (ELCs) and has partial or complete control of at least five. Through its ELCs and logging concessions Pheapimex controls 7.4% of Cambodia’s total land area.

Three of the Pheapimex ELCs are joint ventures with the Chinese company Wuzhishan LS and Kong Triv, another tycoon who is a senator for the CPP. Two of these concessions, in Pursat and Mondulkiri provinces, have been the scene of serious human rights abuses against local people. After eight protestors against the Pheapimex-Wuzhishan ELC in Pursat were wounded in a hand grenade attack by unknown assailants in November 2004, King Norodom Sihamoni wrote a letter to the prime minister to express his concern. In his response to the king, Hun Sen defended the company, arguing that “the grenade attack was only aimed at blaming the government or the local authorities, because according to the technical examination by the competent officials, the purpose of the grenade attack (in which some people were injured and nobody died) was just aimed to make their propaganda voices louder.”

In 2004 Global Witness investigators found a group of large green military trucks, closely resembling those used by Brigade 70, transporting logs cut in the Pheapimex-Wuzhishan ELC in Pursat Province. In 2005, one of Hak Mao’s subordinates confirmed to Global Witness that Yeay Phu had made extensive use of Brigade 70’s transport service.

In a further expansion of its business empire, Pheapimex publicly announced in November 2006 that it was forming a joint venture with Chinese firm Jiangsu Taihu International to set up a new 178 ha Special Economic Zone near Sihanoukville. Pheapimex claimed that the two companies would spend US$1 billion developing the area. Under Cambodian law, companies developing SEZs are granted a nine year tax holiday, as well as exemptions on VAT and import and export duties. A Chinese official from Jiangsu Province told journalists that the Pheapimex deal sprang from a visit to China by Hun Sen. Global Witness is not aware of the government conducting any public bidding for the rights to this SEZ concession and does not know what criteria it used to evaluate the Pheapimex proposal.

In January 2007 Hun Sen presented Yeay Phu with the Moha Sereiwath medal – a decoration reserved for individuals who have made a particularly generous contribution to Cambodia’s development. The following month, Pheapimex emerged at the centre of yet another deal involving a valuable slice of public property. On February 6 Phnom Penh Governor Kep Chuktema signed away 133 ha of the Boeung Kak Lake area on a 99 year renewable lease to a previously obscure firm called In Shukaku, whose director is Yeay Phu’s husband Lao Meng Khin. The Housing Rights Task Force (HRTF), a coalition of local and international NGOs, and the Cambodian Center for Human Rights (CCHR), report that the site is home to at least 4,252 families. According to the NGOs, none of these families were consulted about the deal. HRTF and
Che Lain is the wife of naval commander Yim Saran, the nephew of Senate President and CPP President Chea Sim. Timber trade insiders describe Che Lain as a forceful character who is given to shouting down the phone at MAFF Minister Chan Sarun when he fails to comply with her demands.

Global Witness first found evidence of Che Lain’s involvement in illegal logging while investigating a boat-building racket in 2004. This inventive scam involved tricking monks into signing letters stating that their pagodas needed giant koki logs to build racing boats so that they could compete in the annual Water Festival races in Phnom Penh. Having secured their signatures, Che Lain and other fixers presented the letters to senior officials and persuaded them to sign permits authorising the cutting of koki trees. The fixers then used these documents as the pretext for logging the Seima Biodiversity Conservation Area in Mondulkiri and selling the wood to timber dealers. The more fortunate monks received a small portion of the wood originally promised, others received bags of cement and some never heard from the fixers again. Global Witness has obtained copies of the letters and permits relating to a number of these cases.

CCHR have stated that “If these families are forcibly removed from their homes, following recent precedents by the Municipality and the poor track record of In Shukaku’s director Lao Meng Khin, this would mark the largest single displacement of people in Cambodia since the privatization of land in 1989.”

Pheapimex’s illegal logging has robbed the Cambodian people of a valuable public asset and Global Witness has repeatedly made the case for prosecuting the company and stripping it of its concessions. The firm’s other activities have also caused widespread damage to the livelihoods of ordinary Cambodians. Whether in terms of taxes paid or jobs created, there is little evidence that handing over enormously valuable public assets to Pheapimex has contributed in any way to Cambodia’s development. What is not in doubt is that the company’s owners and their political patrons have profited handsomely. The question of why Hun Sen continues his vigorous promotion of Pheapimex’s interests remains unanswered, however. In February 2007 Global Witness wrote to the prime minister and his wife to ask them whether they hold a private stake in Pheapimex. As this report went to print, neither Hun Sen nor Bun Rany had replied to these letters.
Hak Leng and Siem Touch

Hak Leng and Siem Touch have a long-established timber trading operation in Neak Loeung which includes a sawmill and at least one warehouse. Global Witness has previously uncovered evidence of their involvement in the ‘koki logs for monks’ racket outlined on the previous page.

A senior member of the security forces in Neak Loeung told Global Witness that Hak Leng and Siem Touch regularly coordinate the transportation of illegally-logged luxury timber with Hak Mao’s teams and provide temporary storage facilities for the wood within the town. This officer claims that the couple are also instrumental in shipments of illegally-sourced timber down the river to Vietnam.

An associate of Siem Touch describes her as being a friend of both Hun Sen’s wife Bun Rany and Koeung Chandy, the wife of General Kun Kim, Hun Sen’s chief of cabinet. Hak Leng, meanwhile, is reported to make regular payments to Kun Kim’s brother-in-law, Koeung Vannak, a provincial Forest Administration official, to ensure his protection of the couple’s business. According to several residents of Neak Loeung whom Global Witness interviewed in September 2006, Hak Leng has recently been given the honorific title oknha.
Sean Leang Chhun, also known as Yeay Chhun

Yeay Chhun is one of the most prolific illegal loggers in north-eastern Cambodia. She is particularly active in Kratie and Mondulkiri provinces and transports much of her timber to Neak Loeung or to Vietnam. Global Witness has been gathering information on Yeay Chhun’s activities for more than five years. Officials report that her involvement in the illegal timber trade goes back more than a decade.

In 2001, following a major crackdown on forest crime in Mondulkiri Province the previous year, Yeay Chhun acquired a permit to collect the logs that officials claimed the illegal loggers had left scattered in the forest. The granting of this permit contravened Hun Sen’s 1999 declaration on forest sector reform, which banned old log collection licences because of their persistent misuse as a cover for illegal logging. In 2003, Chan Sarun authorised Yeay Chhun to establish a sawmill in O’Reang District, Mondulkiri Province, in order to process the ‘old logs’. Yeay Chhun proceeded to use these permits as the pretext for illegally cutting and processing over a hundred trees from the Seima Biodiversity Conservation Area in Mondulkiri in 2004.

In May 2004 Global Witness published a short report outlining three cases of illegal logging by Yeay Chhun: the cutting in the Seima Biodiversity Conservation Area, unlawful harvesting in the Snuol Wildlife Sanctuary in Kratie and more illegal felling in a forest in Snuol District outside the wildlife sanctuary boundaries. During the last of these operations one of the trucks carrying Yeay Chhun’s timber fell through a public bridge near Snuol town. A Brigade 70 officer told Global Witness that this convoy included vehicles provided by Hak Mao, but that the truck which collapsed the bridge belonged to Yeay Chhun. The officer said that Yeay Chhun regularly hired Hak Mao to transport her timber between 2002 and 2004 but that their partnership ended following the attention generated by the bridge destruction in Snuol.

A timber trade insider subsequently told Global Witness that Yeay Chhun was upset by the public exposure of her activities because it meant that she had to pay larger than usual bribes to persuade officials to turn a blind eye. The added expense did not permanently derail her business, however. Not long after Global Witness released its report, Yeay Chhun was seen arriving at the Forest Administration office in Phnom Penh for a meeting with Deputy Director General Chea Sam Ang and leaving with a new sheaf of timber transport permits. Chea Sam Ang, the Project Director for the World Bank’s Forest Concession Management and Control Pilot Project, refused to explain his actions to journalists who called him for comment; however FA Director General Ty Sokhun declared that the permits were legitimate.

Global Witness has obtained information from sources in the Snuol area that Yeay Chhun was continuing to transport illegally-logged timber from Kratie to Neak Loeung between July and September 2006.
Pol Saroeun
Pol Saroeun is the Commander-in-Chief of Cambodia’s army. According to officers in Brigade 70 and other Royal Cambodian Armed Forces units, between 2003 and 2005 the general contracted Hak Mao to supply him with protected luxury wood and grade 1 timber to build a house in Svay Rieng Province. Pol Saroeun provided Hak Mao with signed permits approving the wood’s delivery, despite having no legal authority to do so. Hak Mao then used the documents repeatedly as a pretext for transporting much larger volumes of luxury timber; much of it supplied by Dy Chouch. Brigade 70 reportedly exported around 80% of this wood to Vietnam.

Preap Tan
Preap Tan is the governor of Preah Vihear Province. According to a source in Brigade 70, in July 2006 he commissioned Hak Mao to transport 185 koki logs from three locations in Preah Vihear to Phnom Penh.

Global Witness has previously obtained documents signed by Preap Tan and Hun Sen Bodyguard Unit commander Hing Bun Heang concerning procurement of wood from Preah Vihear Province for the construction of four boats. Hing Bun Heang described the boats as being for “Bodyguard Unit activities, undertaking missions for the Prime Minister and his wife ... and distributing gifts to villagers in provinces affected by natural disasters”. Global Witness does not know whether the boats were actually built and, if so, from where the wood was sourced.

Preap Tan’s own bodyguards also appear to have interests in the timber sector. In September 2004 Forest Administration staff in Tbeng Meanchey District in Preah Vihear Province temporarily closed their office, saying that the governor’s bodyguards had fired shots at their compound following a dispute over some wood. According to the FA, Preap Tan acknowledged his bodyguards were at fault and “educated them not to do it again”.

Commander-in-Chief of Cambodia’s army, General Pol Saroeun. He is reported to have contracted Hak Mao to supply him with timber to build his house.

Small truck used by Brigade 70 to distribute goods within Phnom Penh.
4. Transportation of Smuggled Goods by Brigade 70

Global Witness’ initial interest in Brigade 70 related to its role in Cambodia’s illegal timber trade. Field investigations, surveillance and extensive interviews with Brigade 70 officers have yielded additional information on the unit’s transportation of smuggled merchandise, however.

Brigade 70 picks up smuggled goods on behalf of its clients as the items arrive in Cambodia. This enables the clients to evade import duties. Import duties are a potentially important source of revenue for the Cambodian treasury but corruption ensures that levels of tax evasion are extremely high. According to the IMF’s most recent Article IV report on Cambodia, “revenue collection continues to be well below what is needed to support the government’s expenditure objectives”.

Hun Sen periodically announces crackdowns on smuggling, yet military trafficking operations remain a major money-spinner for some of his closest advisors. Through interviews with Brigade 70 officers and businessmen, Global Witness has been able to build up a picture of the range of commodities the unit transports. These include beer, spirits, cigarettes, perfume, electronic goods, construction materials, clothes, sugar, pharmaceuticals, and products destined for supermarkets including ice cream. Hak Mao runs the transportation of these goods out of depots in Phnom Penh, including one of the compounds on Street 2002. According to soldiers and local residents, Brigade 70 distributes items such as alcohol, perfume and luxury foods within Phnom Penh using a fleet of small ice cream and soft drinks trucks. Global Witness investigators have observed these types of vehicles coming in and out of the depots on Street 2002, but have not been able to inspect their contents.

Who is hiring Hak Mao to transport smuggled goods? Customs officers interviewed by Global Witness claimed that the group’s clientele included high-ranking officials and their families. Amongst these, they singled out the wives of Minister of Defence Tea Banh and his brother Tea Vinh, who is a naval commander in Koh Kong. Both these men have a history of involvement in illegal timber exports.

The same customs officials also alleged that Hak Mao was delivering smuggled products for some of Cambodia’s most prominent tycoons and companies. This claim is echoed by a source close to the prime minister, who told Global Witness that most of the contraband that Brigade 70 transported belonged to the Attwood Import Export Company. Attwood is profiled in Box 17. Global Witness wrote to Tea Banh, Tea Vinh and Attwood in February 2007 to ask whether they had ever enlisted the services of Brigade 70. As this report went to print, none of them had replied.

Box 17: Attwood Import Export Co. Ltd

Attwood Import Export Co. Ltd is the official distributor in Cambodia for Hennessy cognac and well-known brands of whisky and beer. Attwood’s Managing Director Lim Chhiv Ho is described by a well-connected source in Cambodia’s commercial sector as one of a quartet of politically powerful women who do business deals together. The other three members of this quartet are said to be Yeay Phu of Pheapimex; the wife of National Customs and Excise Department Director Pen Simon; and Tep Bopha Prasidh, who is married to Minister of Commerce Cham Prasidh and holds the position of Director of Administration at the ministry. Tep Bopha Prasidh is reported to own 10% of Attwood’s shares – a stake worth US$1 million. Lim Chhiv Ho’s daughter is married to the son of Yeay Phu.

Attwood has received concessions from the government to develop three Special Economic Zones (SEZs) near Sihanoukville, Phnom Penh and Bavet on the Vietnamese border. These deals give the company generous tax holidays and duty exemptions. Global Witness wrote to Lim Chhiv Ho in February 2007 to ask how Attwood went about obtaining these SEZs but has not yet received a reply.
Information from Brigade 70 soldiers suggests that the rates Hak Mao charges for transporting smuggled goods are roughly comparable to those for delivering illegally-logged timber. As Box 19 shows, however, for certain very expensive goods the fees can be a great deal higher.

A member of Hak Mao’s staff told Global Witness that Brigade 70 sometimes transports truckloads of sugar overland from Thailand via the Poipet border crossing in Banteay Meanchey Province. Global Witness investigators found loaded Brigade 70 trucks crossing the border at Poipet in September 2006 but were unable to obtain information about what goods they were carrying. Observations and interviews suggest that the major entry points for the smuggled items Brigade 70 transports are on Cambodia’s south coast, however.

4.1 Smuggling Through Sre Ambel Port
In the early stages of Hak Mao’s career with Brigade 70, most of the contraband his teams handled entered Cambodia through the port at Sre Ambel in Koh Kong Province. Here Brigade 70 unloaded boatloads of high value goods smuggled from Thailand, notably international brand cigarettes and alcohol, and paid customs officials only 5-15% of the duties owed. Hak Mao told anyone who asked questions that the smuggled goods belonged to Tea Banh and Tea Vinh. Local officials recall that the Sre Ambel District governor made efforts to clamp down on these activities but was not successful.

From Sre Ambel, Brigade 70 transported the goods either to Phnom Penh, or along the coast to Sihanoukville port. Goods transferred to Sihanoukville were then packed into shipping containers and re-exported. Following Hun Sen’s coup in July 1997 Hak Mao’s business at Sre Ambel expanded. Brigade 70 began importing increased volumes of contraband while shipping consignments of luxury grade wood in the other direction.

As Hak Mao’s enterprise blossomed, other agencies laid a claim to a share of the profits, sparking a violent stand-off on at least one occasion. An official based in Sre Ambel described to Global Witness an incident in which a combined law enforcement team of customs officials, economic police and military police intercepted three large military trucks as they headed north from Sre Ambel. The trucks were carrying cigarettes, whisky and Hennessy cognac and the checkpoint team demanded that the drivers pay them a bribe. The truck drivers refused, saying that the goods belonged to Tea Banh, Tea Vinh and prominent tycoon Teng Bunma. A standoff ensued. Two hours later Hak Mao himself arrived with 20 armed troops, threatened the law enforcement team and directed his trucks to smash their way through the checkpoint barrier. The two groups then began shooting at each other, the customs officers, police and military police retreated and the trucks pulled away.

Having regrouped, the law enforcement team contacted the Military Region III command to request that they intercept the Brigade 70 convoy as it headed along Route 4 towards Phnom Penh. This plan foundered on the close ties between Hak Mao and MIII however. When the MIII troops eventually arrived on the scene, it was to disarm the checkpoint officials rather than to back them up. In the aftermath, some members of the law enforcement team were fired from their positions. It appears to be on the strength of this and similar incidents that local people began calling Brigade 70 the ‘Samurai’ group.

By the end of 2004, Hak Mao had largely ceased using Sre Ambel and had shifted his operation to Mong Reththy’s new Oknha Mong port at Keo Phos village, closer to Sihanoukville.
4.2 Smuggling through Oknha Mong Port

“There are no longer any barriers between nations ... The world has become one huge market.” Mong Reththy, 2007

Oknha Mong Port is the brainchild and private business holding of tycoon and CPP senator Mong Reththy. Located just 45 kilometres from Cambodia's main commercial port at Sihanoukville, the creation of the new facility has the explicit backing of Hun Sen, who inaugurated it in December 2004 and hailed it as a means of fostering greater economic competition. Despite this optimistic prognosis, there are indications that the port is effectively exempt from official regulatory structures and acts as a gateway for large-scale smuggling.

Entrance to Oknha Mong Port

When Oknha Mong Port was first announced to the media earlier in 2004, it was described as coming equipped with its own customs, police and military police. This description may be rather too literal; indeed sources at the port say that the approximately 15 customs officers stationed there are answerable only to Mong Reththy and may not submit a report to their head office in Phnom Penh unless the tycoon first authorises it.

Hak Mao’s teams began using Oknha Mong Port soon after it opened for business, transporting goods to and from Phnom Penh. Brigade 70 is also known to take deliveries from Oknha Mong Port along the coast to the seaport at Sihanoukville.

Dock workers and local residents have remarked on the heavily armed escorts accompanying some of the sealed shipping containers Hak Mao’s men deliver for export via Oknha Mong Port. Asked by Global Witness what they thought was in these containers, some of the workers joked that they probably contained narcotics or counterfeit dollars. Such a possibility is taken seriously by some members of the diplomatic community, who have privately expressed concerns that drugs are being trafficked through the port.

As at Sre Ambel before, Hak Mao’s men pay the customs officials at Oknha Mong Port no more than 5-15% of the required import tariffs. An eyewitness to some of these transactions claims that the officials have no choice but to accept these poor terms given Brigade 70’s capacity for violence and the risk of being fired by Mong Reththy if they raise objections.

Box 18: Mong Reththy

“It should be mentioned also that Mr Oknha [Mong Reththy] has been doing a great deal for the country” — Prime Minister Hun Sen at the opening of Oknha Mong Port, 2004.

“I will bulldoze the homes of [residents] who refused money” — Mong Reththy commenting on his demolition of the Royal University of Fine Arts campus, 2005.

Mong Reththy is one of Cambodia’s most prominent tycoons and a close ally of Hun Sen. In 2006 he became a senator for the CPP.

Plantations, commodities trading, cattle farming and real estate development are just some of Mong Reththy’s interests. His eclectic business portfolio has also encompassed illegal logging in Bokor National Park and an economic land concession in Stung Treng which at 100,852 ha is more than ten times the size permitted by the Land Law. This ELC is sited on the cancelled Macro Panin logging concession in violation of the sub-decree on Forest Concession Management. Chan Sarun signed off on the deal in November 2001, three months after the passage of Land Law limiting ELCs to 10,000 ha. When Global Witness wrote to Chan Sarun to question the legality of his decision, the minister responded with the argument that the government was obliged to give Mong Reththy the concession because he had asked for it before the Land Law was ratified. In December 2006 Global Witness received reports from a human rights worker that Mong Reththy’s company had begun clearing parts of the Green Sea ELC close to the Lao border.

Mong Reththy has also been at the forefront of the recent rash of land-swap deals in which ownership of public buildings has been transferred to tycoons with links to the CPP. His land-swap acquisitions have included Cambodia’s Supreme Court, Appeals Court, Phnom Penh Municipal...
Court and Justice Ministry buildings. He has also flattened the historic Royal University of Fine Arts campus in Phnom Penh and forcibly evicted local residents in order to make way for a development he has named ‘China Town’.

The government’s decision to give the green light for Oknha Mong Port demonstrates considerable confidence in a man previously subject to allegations of drug trafficking. Claims that there was more to Mong Reththy’s import-export business than met the eye first surfaced in April 1997, when officials in Sihanoukville seized seven tons of marijuana from containers labelled as rubber. Newspapers reported that documents taken during the seizure bore stamps and seals of a company belonging to Mong Reththy. In media interviews Mong Reththy denied any involvement.

Secretary of State at the Ministry of Interior Ho Sok, a member of the CPP’s Funcinpec coalition partner, led the investigation into Mong Reththy’s alleged connection with the marijuana. His announcement that a court was preparing an arrest warrant for the tycoon prompted Hun Sen to comment that anyone attempting to arrest Mong Reththy had better “wear a steel helmet”. In July 1997, during the coup in which Hun Sen ousted his Funcinpec co-prime minister Prince Norodom Ranariddh, Ho Sok was detained by CPP forces and murdered. The investigation into Mong Reththy’s dealings proceeded no further.

Mong Reththy has continued to deny any connection with drug trafficking. In an interview with a local newspaper in 2004, he said “I was accused of planting and smuggling marijuana. I have tried to ignore it. I have never even smoked a cigarette in my life, so how could I do business like that? I only do what is legal”.

Global Witness wrote to both Mong Reththy and Hun Sen to ask them for their comment on the reports of drug trafficking. As this report went to print, Hun Sen had not replied, however Mong Reththy’s lawyer responded by e-mail as follows:

“We have received the inquiry from your office related to Mr Mong Reththy and he is pleased to receive it. Mr Mong has asked us to inform you that he is unable to give Global Witness a written statement BUT he is willing to interview with a Global Witness representative in Phnom Penh or in London. If you have any further inquiry, please do not hesitate to contact us.”

Global Witness accepted the invitation to take part in an interview with Mong Reththy, and proposed a tape-recorded discussion over the telephone. At the time of the report’s publication, Mong Reththy’s lawyer had not responded to this proposal.
Box 19: Special Deliveries

According to members of his staff, in March 2005 Hak Mao received US$100,000 for transporting 60,000 bottles of Hennessy cognac from Oknha Mong Port to the InterContinental Hotel in Phnom Penh. The InterContinental Hotel building previously belonged to Teng Bunma, a tycoon famous for shooting out the tyres of an aeroplane after the airline mislaid his bags. However, hotel staff told Global Witness in 2005 that ownership had passed to Hun To, the nephew of the prime minister.

As of September 2006, the bar at the InterContinental Hotel stocked three different Hennessy cognacs. Top of the range was the Hennessy Paradis, weighing in at US$35 per measure or US$980 per 70 cl bottle. Global Witness does not know which type of Hennessy cognac Hak Mao was asked to deliver to the hotel. At InterContinental prices, however, the retail value of 60,000 bottles of Hennessy Paradis would be close to US$5.9 million.

Hennessy’s official distributor, Attwood, runs a large shop retailing duty free liquor in a building next to the InterContinental Hotel. In January 2007 Global Witness wrote to both Attwood and Hennessy companies to ask if they were aware of the evidence of cognac smuggling, but has not received a response from either firm. There is no suggestion by Global Witness that Hennessy is involved in the smuggling of its products, or that the InterContinental Hotels Group is implicated in any way.

In December 2006 Global Witness staff observed a truck bearing the Hennessy logo leaving a warehouse on Street 430, one block south of the InterContinental Hotel. Two large green military-style trucks parked outside this depot were both labelled ‘LM’, indicating that they were part of the Long Meng Group, a smuggling operation run by members of the police which is profiled in Box 20. Global Witness has written to both Attwood and the InterContinental Hotel to ask them if they have any connection with these premises, but has not yet received a reply from either company.
5. The Bottom Line – Hak Mao’s Income and Expenditure

Assuming an average return of US$1,100 per truck for both timber and smuggled goods and ignoring lucrative one-off deals like the Hennessy delivery, Hak Mao’s basic monthly takings could be in the region of US$171,600-US$228,800, depending on whether he has just 12 trucks or all 16 in operation. Hak Mao’s staff claim that Brigade 70’s illegal timber and contraband delivery services generate average profits of US$1,500-US$5,000 per day.436

One Brigade 70 source told Global Witness that Hak Mao pays a cut of his earnings – at least US$30,000 per month – to the unit itself and that he effectively underwrites its existence. These funds are said to cover soldiers’ food and travel as well as parties for its officer corps.437 An associate of Hak Mao provides more detailed information that broadly corroborates this account but suggests that the $30,000 is in fact split between Brigade 70 and the Bodyguard Unit, with the latter receiving the larger share.438

According to this source, Hak Mao’s basic monthly contributions to Brigade 70 and the Bodyguard Unit are calculated according to the number of trucks he is using at any one time.438 At the start of 2006 he was paying US$1,000 per vehicle per calendar month towards the operations of Brigade 70 and the same amount to the Bodyguard Unit commander Hing Bun Heang – a combined outlay of US$24,000-US$32,000.438 Global Witness believes that the share paid to Hing Bun Heang is intended for Bodyguard Unit operations, although it is possible that some of the money augments the general’s private bank accounts.

In mid 2006 however, Hak Mao became concerned that he might be in line for promotion to two star major general, the same rank as Brigade 70 commander Mao Sophan.438 One brigade being too small for two major generals, the extra star might necessitate Hak Mao transferring to the army headquarters and thereby losing his capacity to run the unit’s trafficking businesses.438 Coincidentally or otherwise, it was around this time that Hak Mao upped his monthly payments to Hing Bun Heang to US$1,700 per truck or US$20,400-US$27,200 in total.438 As this report went to print, it remained unclear whether or not Hak Mao had succeeded in evading promotion.

The figures available suggest that the overall annual turnover of Hak Mao’s operations could be in the region of US$2 million and US$2.75 million; with around 60% coming via transportation of illegally-logged timber and the other 40% from delivering contraband. Of this, between US$388,000 and US$518,400 is financing Hun Sen’s two most important military units, Brigade 70 and the Bodyguard Unit.
Box 20: Long Meng Group

In the course of investigating Hak Mao and Brigade 70, Global Witness also gathered information on a rival syndicate run by a colonel in the economic police named Long Meng. According to officials in Koh Kong Province, Long Meng has been active in the business since around 2000, arranging delivery of smuggled goods in much the same manner as Hak Mao. He manages a fleet of at least 20 large trucks, which are painted military green in the style of the Brigade 70 vehicles. Each truck carries an identification plaque in the front windscreen which begins with the letters ‘LM’.

Long Meng’s group initially took up the slack left by Hak Mao’s switch from Sre Ambel to Mong Reththy’s port in 2004. In March 2006 however, Global Witness found ‘LM’ trucks parked at Oknha Mong Port, suggesting that the Long Meng group may have expanded its zone of operations. During the same aerial survey, Global Witness found a cargo vessel labelled with the Long Meng ‘LM’ logo docking alongside a loaded barge sailing under a Thai flag just off the coast from Keo Phos.

During investigations in December 2006 and January 2007, Global Witness found Long Meng trucks in convoys of up to 25 vehicles transporting goods along National Road 4, which connects Phnom Penh to ports on the coast.
CONCLUSION

Eight years after Prime Minister Hun Sen pledged to stamp out forest crime, illegal logging continues to erode Cambodia’s most valuable forests. Areas such as Prey Long remain seriously at risk.

More than ever, large-scale illegal logging operations, such as the ones described in this report, are the preserve of a relatively small number of people who are relatives or friends of the prime minister or other senior officials. Dy Chouch, Seng Keang and Khun Thong have been a fixture in Cambodia’s illegal logging sector for the past decade. Their careers show how, despite a forestry reform process launched by the prime minister himself, elite families have maintained, and even strengthened, their grip on the illegal logging industry.

The responsibility of Hun Sen and his ministers goes beyond allowing their families to log illegally, however. The job auction at the Forest Administration demonstrates that institutionalised corruption is driven from the highest levels of the government. By allowing and in some cases encouraging state institutions to generate money through extortion and other types of crime, senior officials are exacerbating the damage to Cambodia’s forests and the country’s overall development prospects.

The example of Brigade 70, meanwhile, shows how intimately Hun Sen’s personal powerbase is connected to organised crime. Brigade 70’s prominent role in timber trafficking and smuggling, as with elite families’ dominance of illegal logging, reflects a wider consolidation of power in Cambodia by Hun Sen and his allies.

Addressing these problems requires holding the most powerful criminals accountable to the law. There can be little doubt that a handful of competently investigated and prosecuted cases against senior officials, their relatives and associates would have a far greater impact on abuse of power and corruption than new legislation, important though this is.

The stakes in the fight against corruption have been raised recently by the discovery of oil and gas reserves off the coast of Cambodia. The country will soon be earning hundreds of millions of dollars from offshore oil and gas extraction, something that should be a cause for celebration in a country that remains heavily dependent on overseas aid. However, the precedent offered by Cambodia’s forest sector is hardly encouraging. Given the entrenched corruption in government, the oil discovery poses as much a threat as an opportunity. Under current conditions, Cambodia has the potential to follow the example of countries such as Angola, where a super-rich elite, bloated by oil revenues, rules with little regard for the interests of an impoverished population.

Senior officials’ vested interests in the status quo mean that change can only be driven by strong pressure from outside the government. Ideally this would be led by ordinary Cambodians citizens and civil society organisations. However, in the current political climate, in which those who speak out against abuses are threatened or attacked, civil society in Cambodia is not robust enough to play this role on its own. Those with the greatest leverage over the government remain the international donor community.

In the past decade and a half, international donors have been reluctant to use this leverage and have helped legitimise the entrenchment of a kleptocracy. It is not too late for donors to start playing a more constructive role, however. At the forthcoming 2007 Consultative Group meeting donors need to redefine the terms of their engagement with their Cambodian counterparts. As a first step, they must directly link future disbursements of non-humanitarian aid to reforms that make the Cambodian government more accountable to its own citizens.
APPENDIX 1: CAMBODIA’S TYCOON-SENATORS/CRONYOMETER REFERENCES

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1. Permits to build and operate casinos: Personal communication from a researcher, 2006.
2. The three shareholders of Wuzhishan as Liu Wei, Lao Meng Khin and Ly Yong Phat: Cambodia Daily, 29 March 2006.
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Men Saran
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Cambodia’s Family Trees: Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fishery, Cambodia, 2006.

Cambodia’s Family Trees: Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fishery, Cambodia, 2006.

APPENDIX 2: CAMBODIA’S FAMILY TREES

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1 Global Witness wrote a letter to Chan Saran in February 2007 to ask for his comments on the main issues raised in this report as involve or relate to him. The time of the report's publication, Global Witness had not received a response. For information on the content of this letter to Chan Saran please contact Global Witness via mail@globalwitness.org.

2 Global Witness wrote a letter to Tuy Sophan in February 2007 to ask for his comments on the main issues raised in this report as involve or relate to him. At the time of the report's publication, Global Witness had not received a response. For information on the content of this letter to Tuy Sophan please contact Global Witness via mail@globalwitness.org.

3 Global Witness wrote a letter to Heng Bun Heang in February 2007 to ask for his comments on the main issues raised in this report as involve or relate to him. At the time of the report's publication, Global Witness had not received a response. For information on the content of this letter to Heng Bun Heang please contact Global Witness via mail@globalwitness.org.

4 Global Witness wrote a letter to Seng Kok Heang in February 2007 to ask for his comments on the main issues raised in this report as involve or relate to him. At the time of the report's publication, Global Witness had not received a response. For information on the content of this letter to Seng Kok Heang please contact Global Witness via mail@globalwitness.org.

5 Global Witness wrote a letter to Kong Khun Thong in February 2007 to ask for his comments on the main issues raised in this report as involve or relate to him. At the time of the report's publication, Global Witness had not received a response. For information on the content of this letter to Kong Khun Thong please contact Global Witness via mail@globalwitness.org.

6 Global Witness wrote a letter to Seng Kaok in February 2007 to ask for her comments on the main issues raised in this report as involve or relate to her. At the time of the report's publication, Global Witness had not received a response. For information on the content of this letter to Seng Kaok please contact Global Witness via mail@globalwitness.org.

7 Global Witness wrote a letter to Khun Thong in February 2007 to ask for his comments on the main issues raised in this report as involve or relate to him. At the time of the report's publication, Global Witness had not received a response. For information on the content of this letter to Khun Thong please contact Global Witness via mail@globalwitness.org.

11 Global Witness wrote a letter to Cheam Yeap in February 2007 to ask for his comments on the main issues raised in this report as involve or relate to him. At the time of the report's publication, Global Witness had not received a response. For information on the content of this letter to Cheam Yeap please contact Global Witness via mail@globalwitness.org.

13 Global Witness wrote a letter to Hak Mao in February 2007 to ask for his comments on the main issues raised in this report as involve or relate to him. At the time of the report's publication, Global Witness had not received a response. For information on the content of this letter to Hak Mao please contact Global Witness via mail@globalwitness.org.

15 Global Witness wrote a letter to Sa Sotha in February 2007 to ask for his comments on the main issues raised in this report as involve or relate to him. At the time of the report's publication, Global Witness had not received a response. For information on the content of this letter to Sa Sotha please contact Global Witness via mail@globalwitness.org.

16 Global Witness wrote a letter to Mong Reththy in February 2007 to ask for his comments on the main issues raised in this report as involve or relate to him. Mong Reththy's lawyer responded, declining to provide a written response, instead offering a verbal interview. Global Witness accepted Mong Reththy's advice and at the time of writing had not heard from Mong Reththy's lawyer. For information on the content of this letter to Mong Reththy please contact Global Witness via mail@globalwitness.org.

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36 Personal communication from a former member of staff at UNOHCHR, 2006; Lor Huot Radsady and Green Elite Group Co. Ltd declined to provide a written response, but agreed to be interviewed for Global Witness investigations, 2005.

40 Global Witness wrote a letter to Leang Vouch Chhin in February 2007 to ask for her comments on the main issues raised in this report as involve or relate to her. At the time of the report's publication, Global Witness had not received a response. For information on the content of this letter to Leang Vouch Chhin please contact Global Witness via mail@globalwitness.org.


49 Global Witness wrote a letter to Hun To please contact Global Witness via mail@globalwitness.org.

53 Global Witness wrote letters to Leang Vouch Chhin in February 2007 to ask for her comments on the main issues raised in this report as involve or relate to her. At the time of the report's publication, Global Witness had not received a response. For information on the content of this letter to Leang Vouch Chhin please contact Global Witness via mail@globalwitness.org.

59 For information on the content of this letter to Khun To please contact Global Witness via mail@globalwitness.org.


relate to the company. At the time of the report’s publication, Global Witness had not received a response. For information on the content of this letter to Coleym International please contact Global Witness via mail@globalwitness.org.

119 Sub-decree on the withdrawal of red land concessions for rubber plantation, 17 August 2001.

120 Field observations; and report ‘Cambodia: Conflict and Agriculture: An Assessment’, November 2004.

121 Comment from a researcher at the MAFF, 11 October 2003.

122 Letter from MAFF Minister Chan Sarun to the Forest Administration, 12 November 2005.

123 Letter from MAFF Minister Chan Sarun to MAFF, 31 October 2003.

124 Prom Tola and Bruce McKenney, Trading Forest Products in Cambodia: Challenges, Threats and Opportunities for Revenue, Cambodian Development Resource Institute, 2003, p. ii.


126 Interviews with local residents, 2005 and 2006; interviews with NGOs, 2005

127 Global Witness wrote a letter to Keo Sarim Group, 18 February 2007 to ask for his comments on the main issues raised in this report as involve or relate to him. At the time of the report’s publication, Global Witness had not received a response. For information on the content of this letter to Keo Sarim please contact Global Witness via mail@globalwitness.org.


129 Letter from Coleym to the Forest Administration, 17 May 2004.

130 For information on the content of this letter to Sath Chanthan please contact Global Witness via mail@globalwitness.org.

131 Global Witness wrote a letter to Sath Chanthan in February 2007 to ask for his comments on the main issues raised in this report as involve or relate to him. At the time of the report’s publication, Global Witness had not received a response. For information on the content of this letter to Sath Chanthan please contact Global Witness via mail@globalwitness.org.

132 Global Witness wrote a letter to Ngin Thong in February 2007 to ask for his comments on the main issues raised in this report as involve or relate to him. At the time of the report’s publication, Global Witness had not received a response. For information on the content of this letter to Ngin Thong please contact Global Witness via mail@globalwitness.org.

133 Global Witness wrote a letter to Ngim Vannah in February 2007 to ask for his comments on the main issues raised in this report as involve or relate to him. At the time of the report’s publication, Global Witness had not received a response. For information on the content of this letter to Ngim Vannah please contact Global Witness via mail@globalwitness.org.

134 Interview with local residents, 2005 and 2006.

135 Interview with factory representatives, 2005 and 2006.

136 Global Witness wrote a letter to the Forest Administration, 11 November 2003.

137 CAMBODIA’S FAMILY TREES

138 Global Witness wrote a letter to Ngin Thong and Lia Chun Hua, 19 August 2002.


141 Interview with a local resident, 2005.

142 Field observations and interviews with local residents, 2005 and 2006.

143violent Human Rights Abuse: The Case of Cambodia, a Human Rights Perspective, Annex 1, Rights and Rights of the World 2002; interview with a close associate of Seng Keang, 2005; interviews with local residents and NGOs, 2005.

144Global Witness wrote a letter to Keo Sarim Group, Cambodia – A National Biodiversity Prospectus, KICN, 1997, p. 36.


146Global Witness wrote a letter to Neak Sok Nai please contact Global Witness via mail@globalwitness.org.

147Letter from MAFF Minister Chan Sarun to the Forest Administration, 12 November 2005.

148Prom Tola, ‘Cambodia’s Family Trees’

149Global Witness wrote a letter to Sath Chanthan in February 2007 to ask for his comments on the main issues raised in this report as involve or relate to him. At the time of the report’s publication, Global Witness had not received a response. For information on the content of this letter to Sath Chanthan please contact Global Witness via mail@globalwitness.org.

150Personal communication from a researcher at the MAFF, 11 October 2003.


152Letter from MAFF Minister Chan Sarun to the Forest Administration, 22 November 2005.

153Global Witness wrote a letter to Neak Sok Nai in February 2007 to ask for his comments on the main issues raised in this report as involve or relate to him. At the time of the report’s publication, Global Witness had not received a response. For information on the content of this letter to Neak Sok Nai please contact Global Witness via mail@globalwitness.org.

154Global Witness wrote a letter to Ngim Vannah in February 2007 to ask for his comments on the main issues raised in this report as involve or relate to him. At the time of the report’s publication, Global Witness had not received a response. For information on the content of this letter to Ngim Vannah please contact Global Witness via mail@globalwitness.org.

155Field observations and interviews with local residents, 2005 and 2006.

156Field observations, 2005 and 2006.

157Field observations, 2006.

158Field observations and interviews with NGO workers, 2005.

159Interviews with local residents, 2004 and 2005.

160Interviews with local residents, 2004 and 2005.

161Interviews with timber traders and local residents, 2005.

162Interviews with local residents, 2005.

163Field observations and interviews with local residents, 2005 and 2006.

164Field observations, 2004; interviews with local residents and factory staff, 2005.

165Field observations and interviews with local residents, 2005 and 2006.

166Field observations, 2005; personal communication from an SGM representative, 2005.


168Interviews with local residents, 2005.

169Interviews with an employee of Seng Keang, 2005.

170Field observations, 2005; interview with an employee of Seng Keang, 2005.

171Field observations, 2005; interviews with sawmill workers, 2005.

172Field observations, 2005 and 2006; interviews with local residents, 2005.

173Field observations, 2005 and 2006; interviews with local residents and officials, 2005.

174Global Witness wrote a letter to So Sovann in February 2007 to ask for his comments on the main issues raised in this report as involve or relate to him. At the time of the report’s publication, Global Witness had not received a response. For information on the content of this letter to So Sovann please contact Global Witness via mail@globalwitness.org.


176Letter from Mennon to Global Witness, 15 February 2007 to ask for his comments on the main issues raised in this report as involve or relate to him. At the time of the report’s publication, Global Witness had not received a response. For information on the content of this letter to Mennon please contact Global Witness via mail@globalwitness.org.

177Global Witness wrote a letter to the Forest Administration, 16 May 2006; China Customs (for 2004 and 2005).


179Global Witness wrote a letter to Neak Sok Nai in February 2007 to ask for his comments on the main issues raised in this report as involve or relate to him. At the time of the report’s publication, Global Witness had not received a response. For information on the content of this letter to Neak Sok Nai please contact Global Witness via mail@globalwitness.org.

180Global Witness wrote a letter to Neak Sok Nai in February 2007 to ask for his comments on the main issues raised in this report as involve or relate to him. At the time of the report’s publication, Global Witness had not received a response. For information on the content of this letter to Neak Sok Nai please contact Global Witness via mail@globalwitness.org.

181Global Witness wrote a letter to Neak Sok Nai in February 2007 to ask for his comments on the main issues raised in this report as involve or relate to him. At the time of the report’s publication, Global Witness had not received a response. For information on the content of this letter to Neak Sok Nai please contact Global Witness via mail@globalwitness.org.
245 Global Witness wrote to Men Pha in February 2007 to ask for his comments on the main issues raised in this report as involve or relate to him. At the time of the report’s publication, Global Witness had not received a response. For information on the content of this letter to Men Pha please contact Global Witness via mail@globalwitness.org.

246 Global Witness wrote a letter to Chet Ra in February 2007 to ask for his comments on the main issues raised in this report as involve or relate to him. At the time of the report’s publication, Global Witness had not received a response. For information on the content of this letter to Chet Ra please contact Global Witness via mail@globalwitness.org.

247 Personal communication from a former official, 2005.
248 Interviews with local residents, 2003 and 2005.
249 Interviews with local officials, 2005.
250 Personal communication from member of UNOHCHR staff, 2005.
251 Personal communication from member of UNOHCHR staff, 2005.
252 Personal communication from member of UNOHCHR staff, 2005.

253 Interview with RCAF officers, 2001 and 2005.
254 Interviews with local residents, loggers and businessmen, 2005.
255 Interview with a Brigade 70 officer, 2004.
256 Personal communication via a former official, 2005 and 2006.
257 Personal communication from a confidential source, 2005.
258 Personal communication from a former official, 2005.
259 Personal communication from a former official, 2006.
260 Global Witness wrote a letter to Lien Heang in February 2007 to ask for his comments on the main issues raised in this report as involve or relate to him. At the time of the report’s publication, Global Witness had not received a response. For information on the content of this letter to Lien Heang please contact Global Witness via mail@globalwitness.org.

261 Global Witness wrote a letter to Nong Sophan in February 2007 to ask for his comments on the main issues raised in this report as involve or relate to him. At the time of the report’s publication, Global Witness had not received a response. For information on the content of this letter to Nong Sophan please contact Global Witness via mail@globalwitness.org.

262 Global Witness wrote a letter to Nehm Runtha in April 2007 to ask for his comments on the main issues raised in this report as involve or relate to him. At the time of the report’s publication, Global Witness had not received a response. For information on the content of this letter to Nehm Runtha please contact Global Witness via mail@globalwitness.org.

264 Global Witness wrote a letter to Men Pha in February 2007 to ask for his comments on the main issues raised in this report as involve or relate to him. At the time of the report’s publication, Global Witness had not received a response. For information on the content of this letter to Men Pha please contact Global Witness via mail@globalwitness.org.

265 Global Witness wrote a letter to Chet Ra in February 2007 to ask for his comments on the main issues raised in this report as involve or relate to him. At the time of the report’s publication, Global Witness had not received a response. For information on the content of this letter to Chet Ra please contact Global Witness via mail@globalwitness.org.

266 Global Witness wrote to the Australian and Chinese embassies in Cambodia and its respective foreign affairs minister to ask for details of their defense co-operation agreements with Cambodia. March 2007. At the time of the report’s publication, Global Witness had not received responses to these letters.

267 Global Witness wrote a letter to Mao Sophan in February 2007 to ask for his comments on the main issues raised in this report as involve or relate to him. At the time of the report’s publication, Global Witness had not received a response. For information on the content of this letter to Mao Sophan please contact Global Witness via mail@globalwitness.org.

268 Global Witness wrote a letter to Kun Kim in February 2007 to ask for his comments on the main issues raised in this report as involve or relate to him. At the time of the report’s publication, Global Witness had not received a response. For information on the content of this letter to Kun Kim please contact Global Witness via mail@globalwitness.org.

269 Interview with police and FA staff, 2001.
270 Interview with former FA officers, 2004 and 2005.
271 Global Witness wrote to a Brigade 70 officer, 2005; field observations 2004 and 2005.
273 Interview with local residents and timber traders, 2005.
274 Interview with FA and RCAF officers, 2004.
275 Field observations, 2006.
276 Global Witness wrote to Nguon Meas in February 2007 for his comments on the main issues raised in this report as involve or relate to him. At the time of the report’s publication, Global Witness had not received a response. For information on the content of this letter to Nguon Meas please contact Global Witness via mail@globalwitness.org.

277 Interview with local residents, loggers and businessmen, 2005.
278 Global Witness wrote to a Brigade 70 officer, 2005; field observations 2004 and 2005. At the time of the report’s publication, Global Witness had not received a response. For information on the content of this letter to a Brigade 70 officer please contact Global Witness via mail@globalwitness.org.


282 Field observations, interviews with local residents, loggers and RCAF officers, 2005.
283 Personal communication from a former official, 2006.
284 Interviews with RCAF officers, 2004; field observations 2004 and 2005. At the time of the report’s publication, Global Witness had not received a response. For information on the content of this letter to Toul Neang please contact Global Witness via mail@globalwitness.org.

289 Personal communication from a confidential source, 2007.
290 Interviews with Seng Keang Import Export Co. Ltd in Sandan in February 2007 to ask for his comments on the main issues raised in this report as involve or relate to him. At the time of the report’s publication, Global Witness had not received a response. For information on the content of this letter to Seng Keang please contact Global Witness via mail@globalwitness.org.

291 Personal communication from a confidential source, 2007.
292 Interview with Seng Keang to the governor of Kampot Province, 18 August 2005.
293 Personal communication from a confidential source, 2006; interview with an official, 2006.
294 Interviews with local residents, 2004 and 2005.
295 Personal communication from NGOs working on human rights issues in Cambodia, 2004.
296 Interview with an official, 2005.
298 Personal communication from member of staff at UNOHCHR, 2006; field observations 2004 and 2005.
299 Personal communication from a former official, 2005 and 2006.
300 Interviews with RCAF officers, timber traders, local residents and officials, 2004; field observations 2004.
301 Interviews with RCAF officers, timber traders, local residents and officials, 2004; field observations 2004.
302 Field observations, interviews with local residents, 2004 and 2005; interviews with police, military police, FA and RCAF officers, 2004; field observations, 2005.
303 Interviews with brigades, 2005.
304 Interviews with brigades, 2005.
305 Interviews with brigades, 2005.
306 Interviews with brigades, 2005.
307 Global Witness wrote a letter to Mao Sophan in February 2007 to ask for his comments on the main issues raised in this report as involve or relate to him. At the time of the report’s publication, Global Witness had not received a response. For information on the content of this letter to Mao Sophan please contact Global Witness via mail@globalwitness.org.

308 Personal communication from member of UNOHCHR staff, 2005; personal communication from a human rights worker, 2006.
309 Personal communication from a former Brigade 70 officer, 2004.
310 Personal communication from member of UNOHCHR staff, 2005; personal communication from a human rights worker, 2006.
311 Personal communication from member of UNOHCHR staff, 2005; personal communication from a human rights worker, 2006.
312 Personal communication from a human rights worker, 2006.
313 Personal communication from a human rights worker, 2006.
314 Personal communication from a human rights worker, 2006.
315 Personal communication from a human rights worker, 2006.
316 Personal communication from a human rights worker, 2006.
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326 Personal communication from a human rights worker, 2006.
327 Personal communication from a human rights worker, 2006.
328 Personal communication from a human rights worker, 2006.
329 Personal communication from a human rights worker, 2006.
41 Personal communication from a researcher, 2004.
42 Interviews with NGOs representative, 2004.
43 Interviews with local residents, 2003 and 2004.
44 Interviews with a Brigade 70 officer, 2004.
46 Notice placed in newspaper by Khan kim, on the street in front of the InterContinental Hotel, Phnom Penh, February 30, 2006.
47 Notice placed in newspaper by Khan kim, on the street in front of the InterContinental Hotel, Phnom Penh, February 30, 2006.
48 Interviews with local residents, 2004.
49 Field observations; interviews with monks, 2002 and 2004.
51 Notice placed in newspaper by Khan kim, on the street in front of the InterContinental Hotel, Phnom Penh, February 30, 2006.
53 Global Witness wrote a letter to Chea Sam Ang in March 2007 to ask for his comments on the main issues raised in this report and to relate to him. At the time of the report’s publication, Global Witness had not received a response. For information on the content of this letter to Chea Sam Ang please contact Global Witness via mail@globalwitness.org.
54 Interviews with an official, 2004; interviews with local residents, 2005.
55 Interviews with local residents, 2003 and 2004.
56 Notice placed in newspaper by Khan kim, on the street in front of the InterContinental Hotel, Phnom Penh, February 30, 2006.
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58 Interview with a Brigade 70 officer, 2004.
60 Notice placed in newspaper by Khan kim, on the street in front of the InterContinental Hotel, Phnom Penh, February 30, 2006.
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63 Interviews with local residents, 2003 and 2004.
64 Interviews with an official, 2004; interviews with local residents, 2005.
65 Interviews with local residents, 2003 and 2004.
66 Notice placed in newspaper by Khan kim, on the street in front of the InterContinental Hotel, Phnom Penh, February 30, 2006.
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Global Witness is a UK-based non-governmental organisation which investigates the role of natural resources in funding conflict and corruption around the world.

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Elitus Kleptocraticus / *n*

Only responds to asset freeze.
Normal habitat includes lavish property developments, but often also found in spas, banks and casinos in prominent luxury locations such as Zurich, London, Paris, Geneva, Monaco, New York, Singapore, and increasingly, Beijing.
Unfortunately, behavioural problems usually ignored by species *Donorus pedestriensis.*